U.S. v. Green, 80-2461
Decision Date | 21 May 1982 |
Docket Number | No. 80-2461,80-2461 |
Citation | 220 U.S. App. D.C. 147,680 F.2d 183 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. James K. GREEN, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (Criminal No. 00729-68).
Charles G. Cole, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this Court), for appellant.
Susan R. Holmes, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Charles F. C. Ruff, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry and Michael W. Farrell, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILKEY and WALD, Circuit Judges.
Opinion PER CURIAM.
In this appeal, James Green challenges the district court's denial without a hearing of his motion under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Green sought modification of the 10-30 year prison sentence imposed after his conviction of armed rape, armed robbery, armed burglary and assault with and possession of a dangerous weapon. Green did not dispute the validity of the underlying convictions which were upheld on appeal in 1970; 1 the issue before the district court was whether Green had been denied due process or his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing. Section 2255 does not require the district court to hold a hearing on the motion if "the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief," and the district court so decided here. We hold that the district court's appraisal of the record was correct and that Green was not entitled to relief. He was neither denied due process at the sentencing stage nor was his sentence tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel under the standards set forth in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C.Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944, 100 S.Ct. 302, 62 L.Ed.2d 311 (1979).
Green was represented at his five-day trial by retained counsel of his choice. On November 6, 1968, the jury found Green guilty of the armed rape and robbery of a Washington, D. C. resident in her home. He was also found guilty of first degree burglary and illegal assault with and possession of a loaded gun. The facts of the crime were recounted by the district court:
The defendant followed Mrs. Lilia Pearce, a 26-year old, white female into her residence on March 27, 1968. He waited until she was leaving again and asked her where the janitor was located. Mrs. Pearce took the defendant downstairs, where he shoved her into a corner, pointed a gun at her head, and threatened to kill her if she would not give him her money. He then pulled her back up the stairs to her apartment. Once inside, he forced her into each room, asking what she had of value. Mrs. Pearce turned over $100.00. The defendant then forced Mrs. Pearce onto the bed where he made her take off her clothes and then had sexual relations with her. When he finished, he tied her hands, gagged her and forced her into a closet, against which he put a duffel bag before leaving.
United States v. Green, No. 729-68 at 1 (Nov. 7, 1980) ( ).
Subsequent to Green's conviction, the probation office for the district court prepared a presentence report, which detailed both the government's and Green's versions of the offense, explained that Green had no previous arrest record (though he was AWOL from the Army at the time of his offense), discussed various aspects of his background, and concluded with an "Evaluative Summary." The evaluative summary contained a review of Green's personal history and attitudes including observations on his propensity to "project responsibility onto others, particularly the police, the Assistant U. S. Attorney, and even his own lawyer." The report summed up with the comment that 2 The presentence report also included the statement that "Green said he felt his lawyer was incompetent and that, perhaps there was a conspiracy between his lawyer and the Assistant U. S. Attorney," although Green could offer no motivation for such a conspiracy.
Green's sentencing hearing, at which he was represented by trial counsel, was held on January 3, 1969. We quote the hearing transcript virtually in its entirety:
On Green's appeal of his convictions, he was represented by new counsel appointed by this court. The convictions were affirmed by a unanimous panel in an opinion written by then Chief Judge Bazelon. In the course of that appeal, new counsel did not raise any issue regarding error in Green's sentencing nor allege ineffective assistance of counsel at any stage of the proceedings. While the appeal was pending, Green brought a pro se motion for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance by virtue of counsel's failure to file certain pretrial motions, but did not mention any defects in either the trial or the sentencing process. That motion was denied without opinion, and no appeal was taken.
Green served four years of his 10-year sentence and then escaped from prison, remaining free from 1973-1977. Upon his recapture, he was sentenced to an additional year in prison. In January 1982, he was released to the community under parole supervision.
Green had filed his habeas motion pro se on August 7, 1980, some 111/2 years after his conviction, claiming that he was sentenced on the basis of willfully false and prejudicial information in the presentence report, 4 and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing 5 in that counsel did not disclose to him the contents of the presentence report nor seek to correct purported errors in the report before the sentencing judge. The only reference he made to any conflict or rift between them at the time of sentencing which might have adversely affected her representation of him was his speculation that she was "concerned" about the dissatisfaction with her that he had expressed in the presentence report. In accordance with the rules governing section 2255 proceedings, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255 Rule 4(a), Green's motion was referred to the district judge who had originally sentenced him. In opposition to Green's motion, the government filed affidavits by the author of the presentence report and by defendant's trial counsel to show that Green's allegations of errors in the report were either incorrect or immaterial 6 and that Green's attorney had given him competent representation. 7 Counsel's affidavit stated that she had reviewed the presentence report with Green, and that though Green was unhappy with the report, counsel found it "accurate in all material respects" and "consistent with counsel's impressions of Mr. Green and with the information he had given (counsel) about himself." The affidavit also claims that although Green had asked counsel to correct the report, he did not provide counsel with "any legal or factual basis for these wishes." Furthermore, counsel "believed it would be unwise, tactically, to challenge the report in the manner suggested by the defendant." Counsel did, however, advise Green that he could voice his objections to the court at the sentencing hearing. Finally, the affidavit states: "I knew that Mr. Green was displeased with me in this regard and I so advised the Court, but I did not seek to withdraw because Mr. Green himself asked me to remain in the case."
The record having been thus supplemented, as permitted by the section 2255 rules, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2255 Rule 7, 8 the district court chose to avail itself of those procedures that "enable the judge to dispose of some habeas petitions not dismissed on the pleadings, without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing."...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Com. v. Smith
..."probably affected" and there is no showing, on rebuttal by the Government, that no actual harm occurred. United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 183, 188-189 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam ); United States v. Patterson, 652 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C.Cir.1981); United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 782-78......
-
United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler
...is denied his right to counsel altogether." United States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659, 669 (3rd Cir.1982). See also, United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 183, 190 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1982); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir.1978). Furthermore, a growing line of cases in the other ci......
-
Mickens v. Greene
...v. Winkle, 722 F.2d 605, 611-612 (10th Cir.1983); Brien v. United States, 695 F.2d 10, 15 n. 10 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 183, 191-92 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1982); Cox v. Norris, 958 F.Supp. 411, 418 (E.D.Ark.1996); Bonin v. Vasquez, 807 F.Supp. 589, 606 (C.D.Cal. 1992); In R......
-
United States v. Cruz
...obstruction of justice, stating unequivocally that “sentencing is part of the prosecution”); United States v. Green, 680 F.2d 183, 191 (D.C.Cir.1982) (Bazelon, J., dissenting on other grounds) (“Sentencing is the most important part of the typical criminal trial.”). 10. Cruz takes issue wit......