U.S. v. Gonzalez-Mercado

• Decision Date: 26 January 1987
• Docket Number: GONZALEZ-MERCAD,D,No. 85-5511,85-5511
• Citation: 808 F.2d 796
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Orlando Jairoefendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 796

808 F.2d 796

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Orlando Jairo GONZALEZ-MERCADO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 85-5511.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 26, 1987.

Kathy Hamilton, Coral Gables, Fla., for defendant-appellant.

Leon Kellner, U.S. Atty., Amelia Gomez, David O. Leiwant, Linda Collins-Hertz, Asst. U.S. Attys., Miami, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before FAY and JOHNSON, Circuit Judges, and HOFFMAN ^*, Senior District Judge.

WALTER E. HOFFMAN, Senior District Judge:

This is an appeal from the district court's refusal to allow defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.

Background

Appellant, a Columbian citizen, and his ten co-defendants were crew members aboard the motor vessel BULL SAILOR, a vessel on the high seas and subject to jurisdiction of the United States. The Coast Guard stopped, boarded and extensively searched the vessel twice within a 72-hour period and, during the second detention, discovered a quantity of marijuana secreted in a hidden compartment of the vessel. As a result of the Coast Guard search, appellant was arrested on March 17, 1984, and subsequently indicted on two counts along with the ten other co-defendants. The appellant has been incarcerated since March 28, 1984.

Count I charged that appellant conspired to commit an offense against the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 955a(a) and that appellant conspired with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 955c. Count II further charges that defendant possessed with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 955a(a) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2.

Appellant pled not guilty to both charges before a United States Magistrate on April 27, 1984. Trial date was repeatedly postponed and it became evident that a convenient trial date would not become available until early 1985. ¹

During the fall of 1984 the government approached counsel for all defendants in an effort to reach a plea agreement. The essence of the government's offer was to drop Count I and recommend a sentence reduced to time served if defendants would plead guilty to Count II. Counsel for the defendants expressed some apprehension with respect to the particulars of the agreement. Counsel for the defendants desired that the plea agreement incorporate a provision under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(C) ("type C agreement"), which permits a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea should the court exceed the sentence recommended by the government; however, the Assistant United States Attorney informed counsel that only plea agreements under Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(e)(1)(B) ("type B agreement"), were acceptable. Under a type B agreement, the government will "make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court." Counsel for the defendants indicated a reluctance to accede to a type B agreement unless there was some indication that the court would be amenable to the plea to time served.

On November 8, 1984, defendants through their counsel, appeared before the court to announce the plea change. ² Apparently during the appearance, a United States Probation Officer, assigned to the proceedings, met with Judge C. Clyde Atkins to discuss the preparation of the pre-sentence investigations (PSI). Upon emerging from the court's chambers, the probation officer informed counsel that the court would consider a recommendation of a plea to time served only for those defendants without prior criminal convictions. ³ However, as to those defendants with prior convictions, the probation officer indicated that the court would accept a plea with a recommendation of a sentence of 18 months. ⁴ Counsel for the appellant discussed with the appellant that he fell into this latter group having been previously convicted, and that a cap of eighteen months would be recommended but was not binding on the court. Counsel for all defendants expressed the desire to waive the PSI at that time, if the court would take the plea and proceed to sentencing. The court rejected this request and indicated that the PSI of each defendant would be reviewed prior to sentencing.

The defendants, with counsel present, appeared before the court on December 14, 1984, to enter the change of plea. The court engaged in a comprehensive Rule 11 colloquy. The appellant responded that he waived the rights assured by a trial by jury, had discussed this waiver with his attorney, and understood the nature of the charge against him and the maximum sentence the court could impose upon him according to law. The appellant further indicated that the plea agreement had been translated and that he understood it, that by pleading guilty he admitted the charges, that the court could impose any sentence authorized by law, that the plea could not be withdrawn solely because of the sentence imposed, and that no other agreement between the parties existed. Supp.R., Vol. 1, pp. 16-28. Nothing was mentioned during the entry of the plea of guilty and subsequent inquiry under Rule 11 as to the prior comments of the probation officer. After accepting the guilty pleas of all of the defendants, the court set sentencing for those defendants with no prior convictions for January 3, 1985, which date was apparently later changed to January 9, 1985. Sentencing for those defendants with prior convictions was set for January 10, 1985.

On January 10, 1985, appellant appeared before the court for sentencing with the other co-defendants with prior convictions. ⁵ Because of the confusion initiated by the probation officer's comments, counsel for the appellant moved to withdraw his guilty plea. In spite of the written plea agreement and the exchange during the Rule 11 colloquy, counsel for the appellant noted that the appellant maintained his innocence to her. Counsel for appellant also indicated that the confusion arose because it was the understanding of counsel that, while the agreement did not have a binding clause, the court would accept the cap of eighteen months for those co-defendants with previous convictions. This understanding came not from the court, but indirectly from the probation officer. R.Vol. 2, pp. 3-7. The court indicated that there was a clear misunderstanding, because the court cannot engage in the plea negotiations. Furthermore, the court stated that it made no indication as to imposition of a specific sentence of any defendant and that the written plea agreement signed by appellant and his counsel, contained a provision that "the Court can impose any sentence authorized by law." R.Vol. 2, p. 3. The court reserved judgment on the motion and requested supporting memoranda.

On May 28, 1985, the court denied the motion stating that it was "within the sound discretion of the district and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Rodriguez-DeMaya, 674 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir.1982)." R.Vol. 1, Item 76, p. 1. This case is now before this Court on the question of whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw.

Discussion

This case presents a novel question in a familiar setting. The courts have frequently considered appropriate circumstances which permit withdrawal of a plea under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d). When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea prior to imposition of a sentence, Rule 32(d) provides that "the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason." In determining whether the defendant has demonstrated a fair and just reason, the court may consider the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 146 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 1602, 51 L.Ed.2d 806 (1977). This circuit has chosen to rely on the permissive language of Rule 32(d) and affirm the trial judge "unless the denial of appellant's motion amounts to an abuse of discretion...." United States v. Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 93, 93 L.Ed.2d 44 (1986). In Stitzer, the court states that based on the previous Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Pressley, 602 F.2d 709, 711 (5th Cir.1979), assessment of the providence of the trial court's refusal to permit withdrawal may be determined by "(1) whether close assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether the original plea was knowing and voluntary; and (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved." We therefore evaluate the district court's refusal to permit withdrawal based on the Pressley factors. ⁶

In proceedings before this court, the appellant was individually represented by court-appointed counsel. The appellant conferred directly with his counsel for 8.8 hours. The appellant's counsel spent over 30 additional hours, exclusive of travel time, in preparation and appearances in this case. R.Vol. 1, Item 85, pp. 1-5. Under these circumstances and in the absence of any suggestion that the appellant was less than aptly represented, we are left to conclude that the appellant received close assistance of counsel.

Under the particular facts of this case, determination of whether the appellant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily proffered deserves considerable attention. While the appellant offers several reasons supporting withdrawal of the plea, the focal question is whether the appellant entered the plea agreement under the mistaken impression that he would receive an 18-month sentence and whether the mistaken belief was reasonable based on the probation officer's comments. Whether the belief was mistaken must be considered in light of the appellant's questionable competence, given his limited education and his lack of familiarity with the English language. However, at all times an interpreter...