U.S. v. Grandison, s. 88-5097
| Citation | 885 F.2d 143 |
| Decision Date | 14 November 1989 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 88-5097,s. 88-5097 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony GRANDISON, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Vernon EVANS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rodney KELLY, Defendant-Appellant. (L), 88-5098 and 88-5099. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit) |
Fred Warren Bennett, Federal Public Defender (Richard C.B. Woods, Baltimore, Md., Martha Rasin, Annapolis, Md., on brief), for defendant-appellants.
Juliet Ann Eurich, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Breckinridge L. Willcox, U.S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., David I. Salem, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN, and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges.
In this case we must determine if appellants established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in jury selection by the prosecution under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The district court held they did not. --- F.Supp. ----. We affirm.
On May 27, 1983, a federal grand jury in the District of Maryland returned a two count indictment against Anthony Grandison, Vernon Evans, Jr., Janet Patricia Moore, and Rodney Kelly, charging them with conspiracy to violate civil rights resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 241, and witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512. Voir dire commenced on September 12, 1983, and lasted approximately three weeks. Jury selection then began on October 3, 1983.
The parties agreed that jury selection was to be conducted by a process of striking veniremen from the box. Under this procedure, twelve veniremen are seated in the jury box and the defendants and government alternate strikes. The parties can strike any of the veniremen in the box, regardless of when they are seated. As a venireman is stricken, a new potential juror is added to the box. The parties also agreed that the defendants would have seventeen peremptory challenges and the government would have ten. The defense exercised fifteen strikes and the government exercised nine. The defense exercised all but one of its strikes against white veniremen. The government struck six black veniremen. The government stated several times during selection that the jury as constituted was acceptable, and on one occasion the jury contained three black members. The jury, as finally composed, consisted of ten white and two black jurors.
Before the jury was sworn, defendants made a motion for mistrial based on the government's alleged use of peremptories to strike blacks. The district court denied the motion. On November 3, 1983, all four defendants were convicted of both charges. The convictions were affirmed on December 23, 1985. United States v. Grandison, 780 F.2d 425 (4th Cir.1985). Defendants Grandison, Evans, and Kelly then filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
On February 23, 1987, the Supreme Court vacated the convictions of Grandison, Evans, and Kelly, 479 U.S. 1076, 107 S.Ct. 1270, 94 L.Ed.2d 131 remanding the case to this circuit for further consideration in light of Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), which held that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), was to be applied retroactively. On April 8, 1987, this circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Defendants then filed a motion for a new trial and the government filed a consolidated response.
On January 22, 1988, the district court held a hearing to determine if defendants could establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the prosecution in jury selection. On May 27, 1988, the court issued an order denying defendants' motion for a new trial and directing that the judgments be reinstated. The court concluded that the combination of facts and circumstances "reveal[ed] an inference opposite to that of racial discrimination." Because no prima facie case of discrimination was established, the court did not require the government to explain the reasons for its strikes.
Defendants appeal.
We will review at the outset the law as it relates to racial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges, and the critical role of the trial judge in its implementation.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a defendant may make a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection by showing the racially discriminatory use of peremptories by the prosecution in his case alone. To establish a prima facie case under Batson, a defendant must show that "he is a member of a cognizable racial group, ... and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race." Id. 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct at 1723 (citation omitted). The defendant may rely on the fact that the peremptory challenges may disguise racial discrimination. Id. Then, "the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used [peremptory challenges] to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race." Id. "Relevant circumstances" may include, but are not limited to, a pattern of peremptorily striking black jurors and the government's questions during voir dire and in exercising its challenges. Id. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23. While Batson "involved a state prosecution and application of the fourteenth amendment, the same limitations are imposed on federal prosecutors by the fifth amendment." United States v. Lane, 866 F.2d 103, 104 n. 1 (4th Cir.1989).
If a defendant makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black veniremen. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. To meet this burden of production, the explanation must relate to the particular case to be tried. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Of course, at all times, the defendant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 93, 106 S.Ct. at 1721.
The trial judge plays a "pivotal role ... in determining a prima facie case." United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 746 (3d Cir.1988). See also Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 98 n. 21, 99 n. 22, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 1724 n. 21, 1724 n. 22; United States v. Allen, 814 F.2d 977, 978 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Woods, 812 F.2d 1483, 1487 (4th Cir.1987); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 330 (7th Cir.1986). He or she has the opportunity to observe voir dire and the prosecution's exercise of its peremptory challenges. The trial judge also has the experience "to identify a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 99 n. 22, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 22. As in the Title VII context, moreover, a trial judge's " 'finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact,' " id. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21, quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), which turns largely "on evaluation of credibility." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21. Such findings are entitled to "great deference," id., and "will not be disturbed by this court unless clearly erroneous." Lane, 866 F.2d at 105; United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125, 129 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038, 1040 (4th Cir.1988); Woods, 812 F.2d at 1487; Mathews, 803 F.2d at 330.
The circumstances of this case illustrate why deference to district courts is so appropriate in this context. Here, the trial court was intimately familiar with the selection of the jury. It conducted individual voir dire in its chambers, asking each potential juror the same series of questions. Following this initial questioning, it asked follow-up questions of the potential jurors prepared by the parties. After all questioning had been completed, the court heard argument and ruled on the parties' motions to strike jurors for cause. Finally, it observed the parties' use of their peremptory challenges.
Thus, the district court's findings stemmed from first-hand knowledge and observation of the critical events. The fact-finder was in an even more advantageous position, vis-a-vis an appellate court, than in a Title VII case, where substantial deference to factual determinations on discrimination is routinely accorded. In assessing appellants' prima facie case, the district court relied on its "memory of" voir dire as well as its "evaluation of credibility." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21. The court, as Batson requires, analyzed all facts and circumstances surrounding the case to determine if they created an inference that government counsel intentionally and purposefully struck potential jurors solely because they were black.
Appellants contend that the facts of this case support an inference of racial discrimination. We, however, affirm the finding of the trial court to the contrary.
No per se rule exists to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Lane, 866 F.2d at 107; United States v. Sanqineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1521 (6th Cir.1988); United States v. Montgomery, 819 F.2d 847, 851 (8th Cir.1987); Clemons, 843 F.2d at 746. But see United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir.1987). Nor does a prosecutorial checklist exist to avoid the inference of discriminatory practices. "The Supreme Court's mandate in Batson to consider all the facts and circumstances means that we cannot lay down clear rules as to [what] ... will constitute or refute a prima facie case." Sanqineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d at 1521.
While the racial composition of the actual petit jury is not...
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