U.S. v. Gray
| Decision Date | 10 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-80193.,04-80193. |
| Citation | 382 F.Supp.2d 898 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Spence Bernard GRAY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Michael J. Riordan, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, Detroit, MI, for Defendant.
TO REMAND OR ENFORCE STATE PROSECUTOR'S PLEA BARGAIN
Defendant Spence Bernard Gray is charged in a March 3, 2004 indictment with being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Through the present motion, Defendant seeks a "remand" of this case to state court so that he can obtain the benefit of a plea bargain that was offered to him, but that he rejected, in the course of state court proceedings arising from the same underlying April 21, 2003 act of firearm possession. Alternatively, he asks the Court to enforce in this federal case the terms of the plea offer extended (and rejected) in state court, under which Defendant would have received a 24-month term of imprisonment.
On January 6, 2005, the Court held a hearing on Defendant's motion. Having reviewed the briefs and exhibits filed by the parties, and having considered the arguments of counsel at the January 6 hearing, the Court now is prepared to rule on Defendant's motion. This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's rulings.
In the early morning hours of April 21, 2003, Detroit police officers stopped a vehicle being driven by Defendant Spence Bernard Gray. Defendant allegedly exited his car and fled, with the officers pursuing him on foot. After a short chase, Defendant was apprehended and placed on the ground. As Defendant followed an officer's instruction to take his hand from his pocket, he allegedly removed an object and slid it a few feet away. The officers subsequently retrieved this object, and discovered that it was an Astra 9 millimeter handgun. Defendant later gave a written, sworn statement admitting possession of the handgun.
On April 30, 2003, Defendant appeared at a state court pre-examination in 36th District Court before Judge Wade McCree. At this hearing, Defendant was advised of the state charges against him — carrying a concealed weapon, a felony firearm violation, and a felon-in-possession charge — and was informed that a preliminary examination was scheduled for May 5, 2003. During this same proceeding, the state prosecutor, Daryl M. Carson, offered Defendant the opportunity to plead guilty to the felony firearm offense in exchange for a 24-month term of incarceration and the dismissal of the other charges. Defendant, who was represented by attorney Jeffrey G. Knoche, rejected this plea offer.
In the course of this state court hearing, Defendant was expressly informed that his rejection of the plea offer would result in the federal prosecutor's pursuit of a federal felon-in-possession charge against him.1 Specifically, the state prosecutor stated that "this is a Federal gun case," and that Defendant's "potential guidelines in the Federal system ... if he were to plead guilty are 30 to 37, greater than that if he were to go to trial." (4/30/2003 State Court Pre-Exam Hearing Tr. at 4.) In contrast, the state court judge observed, and defense counsel agreed, that "the offer as it stands now ... is simply that [Defendant] still has to give two years here." (Id.)
In light of this difference and Defendant's initial rejection of the state prosecutor's plea offer, the state prosecutor asked the state court judge to confirm that Defendant understood the ramifications of his decision:
(Id. at 5-6.)
Defendant failed to appear for his May 5, 2003 preliminary examination in state court, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On February 23, 2004, Defendant was arrested by agents of the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and a federal magistrate ordered his detention. On March 3, 2004, a federal grand jury indicted Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm. At around this same time, the state court dismissed without prejudice the state charges pending against him.
In the course of these federal proceedings, the government has offered Defendant a Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 plea agreement with an estimated category IV criminal history and an offense level of 21, resulting in a recommended sentencing range of 57-71 months of imprisonment. In light of this plea offer, Defendant has brought the present motion, seeking either a "remand" of this case to the state court — where Defendant presumably would seek reinstatement of the state prosecutor's earlier plea offer calling for a 24-month prison sentence — or an order enforcing the state prosecutor's 24-month plea offer in this federal proceeding.
Defendant's motion implicates the joint federal/state program known as "Project Safe Neighborhoods" ("PSN"), a crime reduction initiative developed by the U.S. Department of Justice. Under this program, the federal U.S. Attorney's Office in Detroit consults with the local Wayne County Prosecutor's Office to determine the jurisdiction in which firearm-related offenses should be prosecuted. If a particular defendant meets certain specified PSN criteria, he may be given an opportunity to plead guilty in state court to a state felony firearm offense in lieu of federal prosecution. Pursuant to this program, the state prosecutor offered Defendant a plea bargain calling for a two-year prison term, but he rejected this offer at the April 30, 2003 state court pre-examination hearing.
Through his present motion, Defendant maintains that the PSN initiative reflects sufficiently close cooperation and collaboration between the state and federal prosecuting authorities that the state prosecutor's 24-month plea offer should be binding on the federal prosecutor. He further contends that the federal prosecutor's failure to extend a similar offer in this case, and the substitution of a plea agreement calling for a longer term of imprisonment, constitutes a "bad faith refusal" to be bound by the prior offer made in the state court proceedings. As explained below, however, these arguments are both factually and legally flawed.
As the first form of relief sought in his motion, Defendant requests that the Court "remand" this case to the Michigan courts, presumably so that he can then urge the reinstatement of the state prosecutor's 24-month plea offer. Alternatively, certain of Defendant's arguments, particularly at the January 6, 2005 hearing, could be viewed as seeking the dismissal of this federal proceeding, which presumably would clear the way for reinstatement of the state court prosecution — and, Defendant apparently assumes, a new opportunity to accept a 24-month plea offer. The Court finds no basis for awarding either form of relief.
Initially, as the Government correctly points out in its response to Defendant's motion, this Court lacks the authority to "remand" this matter to the state court. This case, in which Defendant is charged with violating a federal statute, lies squarely within the original federal court jurisdiction conferred under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. It is entirely separate and distinct, therefore, from any state court proceeding arising from Defendant's alleged violation of state law. See United States v. Louisville Edible Oil Products, Inc., 926 F.2d 584, 587 (6th Cir.1991) (). This Court is powerless, therefore, to order a "remand" of this distinctly federal case to state court.2
Nor has Defendant identified any legal basis for the Court to refrain from exercising its unquestioned jurisdiction over this federal proceeding — an outcome which presumably would entail either the outright dismissal of this case or some other form of "deference" to the state court prosecution. When asked at the January 6 hearing to suggest the ground for such relief, defense counsel pointed to the federal constitutional guarantee of due process as the source of Defendant's claimed entitlement to be prosecuted in the purportedly more favorable state court environment — or, at least, under the more favorable terms offered during the state court pre-examination proceeding. Defendant also cites Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that a state prosecutor was prohibited from bringing felony charges against a defendant who had been convicted of a misdemeanor arising from the same conduct and had exercised his statutory right of appeal from this conviction. In so ruling, the Court explained that "[d]ue process of law requires that such a potential for vindictiveness must not enter into" a state's appellate process. Perry, 417...
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