U.S. v. Goltz
| Decision Date | 07 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 00-40069.,CR 00-40069. |
| Citation | 187 F.Supp.2d 1168 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Andrew GOLTZ, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Robert A. Mandel, United States Attorney's Office, Sioux Falls, SD, for Plaintiff.
Sidney B. Strange, Strange, Farrell & Johnson, Sioux Falls, SD, for Defendant.
The defendant, Andrew Goltz, has been charged in an indictment with train wrecking which resulted in the death of a person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (2000). During the defendant's change of plea hearing, the Court informed the defendant that the statutory minimum penalty for this crime is life imprisonment. In response, defense counsel argued that the Court could impose a sentence of less than life imprisonment, and requested an opportunity to brief the issue. After reviewing brief submitted by both parties and conducting further research on this issue, the Court believes that the penalty provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1992 when death results does not establish a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. Thus, defendant may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment less than life if he is convicted or pleads guilty to the crime charged and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines in this case provide for such a sentence.
The defendant, Andrew Goltz, admitted to investigators that, on or about August 26, 2000, he tampered with a switch on railroad tracks used by the Dakota, Minnesota and Eastern Railroad in Brookings, South Dakota. According to his statements to law enforcement, the defendant used a hammer to break a lock on the switch, turned the switch, and then used plastic bags and a pizza box to cover up a reflector that would have alerted the operators of an oncoming train to the fact that the switch had been turned. When a west-bound train came along during the early morning hours of August 26, it was diverted onto a sidetrack where it collided with eight stationary rail cars. The train's conductor, Brad Davis, was killed in the collision, and its engineer, Dennis Baum, was seriously injured.
In his statements to investigators on August 29, Goltz described why he turned the switch:
Well, I thought, I thought the train was just going to detour and it was going to shake up the drivers. I really didn't intend to hurt anybody or wreck any of the equipment or anything.
Goltz stated that "it was supposed to be, like, a prank." There is apparently some evidence that Goltz knew the eight cars were parked on the sidetrack.
The defendant was indicted under the federal train wrecking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1992. An offense under this section is committed by anyone who "willfully derails, disables, or wrecks any train, engine, motor unit, or car used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1992(a) (2000). The same statute creates a felony for anyone who "willfully makes any ... track, signal, station, . . . or any other way, structure, property or appurtenance . . . hazardous to work or use, with the intent to derail, disable, or wreck a train, engine, motor unit, or car used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce." Id. Generally speaking, the term of imprisonment for a violation of § 1992 is limited to "not more than twenty years." Id. If the violation results in the death of any person, however, the violator "shall be subject also to the death penalty or to imprisonment for life." 18 U.S.C. § 1992(b) (2000).
The government argues that the penalty provision in § 1992(b) imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. An evaluation of the language in § 1992(b), however, reveals an ambiguity, which the Court finds must be analyzed in determining whether the defendant must be sentenced to life imprisonment if convicted or if he pleads guilty. The Supreme Court directs that "`[i]n determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language,' ... giving the `words used' their `ordinary meaning.'" Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 112 L.Ed.2d 449 (1990) (citations omitted). A familiar cannon of statutory interpretation is that "Courts should interpret statutory language in a manner that gives effect to all terms so as to avoid rendering terms useless." United States v. Days Inns of America, Inc., 151 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1016, 119 S.Ct. 1249, 143 L.Ed.2d 346 (1999).
The current version of 18 U.S.C. § 1992 states in full:
(a) Whoever willfully derails, disables, or wrecks any train, engine, motor unit, or car used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce by any railroad; or
Whoever willfully sets fire to, or places any explosive substance on or near, or undermines any tunnel, bridge, viaduct, trestle, track, signal, station, depot, warehouse, terminal, or any other way, structure, property, or appurtenance used in the operation of any such railroad in interstate or foreign commerce, or otherwise makes any such tunnel, bridge, viaduct, trestle, track, signal, station, depot, warehouse, terminal, or any other way, structure, property, or appurtenance unworkable or unusable or hazardous to work or use, with the intent to derail, disable, or wreck a train, engine, motor unit, or car used, operated, or employed in interstate or foreign commerce; or
Whoever willfully attempts to do any of the aforesaid acts or things -
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) Whoever is convicted of a violation of subsection (a) that has resulted in the death of any person, shall be subject also to the death penalty or to imprisonment for life.
18 U.S.C. § 1992 (2000).
The phrase "shall be subject also to" in § 1992(b) is not the typical penalty provision found in various statutes in title 18 of the United States Code. The typical penalty provision in title 18 uses terms such as "shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both," 18 U.S.C. § 111(b) (2000) (emphasis added), or "shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life," 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (2000) (emphasis added). In the context of this case, the word "also" is defined as "in addition: as well: besides, too." Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 62 (1981). The word "also" would be rendered useless in § 1992(b) if the statute is interpreted to impose a mandatory minimum of life imprisonment. The word "also" conveys a sense that "in addition to" other authorized penalties, the sentencing court has the option of imposing a life imprisonment sentence or the death penalty. If a life imprisonment sentence is mandatory, there would be no reason to say the person convicted of the crime is "subject also to the death penalty or to imprisonment for life" because there would not be any other options for the sentencing court in addition to the death penalty or life imprisonment. The typical phrase imposing mandatory minimum sentences of life imprisonment in title 18 provide the convicted person "shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life," and there is no doubt that the minimum sentence is life imprisonment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111(b); 1201(a) (); 1203(a) (same); 2113(e) (). The word "also" is not used in those statutes. The word "also" does have meaning if § 1992(b) is interpreted to mean that in addition to any other authorized penalty, the defendant may be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.
In discussing the meaning of the word "also" in § 1992, the government argues that (Government's Response to Defendant's Brief, Doc. 51.) The construction that the government did not offer is that the words "subject also to" trigger a maximum punishment of death or life imprisonment where the government elects not to seek the death penalty in addition to the fine or imprisonment authorized by the remaining portions of § 1992, with the ultimate sentence being determined by application of the sentencing guidelines.
The use of the words "subject . . . to" also creates an ambiguity in the context of § 1992. The definition of "subject" in the sense relevant to this case is "suffering a particular liability or exposure." Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 2275. Black's Law Dictionary defines "subjection" as "[t]he condition of being subject, exposed, or liable; liability . . . susceptibility." Black's Law Dictionary Abridged 1156 (7th ed.2000). There is no doubt that pursuant to § 1992, a person convicted of violating § 1992 is "exposed" to life imprisonment and the death penalty, in the sense that both of those penalties are possible sentences. But there is doubt about whether the phrase "subject ... to" in § 1992 means a person convicted of violating § 1992 must be sentenced to life imprisonment or the death penalty. Being "exposed" to a maximum penalty is entirely different from a penalty being the mandatory minimum penalty.
Because of ambiguities create by the phrase "shall be subject also to" in § 1992(b), the Court is required to evaluate the "language, structure,...
To continue reading
Request your trial