U.S. v. Gold
| Decision Date | 16 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | NO. IP 99-110-CR H/F.,IP 99-110-CR H/F. |
| Citation | 77 F.Supp.2d 936 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Gary D. GOLD, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
James McKinley, Indiana Federal Community Defender, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A federal grand jury indicted defendant Gary D. Gold for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. Indianapolis police officers seized the firearm in question and arrested Gold after an officer stopped the car Gold was driving and issued a ticket for changing lanes without using his turn signal. After the officer stopped Gold's car, he ordered Gold to step out of his car so he could explain the ticket, and then started to frisk Gold for weapons. Gold ran, dropped the firearm and was arrested. Gold has moved to suppress all evidence, including the firearm, obtained by law enforcement after the vehicle stop. The court held an evidentiary hearing on November 4, 1999. Pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court now states its findings of fact and conclusions of law. As explained in detail below, the court grants Gold's motion to suppress because the officer did not have probable cause to stop Gold's car for the charged traffic violation.
In the evening of April 8, 1999, IPD Officer Thomas Feeney was parked in a parking lot near the intersection of Arlington Avenue and 21st Street on the east side of Indianapolis. IPD had received complaints about possible drug trafficking at a nearby house, and Officer Feeney and IPD Officers Cavanaugh and Hopkins were observing the house. Just before 9:00 p.m., the officers observed a late model blue Cadillac pull up in front of the house. The driver, who later turned out to be defendant Gold, stopped the Cadillac in front of the house so that the street was blocked. The driver and the passenger then got out of the Cadillac and walked up to the house, leaving the Cadillac's lights on and its engine running.
A few minutes later, the driver emerged from the house alone and returned to the Cadillac. The Cadillac pulled away from the house and began heading west on 21st Street. Officer Feeney began to follow the Cadillac so that he could check the license plate on the police computer. The driver stopped the Cadillac at the traffic light at 21st Street and Arlington Avenue.
As one approaches that intersection from the east, there are three marked lanes for westbound traffic. The left lane is for left turns south onto Arlington. The right and center lanes are simply normal traffic lanes. See Def. Ex. D (photograph of intersection from the west). The Cadillac was the first car stopped in the right westbound lane. Stopped next to it in the center lane was a pickup truck. Officer Feeney stopped his marked patrol car in the center lane directly behind the pickup truck.
The lane designations on westbound 21st Street change at the intersection with Arlington. West of the intersection, there are no broken white line markings to identify two separate lanes of westbound traffic. Instead, the pavement narrows quickly so that the westbound traffic must merge into one lane approximately 275 feet west of the intersection. The record before the court does not indicate that there are any signs warning westbound drivers that a "lane ends" or that they must merge into one lane.
Although the Cadillac was not signaling a turn, Officer Feeney was expecting the Cadillac to turn right, to go north on Arlington. When the light for westbound traffic on 21st Street turned green, however, both the Cadillac and the pickup truck drove straight through the intersection. The Cadillac accelerated rapidly. Without using a turn signal, the Cadillac pulled in front of the pickup truck as the westbound vehicles formed one lane of traffic.
Officer Feeney passed the pickup truck on the left and turned on his flashing lights to stop the Cadillac. The Cadillac immediately came to a stop on the shoulder of 21st Street in front of a house located at 5920 East 21st Street. The Cadillac's left tires came to a stop on the white line marking the edge of the traffic lane. Officer Feeney stopped his patrol car directly behind the Cadillac. His patrol car's headlights pointed at the rear of the Cadillac. Officers Cavanaugh and Hopkins parked their patrol car behind Officer Feeney's car.
Officer Feeney approached the front passenger side door of the Cadillac and asked the driver if he was having a medical emergency. After the driver replied no, Officer Feeney asked the driver to identify himself. The driver handed Officer Feeney an Indiana driver's license with the name Gary Gold. Officer Feeney informed Gold that a computer check of the Cadillac's license plate had shown the plate was registered to two persons other than Gold. Gold said he had recently purchased the Cadillac and had not yet changed the registration. Officer Feeney then told Gold that he had pulled him over for failing to use his turn signal when changing lanes.
Officer Feeney went back to his patrol car and wrote Gold a traffic ticket for failing to signal when changing lanes. Ex. 1. Officer Feeney also wrote a warning for improper use of a license plate Ex. 2. When he returned to the Cadillac, Officer Feeney again walked to the passenger side. Because the Cadillac was parked on the edge of the roadway and because of the traffic, Officer Feeney was also concerned about the risk that he could be struck by a car if he approached the Cadillac on the driver's side. (Officer Feeney had been injured that way in a previous traffic stop, so he was especially aware of that danger.) Officer Feeney spoke through the passenger side window and asked Gold to exit the car so the ticket could be explained to him. The court credits Officer Feeney's testimony about the location of the Cadillac and his safety concerns, as well as his testimony that it was his "normal practice" to ask drivers to step out of a car in such situations because he does not like to hand a traffic ticket through a passenger window. After asking Gold to step out of the Cadillac, Officer Feeney walked to the back of the Cadillac.
Standing near the Cadillac's trunk, Officer Feeney watched as Gold stepped out of the car. Officer Feeney testified that Gold had his back turned "directly toward" him as he got out of the Cadillac. Gold was wearing a white, baggy T-shirt. Officer Feeney observed that the T-shirt was tucked into Gold's waistband and that it was bunched up around Gold's waist.
After noticing the bulges near Gold's waistband, Officer Feeney asked Gold if he had a weapon. Gold answered that he did not have a weapon. Officer Feeney asked Gold to place his hands on the trunk of the Cadillac so Officer Feeney could pat him down for weapons. When Gold asked why he wanted to frisk him, Officer Feeney said he did not "feel like getting shot tonight." Officer Feeney has patrolled the area near the intersection of 21st Street and Arlington for several years and knew that it is a relatively high crime area. Officer Feeney also knew that a few weeks before he stopped Gold, two people had been found shot to death in a car near the same intersection. At that point in the encounter, Officer Feeney had reasonable grounds for thinking Gold might have a weapon hidden in his waistband.
After Officer Feeney indicated that he wanted to frisk Gold for weapons, Gold took a half step backwards. Officer Feeney grabbed Gold's arm. Gold threw his arm up in the air, broke free, and began running south across 21st Street. Officers Feeney, Cavanaugh, and Hopkins chased Gold across 21st Street. Officer Feeney pointed a flashlight at Gold's back as they ran. The officers saw Gold reach toward his back as he ran, pull a gun out of his waist, and drop the gun. Officer Feeney recovered the gun and Officer Cavanaugh apprehended Gold. A federal grand jury later indicted Gold for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." When police officers stop an automobile and detain the occupants briefly, the stop amounts to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). As a general rule, a police officer's stop of a vehicle is reasonable and thus constitutional if the officer has "probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977).
After a police officer makes a justified stop of a vehicle, the officer has the power to order the driver and passengers to step out of the vehicle. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111, 98 S.Ct. 330. If the officer has reasonable, articulable grounds for believing a person involved in the stop may be carrying a hidden weapon, the officer may conduct a quick frisk or "pat-down" to check for weapons. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111-12, 98 S.Ct. 330.
In this case defendant Gold argues that Officer Feeney violated his Fourth Amendment rights at three distinct points: (1) stopping Gold for a traffic violation; (2) ordering Gold to step out of his car; and (3) attempting to frisk Gold for weapons. If Officer's Feeney's actions were unconstitutional, the gun seized as a result must be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule.1
The court concludes that Officer...
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