U.S. v. Gomez Londono

Decision Date18 April 1977
Docket NumberNo. 837,D,837
Citation553 F.2d 805
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Henry GOMEZ LONDONO, Appellee. ocket 76-1570.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Alvin A. Schall, Asst. U. S. Atty., Brooklyn, N. Y. (David G. Trager, U. S. Atty., E. D. N. Y., Brooklyn, N. Y., on the brief), for appellant.

Jeffrey D. Ullman, New York City (Ivan S. Fisher, New York City, on the brief), for appellee.

Before LUMBARD and OAKES, Circuit Judges, and BRYAN, District Judge. *

LUMBARD, Circuit Judge:

The government appeals, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, from an order of the Eastern District entered on November 17, 1976, in which Judge Dooling granted appellee Henry Gomez Londono's motion to suppress evidence on the grounds that the warrant authorizing the search in which the evidence was seized was legally insufficient. See United States v. Gomez-Londono, 422 F.Supp. 519, 526 (E.D.N.Y.1976). We conclude that the warrant authorizing the search in this case was properly issued on a sufficient showing of probable cause; accordingly, we reverse.

On February 21, 1976 Drug Enforcement Administration agents informed customs agents that a reliable DEA informant had advised that some time between February 21 and 25, 1976, Henry Gomez Londono would leave New York for Colombia, South America. According to the informant, Gomez Londono would be carrying $100,000. to be used in completing a drug transaction. The informant provided a general physical description of appellee, as well as his birth date and passport number.

Customs agents took up surveillance on February 21 at the Avianca Airlines departure area at Kennedy International Airport. On February 22 an airlines employee advised the customs agents that an individual named Henry Gomez Londono was in the Avianca Airlines area of the terminal. The agents observed appellee and concluded that he matched the description provided by the informant. Two plain-clothes agents, Healy and Annunziato, then stopped appellee as he walked toward the Avianca departure area. Inspector Robert Como, who was in uniform, was then brought over; with an airlines employee acting as interpreter, Como introduced himself and agents Healy and Annunziato. Two Port Authority police officers regularly assigned to the terminal to observe departing passengers and an airport employee were also standing nearby but did not participate in the subsequent questioning or arrest of appellee.

Appellee was told that he was required to make a report declaring any money in excess of $5,000. that he was taking out of the country. He was then asked if he was taking more than $5,000. in currency out of the country. After this question was asked a second time, appellee replied that he had $900. and exhibited the cash he had in his pockets. The agents asked appellee a third time if he was carrying in excess of $5,000. and appellee then took an envelope from his jacket; he handed the envelope to the agents and explained that he did not know what was in it. The agents observed something green through an opening in the envelope. They opened it and discovered $10,000. in $100. bills and a photograph of Gomez Londono. Appellee told the agents that he had been asked to deliver the envelope to Bogota, Columbia.

Appellee was then told that he was in custody. His airlines ticket, passport, and baggage claims were taken from him; his baggage, already placed aboard an Avianca aircraft, was taken by customs officials from the plane and brought to the customs office at the International Arrival Building along with appellee. At the International Arrival Building appellee was advised of his constitutional rights and was interviewed. He was then taken to the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City.

The next morning, February 23, appellee was arraigned. On February 24 agent Annunziato submitted an affidavit to the magistrate in support of an application for a warrant authorizing a search of appellee's baggage for currency. The affidavit, which was described by the district court as "far more complete than is usually the case," 422 F.Supp. at 526, recited the facts substantially as set forth above. The affidavit also stated that a DEA agent had stated in a telephone call from South America that the informant had furnished highly reliable information in the past, but that for security reasons he could not provide further information about the informant. A search warrant issued forthwith. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1101(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 1001 were cited in the warrant as the statutes believed to be violated. The search of appellee's baggage that followed revealed approximately $45,000. in cash and two loaded .38 caliber revolvers.

On March 2, 1976 appellee was charged in a three count indictment with knowingly and willfully making a fraudulent declaration to customs agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (count one), willfully transporting currency in the amount of $44,780. without filing a report as required by 31 U.S.C. 1101(b) (count two), and, knowingly delivering firearms to Avianca Airlines for transportation in foreign commerce without appropriate notice to the carrier in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e) (count three).

Following his indictment appellee moved to suppress all statements made by him and all evidence seized from his person and baggage. On the stipulated facts and after hearing argument, Judge Dooling granted the motion to suppress in all respects. Turning first to count two, the court found that there could be no violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1101(b). The court noted that section 1101, 1 which requires, inter alia, that individuals transporting currency in excess of $5,000. outside of the United States file a report as specified in § 1101(b), does not itself prescribe the time and place for the filing of reports. This and other information is prescribed by administrative regulations. Thus, as the court observed, 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) 2 provides that each person physically transporting currency in excess of $5,000. on any one occasion from the United States to a point outside it must file a report; 31 C.F.R. 103.25(b) 3 further specifies that unless otherwise directed or permitted, such reports shall be filed "at the time of departure" with the customs officer in charge at any point of departure. The district court found that Gomez Londono had not yet reached the "time of departure" within the meaning of 31 C.F.R. 103.25(b) when he was stopped and questioned by the customs agents and, thus, his duty to comply with section 1101(b) never matured. 4 Thus, the court rejected the government's argument that the crime was complete when appellee committed his baggage to international transport and made a false declaration to customs agents concerning the amount of money he intended to take abroad, on the ground that appellee had not himself gone far enough to incur any duty under the reporting requirements of the statute.

Turning next to count one, the court found that appellee could not be indicted for a false answer to interrogation unless the questioning was fair under the circumstances and in the light of the statutory purposes behind the currency reporting requirements. Although it found that the circumstances surrounding the questioning did not amount to a "custodial interrogation" so as to mandate the giving of the Miranda warnings, the court found that "when the Government undertakes to interrogate a man in the knowledge that if he gives a truthful answer it will be wholly beneficial to him, and if he gives an untruthful answer he may commit two crimes, due process of law requires that the interrogation be such that the expected or probable result is compliance with law and not the eliciting of a violation of law." 422 F.Supp. at 526.

Having found that appellee could not be held to have committed the offenses charged in counts one and two, the court found that whether count three could stand depended on the validity of the search warrant. Noting that given the Annunziato affidavit, the magistrate could not but have been persuaded that a warrant should issue, the court nonetheless held that the nature of the defects in counts one and two was such that it "necessarily" followed that the warrant was legally insufficient. Accordingly, the evidence was ordered suppressed. 5

The court did not expand on why, given the defects in counts one and two, it "necessarily" followed that the search warrant was legally insufficient. However, the court's rationale appears to have been two-pronged. First, the court seems to have reasoned that because it found that appellee had not gone far enough to violate § 1101, the magistrate could not have had probable cause to believe a violation of that statute had taken place. Second, the court appears to have found that appellee's statements to the customs agents on February 22 were obtained in violation of due process and that the recitation of these statements in the supporting affidavit irreparably tainted the warrant.

On appeal the government, while not challenging the court's findings regarding the sufficiency of counts one and two, contends that the court erred in holding that appellee's statements were improperly obtained and tainted the search warrant and that the warrant was legally insufficient. We agree and reverse that part of the court's order mandating suppression of the evidence.

The government argues that authority for the search was based upon 31 U.S.C. § 1105, which provides, inter alia, that a search warrant may issue upon a showing of probable cause that "monetary instruments are in the process of transportation and with respect to which a report required under section 1101 of this title has not been filed." 6 Gomez Londono contends that a report is not "required under section 1101" until the "time of departure"; thus, paraphrasing the district court's reasoning, appellee argues that since it was held that he had...

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