U.S. v. Goodman, 78-1304

Decision Date02 April 1979
Docket NumberNo. 78-1304,78-1304
Citation590 F.2d 705
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. James Alfred GOODMAN, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

William F. Sherman of Jacoway & Sherman, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.

Kenneth F. Stoll, Asst. U. S. Atty., Little Rock, Ark., for appellee; W. H. Dillahunty, U. S. Atty., on the brief.

Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, and BRIGHT and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

On this appeal we are required to determine whether the district court 1 erred in denying without a hearing appellant James Alfred Goodman's motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 to vacate his pleas of guilty on three separate charges of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). 2 In his motions Goodman contends that the pleas should be set aside because he was incompetent at the time he entered the pleas. In the alternative, Goodman requests that the case be remanded for a nunc pro tunc hearing on his competency at the time of the pleas, and a hearing on his allegations that his pleas were coerced and that Rule 11 was violated. We affirm the district court in its denial of a competency hearing and reverse and remand for further proceedings on certain other allegations presented in the section 2255 motion.

In August of 1977 Goodman was arrested on the charge of robbery of the branch office of the Pulaski Federal Savings and Loan Association in North Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 24, 1977. On August 30, 1977, the district court granted defense counsel's motion that Goodman receive a psychiatric examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244. 3 Accordingly, Goodman was taken to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners (Medical Center) in Springfield, Missouri.

On September 12 the grand jury for the Eastern District of Arkansas returned an indictment charging Goodman in Count I of taking by force or violence $2,316 which belonged to the Pulaski Savings and Loan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and in Count II of taking and carrying away the same money with the intent to steal in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b). Subsequently, a report was received from the chief of psychiatry at the Medical Center finding Goodman mentally competent and he entered a plea of not guilty.

On November 3, 1977, the government filed a notice for increased sentence of Goodman as a special offender pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3575 and Goodman's counsel filed a motion for an independent psychiatric examination under 18 U.S.C. § 4244. Thereafter, a plea negotiation agreement was entered into which called for Goodman to plead guilty to Count II and for Count I to be dismissed. In addition, the government agreed to drop its request to have Goodman sentenced pursuant to section 3575. The agreement further provided that by pleading guilty Goodman was withdrawing his motion for an independent psychiatric examination. He pled guilty to Count II of the Arkansas indictment on December 1, 1977.

At that time federal bank robbery charges against Goodman were pending in Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 20 Goodman requested that the charges from New Mexico and Arizona be transferred to Arkansas. On December 15, 1977, he entered pleas of guilty to both the New Mexico and Arizona charges and was sentenced on those charges as well as the Arkansas charge. He received ten-year sentences on both the Arkansas and New Mexico charges and a five-year sentence on the Arizona charge, all to be served consecutively for a total of 25 years.

On this appeal Goodman contends that because the Arizona federal district court had issued an order finding him incompetent to stand trial on February 17, 1977, he was entitled to an independent judicial determination of his competency before any further judicial proceeding was conducted which affected his rights. The order of the Arizona district court finding Goodman incompetent to stand trial at that time and sending him to the Arizona State Hospital 4 was apparently based on reports from Dr. Estes and Dr. Hoogerbeets. Dr. Estes stated in his report that it was his impression that "Mr. Goodman was putting on an act for me," but that the best disposition would be to hospitalize him "for a period of more constant observation." Dr. Hoogerbeets stated he was "unable to give him a thorough psychiatric evaluation because of the fact that he was rambling on and at least in appearance appeared to be confused." He concluded that Goodman "has severe emotional problems" with "an overlay of exaggeration which may be induced by the fact that he is facing a rather serious legal predicament," and recommended hospitalization "for more prolonged observation and for a much more prolonged psychiatric evaluation."

