U.S. v. Georgia

Citation546 U.S. 151,126 S. Ct. 877,163 L. Ed. 2d 650
Decision Date10 January 2006
Docket NumberNo. 04-1203.,04-1203.
PartiesUNITED STATES <I>v.</I> GEORGIA ET AL.
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Goodman, petitioner in No. 04-1236, is a paraplegic who sued respondent state defendants and others, challenging the conditions of his confinement in a Georgia prison under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. As relevant here, the Federal District Court dismissed the § 1983 claims because Goodman's allegations were vague, and granted respondents summary judgment on the Title II money damages claims because they were barred by state sovereign immunity. The United States, petitioner in No. 04-1203, intervened on appeal. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment as to the Title II claims, but reversed the § 1983 ruling, finding that Goodman had alleged facts sufficient to support a limited number of Eighth Amendment claims against state agents and should be permitted to amend his complaint. This Court granted certiorari to decide the validity of Title II's abrogation of state sovereign immunity.

Held: Insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. Pp. 157-160.

(a) Because this Court assumes that the Eleventh Circuit correctly held that Goodman had alleged actual Eighth Amendment violations for purposes of § 1983, and because respondents do not dispute Goodman's claim that this same conduct violated Title II, Goodman's Title II money damages claims were evidently based, at least in part, on conduct that independently violated § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. No one doubts that § 5 grants Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions by creating private remedies against the States for actual violations of those provisions. This includes the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity by authorizing private suits for damages against the States. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit erred in dismissing those of Goodman's claims based on conduct that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 157-159.

(b) Once Goodman's complaint is amended, the lower courts will be best situated to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis, (1) which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such conduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity in such contexts is nevertheless valid. P. 159.

120 Fed. Appx. 785, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined, post, p. 160.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT.

Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for the United States in No. 04-1203. With him on the brief were Acting Assistant Attorney General Schlozman, Patricia A. Millett, David K. Flynn, and Sarah E. Harrington.

Samuel R. Bagenstos argued the cause for petitioner in No. 04-1236. With him on the briefs were Drew S. Days III, Beth S. Brinkmann, and Seth M. Galanter.

Gregory A. Castanias argued the cause for respondents in both cases. With him on the brief were Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General of Georgia, Kathleen M. Pacious, Deputy Attorney General, John C. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and David E. Langford, Assistant Attorney General.

Gene C. Schaerr argued the cause and filed a brief for the State of Tennessee et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance in both cases. With him on the brief were Paul G. Summers, Attorney General of Tennessee, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Linda T. Coberly, E. King Poor, Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Troy King of Alabama, John W. Suthers of Colorado, M. Jane Brady of Delaware, Lawrence G. Wasden of Idaho, Mike Cox of Michigan, Brian Sandoval of Nevada, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, W. A. Drew Edmondson of Oklahoma Hardy Myers of Oregon, Rob McKenna of Washington, and Patrick J. Crank of Wyoming.

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether a disabled inmate in a state prison may sue the State for money damages under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA or Act), 104 Stat. 337, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. II).

I
A

Title II of the ADA provides that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." § 12132 (2000 ed.). A "`qualified individual with a disability'" is defined as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." § 12131(2). The Act defines "`public entity'" to include "any State or local government" and "any department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a State," § 12131(1). We have previously held that this term includes state prisons. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Title II authorizes suits by private citizens for money damages against public entities that violate § 12132. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (incorporating by reference 29 U.S.C. § 794a).

In enacting the ADA, Congress "invoke[d] the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4). Moreover, the Act provides that "[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an action in [a] Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction for a violation of this chapter." § 12202. We have accepted this latter statement as an unequivocal expression of Congress's intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity. See Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363-364 (2001).

B

Petitioner in No. 04-1236, Tony Goodman, is a paraplegic inmate in the Georgia prison system who, at all relevant times, was housed at the Georgia State Prison in Reidsville. After filing numerous administrative grievances in the state prison system, Goodman filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia challenging the conditions of his confinement. He named as defendants the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections (state defendants) and several individual prison officials. He brought claims under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the ADA, and other provisions not relevant here, seeking both injunctive relief and money damages against all defendants.

Goodman's pro se complaint and subsequent filings in the District Court included many allegations, both grave and trivial, regarding the conditions of his confinement in the Reidsville prison. Among his more serious allegations, he claimed that he was confined for 23-to-24 hours per day in a 12-by-3-foot cell in which he could not turn his wheelchair around. He alleged that the lack of accessible facilities rendered him unable to use the toilet and shower without assistance, which was often denied. On multiple occasions, he asserted, he had injured himself in attempting to transfer from his wheelchair to the shower or toilet on his own, and, on several other occasions, he had been forced to sit in his own feces and urine while prison officials refused to assist him in cleaning up the waste. He also claimed that he had been denied physical therapy and medical treatment, and denied access to virtually all prison programs and services on account of his disability.

The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that the allegations in the complaint were vague and constituted insufficient notice pleading as to Goodman's § 1983 claims. It therefore dismissed the § 1983 claims against all defendants without providing Goodman an opportunity to amend his complaint. The District Court also dismissed his Title II claims against all individual defendants. Later, after our decision in Garrett, the District Court granted summary judgment to the state defendants on Goodman's Title II claims for money damages, holding that those claims were barred by state sovereign immunity.

Goodman appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The United States, petitioner in No. 04-1203, intervened to defend the constitutionality of Title II's abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the District Court had erred in dismissing all of Goodman's § 1983 claims, because Goodman's multiple pro se filings in the District Court alleged facts sufficient to support "a limited number of Eighth-Amendment claims under § 1983" against certain individual defendants. App. A to Pet. for Cert. in No. 04-1236, p. 17a, judgt. order reported at 120 Fed. Appx. 785 (2004). The Court of Appeals held that the District Court should have given Goodman leave to amend his complaint to develop three Eighth Amendment claims relating to his conditions of confinement:

"First, Goodman alleges that he is not able to move his wheelchair in his cell. If Goodman is to be believed, this effectively amounts to some form of total restraint twenty-three to twenty-four hours-a-day without penal justification. Second, Goodman has alleged several...

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