U.S.A. v. Gochis

• Decision Date: 11 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-4064,00-4064
• Citation: 256 F.3d 739
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2001) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. Gochis, Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 739

256 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2001)

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. Gochis, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 00-4064

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

Argued April 4, 2001

Decided July 11, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 98 CR 47--Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

Before Coffey, Manion, and Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judges.

Manion, Circuit Judge.

Michael Gochis was tried before a magistrate judge, and convicted by a jury of three counts of a Class A misdemeanor. The district court vacated the judgment of conviction and ordered a new trial, concluding that because the magistrate judge had failed to explain to Gochis his right to trial, judgment, and sentencing by a district judge, the magistrate judge lacked the authority to preside over the trial. The government appeals, arguing that the magistrate judge had the authority to preside over Gochis's trial because Gochis and his counsel filed a written consent to be tried before the magistrate judge, and that Gochis did not suffer any prejudice as a result of the magistrate judge's omission. We agree, and thus reverse the district court.

I.

Michael Gochis is a former steward for Local 705 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. On January 22, 1998, he was charged with three counts of threatening and using violence against another union member, in violation of 29 U.S.C. sec. 530, a Class A misdemeanor.¹ Pursuant to the local rules of the Northern District of Illinois, Gochis's case was randomly assigned to a magistrate judge.

On January 29, 1998, Gochis appeared without counsel before the magistrate judge for arraignment. At the magistrate judge's direction, the government's counsel read the charges against Gochis. Gochis acknowledged that he understood the charges, and he pleaded not guilty. Following Gochis's arraignment, the subject of the hearing was limited to the amount of his bond, and at that time the government's counsel advised Gochis that he was charged with crimes of violence and faced up to a year in prison on each count. The magistrate judge then advised Gochis that his case was "no insignificant matter" and that he should obtain counsel. The magistrate judge did not, however, explain to Gochis about his right to trial, judgment, and sentencing by a district judge as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(b)(2) (which requires the magistrate judge to inform the defendant at his initial appearance of his right to be tried by a district judge), and 18 U.S.C. sec. 3401(b) (which requires the magistrate judge to "carefully explain" to the defendant his right to a trial by a district judge).

After his initial arraignment, Gochis retained counsel. According to an affidavit filed by the government's coun sel, Gochis's attorney indicated that he had informed Gochis about his right to be tried and sentenced by a district judge, and that Gochis intended to waive that right, but not his right to a jury trial.²

On February 12, 1998, Gochis and his attorney appeared before the magistrate judge. Gochis was arraigned again, and he pleaded not guilty once more. But the magistrate judge again did not explain to Gochis his right to trial, judgment, and sentencing by a district judge.

Following the February 12 hearing, Gochis and his counsel signed and filed a consent form entitled "Consent to Proceed Before United States Magistrate in a Misdemeanor Case." Gochis's signature appears below the following paragraph that is presented in bold print:

I HEREBY: Waive (give up) my right to trial, judgment and sentencing before a United States district judge and I consent to trial, judgment, and sentencing before a United States magistrate.

Although the consent form also provided Gochis the options to waive his rights to a jury trial and to have thirty days to prepare for trial, he chose not to waive either. He requested and received a jury trial. The magistrate judge accepted assignment of the case. On December 7, 1998, Gochis sought a continuance of the trial date to permit substitution of counsel, and that request was granted.

Thereafter, the magistrate judge presided, without objection, over pre- trial, trial, post-trial and sentencing proceedings. The jury trial lasted three weeks and involved the testimony of 25 witnesses. The jury convicted Gochis of all three counts on February 2, 1999. The magistrate judge sentenced Gochis to concurrent terms of six months of impris onment followed by six months of work release and restitution. Gochis appealed his conviction and sentence to the district court.³ The government also appealed Gochis's sentence to the district court.

In appealing his conviction and sentence, Gochis never sought to withdraw his written consent to the magistrate judge's authority. In fact, his opening brief to the district court (filed on March 14, 2000) stated: "The parties con sented to the entry of a final judgment by Magistrate Thomas Rosemond on February 12, 1998." Thus, Gochis never challenged the magistrate judge's failure to admonish him of his right to be tried by an Article III judge until the district court raised the issue sua sponte.

Nevertheless, the district court vacated the judgment and ordered a new trial, concluding that because the magistrate judge had failed to explain to Gochis his right to be tried by a district judge, as required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. sec. 3401(b), the written consent was invalid and the magistrate judge lacked the authority to preside over the trial. United States v. Gochis, 196 F.R.D. 519 (N.D. Ill. 2000).⁴ The government appeals.

II.

On appeal, the government does not dispute that the magistrate judge did not explain to Gochis his right to trial, judgment, and sentencing by a district judge as required by 18 U.S.C. sec. 3401(b) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(b)(2). Rather, the government argues that the district court should not have automatically vacated a three-week trial and jury verdict simply because the magistrate judge did not explain to Gochis what he and his attorney already knew. In other words, the district court should not have imposed a per se reversible error rule on the magistrate judge's failure to literally comply with every letter of 18 U.S.C. sec. 3401(b) and Rule 58, without considering whether the magistrate judge's error was harmless. Instead, the government insists that the district court was obligated to apply Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) to the magistrate judge's omission to determine whether the error was harmless. This is a question of law subject to de novo review. See Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1999).

We agree with the government that the first order of business is to determine whether the magistrate judge's error was harmless according to Rule 52(a).⁵ Rule 52(a) provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." The Supreme Court has emphasized that "Rule 52 is, in every pertinent respect, as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress, and federal courts have no more discretion to disregard the Rule's mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory provisions." Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988). The rule "prohibits federal courts from granting relief based on errors that 'd[o] not affect substantial rights.'" Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 29 (1999). The Court has acknowledged that "on its face, Rule 52(a) admits of no broad exceptions to its applicability." United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 448 n. 11 (1986). There seems to be no valid reason for an exception to apply in this case.

As Rule 52(a) states, an error is "harmless" if it does not affect the defendant's "substantial rights." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). An error affects the defendant's substantial rights if it was "prejudicial," which means that the error "must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." Id. Applying Rule 52(a) in this case, the magistrate judge's omission was harmless if it did not affect Gochis's decision to waive his right to a trial before a district judge. Under a Rule 52(a) analysis, the government "bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice," id., and if the error was harmless, it must be disregarded.

In this case, there is no indication that Gochis has suffered any prejudice as a result of the magistrate judge's failure to admonish him about his right to a trial before a district judge. His primary concern was to have a jury trial, and he pointedly did not sign the portion of the consent form containing the jury waiver. Gochis has not alleged that he was actually ignorant of his right to a trial before a district judge.⁶ See United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 771 (7th Cir. 2001). And the district court did not find that Gochis's consent was not knowing and intelligent.⁷ In fact, Gochis has not alleged that if he was admonished by the magistrate judge, he would have had his case reassigned to a district judge. See id. Moreover, Gochis and his attorney signed and filed a consent form that explicitly advised him of his right to trial, judgment, and sentencing before a district judge.⁸ Additionally, the government's affidavit indicates that Gochis's first attorney had informed him of his right to be tried and sentenced by a district judge before he signed the consent form, and that Gochis intended to waive that right. Even though the trial occurred almost a year after Gochis filed his consent form, he never sought to withdraw his consent. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1984) ("The reference to the magistrate may be withdrawn at any time by the district court for good cause on its own motion or under extraordinary circumstances shown by...