U.S. v. Gonzalez-Perez, 05-10693.
Decision Date | 10 January 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 05-10693.,05-10693. |
Citation | 472 F.3d 1158 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Abeu GONZALEZ-PEREZ, a.k.a. Oscar Ortiz-Garcia, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, Tracy Friddle, Asst. Federal Public Defender (argued), Phoenix, AZ, for the defendant-appellant.
Paul K. Charlton, United States Attorney, Christina M. Cabanillas, Appellate Chief, Bruce M. Ferg, Asst. United States Attorney (argued), Tucson, AZ, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; John M. Roll, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CR-04-01554-JMR.
Before FERDINAND F. FERNANDEZ, W. FLETCHER, and JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
On appeal, Abeu Gonzalez-Perez challenges his sentence on the basis that the district court erred in applying a 16-level enhancement to his sentence for a false-imprisonment conviction under Florida law. Specifically, Gonzalez-Perez contends that his prior conviction under Florida's false imprisonment statute does not constitute a "crime of violence" under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Sentencing Guidelines.1 We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's imposition of the 16-level enhancement, vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. We affirm the district court's other rulings made during the sentencing proceedings.
Gonzalez-Perez pled guilty to illegal re-entry following deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). At sentencing, over Gonzalez-Perez's objection, the district court applied a 16-level crime-of-violence enhancement based on a prior conviction for false imprisonment under Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a). See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). "We review de novo a district court's decision that a prior conviction is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines." United States v. Velasquez-Reyes, 427 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir.2005) (citation omitted).
A 16-level increase in a defendant's offense level is warranted where the defendant was previously removed after conviction for a "crime of violence." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). In determining "whether a defendant's prior offense constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)," this Court applies the categorical approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). United States v. Pimentel-Flores, 339 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under Taylor's categorical approach, to determine whether a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, we do not examine the facts underlying the prior offense, but "look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143.
The Application Note to § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the Sentencing Guidelines, defines crime of violence as:
any of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii).
Accordingly, Gonzalez-Perez's prior conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" if Florida's false imprisonment statute, Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a): (1) "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another," or (2) constitutes "kidnapping" in its generic sense. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n. 1(B)(iii); see also United States v. Pereira-Salmeron, 337 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.2003) ( ).
The Florida statute defines false imprisonment as "forcibly, by threat, or secretly confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his will." Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a). The government argues that a conviction under § 787.02(a) "implicitly contain[s] as an element the use ... of ... force." We disagree.
"[T]he force necessary to constitute a crime of violence must actually be violent in nature." United States v. Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir.2005) (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). However, because under Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a) false imprisonment can be effectuated "secretly," a conviction under Florida's false imprisonment statute need not involve the use of force. See Robinson v. State, 462 So.2d 471, 476 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) ( ); see also Corner v. State, 868 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2004) (same);2 cf. United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 431 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir.2005) ( ).
Alternatively, the government urges us to hold that false imprisonment under Florida law qualifies as a crime of violence within the meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines because the offense effectively constitutes "kidnapping." Again, we disagree. Taylor instructs that where, as here, the enhancement provision does not specifically define the enumerated offense, we must define it according to its "generic, contemporary meaning." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143. We must then compare the state's definition of a crime, "with the generic definition of that crime to determine if the defendant's conviction is a crime of violence pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines." Velasquez-Reyes, 427 F.3d at 1229 (citations omitted). The government proposes that the generic, contemporary definition of kidnapping should be "the unlawful deprivation of another person's liberty of movement." However, the generic definition of kidnapping encompasses, at a minimum, the concept of a "nefarious purpose[]" motivating restriction of the victim's liberty. See Wayne R. LaFave, 3 Substantive Criminal Law § 18.1(e), at 20, n. 154 (2d ed.2003) ( ); see also Model Penal Code § 212.1 ( ). The Florida false imprisonment statute contains no nefarious purpose element whatsoever. See Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a) ( ); cf. Fla. Stat. § 787.01(1)(a) ( )(emphasis added). Accordingly, Florida's false imprisonment statute, Fla. Stat. § 787.02(1)(a), does not conform to the generic, contemporary definition of kidnapping, and does not constitute a categorical crime of violence for the purposes of applying U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).3 Accordingly, the district court erred when it applied the 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) in calculating Gonzalez-Perez's sentence. See Lopez-Montanez, 421 F.3d at 932.
Gonzalez-Perez also contends that his sentence was unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) given that his co-defendant in the Florida false imprisonment case received a sentence of only 60 days after separately reentering the United States. We disagree. The district court's finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) was not implicated is consistent with the reasonableness requirement articulated in United States...
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