In a report from the Arizona State Hospital dated April 12, 1977, Goodman was found not mentally ill and it was stated that his purported inability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and assist counsel in the preparation of his defense was "most likely simulated." Subsequently he was examined at the Kino Community Hospital where the examining psychiatrist concluded that he was a schizophrenia-paranoid type, suffered from a sociopathic personality disorder, and was incompetent to stand trial. Goodman escaped from the Kino hospital and as a result of his escape there were no further proceedings with respect to his competency in the Arizona federal district court.

Goodman's counsel states in his brief to this court that upon learning of the Arizona court's order finding Goodman incompetent, he filed a timely motion to vacate sentence under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35. Goodman filed a separate pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside the convictions. Although at the time of sentencing the Arkansas district court was apparently unaware of the finding of incompetence by the Arizona court, it did have copies of the psychiatric reports from Arizona before it both at the time of sentencing and at the time it ruled on the Rule 35 and section 2255 motions.

On this appeal Goodman primarily relies on the case of Gunther v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 243, 215 F.2d 493 (1954), where the District of Columbia Circuit held that after an accused has been judicially determined incompetent to stand trial, 18 U.S.C. § 4244 requires a subsequent judicial determination of mental competency to stand trial before other judicial proceedings are conducted. 5 In Gunther, the defendant was initially found incompetent to stand trial by the district court and was committed to the custody of the Attorney General. Approximately eight months later, after the superintendent of the hospital certified that the defendant had recovered his reason, the case proceeded to trial without further inquiry or independent determination by the district court in respect to his mental competency to stand trial. The circuit court remanded the case for a hearing on whether the defendant had been incompetent at the time of trial. Only in the event the district court found the defendant was incompetent at the time of trial was vacation of the conviction and a new trial warranted.

We note that the Gunther decision has been questioned and distinguished both in subsequent District of Columbia Circuit cases and in other circuits and was legislatively overruled in the District of Columbia by Congress in 1955. See United States v. Ives, 504 F.2d 935, 946-47 (9th Cir. 1974), Vacated and remanded, 421 U.S. 944, 95 S.Ct. 1671, 44 L.Ed.2d 97 (1975), Rev'd, 574 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1978); Whalem v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 331, 346 F.2d 812 (1965); Hunter v. United States, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 323, 323 F.2d 625 (1963), Cert. denied, 380 U.S. 918, 85 S.Ct. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 803 (1965); Amador Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1962); Hereden v. United States, 286 F.2d 526 (10th Cir. 1961); D.C.Code § 24-301(b). In United States v. Ives, supra, the defendant was initially found incompetent and was referred to the Medical Center. At a hearing four months later he was deemed legally competent to stand trial. However, his first trial resulted in a mistrial and a finding that he was incompetent to be tried. The defendant was returned to the Medical Center and approximately six months later the psychiatric staff opined that he was legally competent to stand trial. Based on the most recent psychiatric report, and without a hearing, the district court found him competent to stand trial and entered a written order to that effect. The Ninth Circuit specifically rejected the holding of Gunther to the extent that it required a judicial hearing "where a defendant has been committed as incompetent, the committing institution has subsequently concluded he is presently competent and the court has entered a finding of competency based upon that opinion." United States v. Ives, supra, 504 F.2d at 947 & n.27. 6 We are satisfied that this is the better view.

In the present case the district court did not enter a formal order finding Goodman competent at the time of the guilty pleas. However, the district court stated in its opinion denying the section 2255 and Rule 35 motions that prior to accepting Goodman's pleas and sentencing him, it did examine the psychiatric evaluations. The court further stated that from its own recollection of the demeanor of Goodman at the time of the pleas and sentencing, which was only two months prior to the filing of the Rule 35 and section 2255 motions, there was no question that he fully understood the proceedings. In addition, in response to questions from the court during both the plea and sentencing proceedings Goodman's counsel stated that he believed that Goodman was competent and understood the proceedings and Goodman stated that he understood the charges against him and the penalty which could be imposed. Moreover, our independent examination of the considerable...

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