U.S. v. Gregg
| Decision Date | 25 April 2000 |
| Citation | 226 F.3d 253 |
| Parties | (3rd Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, APPELLANT IN NO. 99-5079 V. JOSEPH R. GREGG; RUBY C. MCDANIEL; LUIS MENCHACA; FRANCIS S. PAGNANELLI; WILLIAM CHARLES RAISER; MICHAEL HENRY; ROSE KIDD; ARNOLD MATHESON; KATHARINE O'KEEFE; EVA ALVARADO; JOSEPH F. O'HARA; JOSEPH ROACH; ROBERT RUDNICK; JAMES SODERNA; JAMES SWEATT; ELIZABETH WAGI; BYRON ADAMS; KEVIN BLAKE; AMY BOISSONNEAULT; BALDO DINO; STEPHEN C. ELLIOT; SHERYL FITZPATRICK; MARY FOLEY; DENNIS GREEN; GEORGE LYNCH; RAYMOND MICCO; ALEXIS MULRENAN; RALPH TRAPHAGEN; JAMES TROTT; KIMIKO TROTT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. JOSEPH R. GREGG; RUBY MCDANIEL; LUIS MENCHACA; FRANCIS S. PAGNANELLI; WILLIAM RAISER; MICHAEL A. HENRY; ROSE KIDD; ARNOLD MATHESON; KATHARINE O'KEEFE; EVA ALVARADO; JOSEPH O'HARA; JOSEPH H. ROACH; ROBERT RUDNICK; JAMES SODERNA; JAMES SWEATT; ELIZABETH WAGI; BYRON ADAMS; KEVIN BLAKE; AMY BOISSONNEAULT; BALDO DINO; STEPHEN ELLIOT; SHERYL FITZPATRICK; MARY FOLEY; DENNIS GREEN; GEORGE LYNCH; RAYMOND MICCO; ALEXIS MULRENAN; RALPH TRAPHAGEN; JAMES TROTT; KIMIKO TROTT; ROSE KIDD; JAMES SWEATT; ELIZABETH WAGI; RAYMOND MICCO; WILLIAM RAISER; JAMES SODERNA; KEVIN BLAKE; BALDO DINO; APPELLANTS IN NO. 99-5124 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA V. JOSEPH R. GREGG; RUBY MCDANIEL; LUIS MENCHACA; FRANCIS PAGNANELLI; WILLIAM RAISER; MICHAEL A. HENRY; ROSE KIDD; ARNOLD MATHESON; KATHARINE O'KEEFE; EVA ALVARADO; JOSEPH O'HARA; JOSEPH H. ROACH; ROBERT RUDNICK; JAMES SODERNA; JAMES SWEATT; ELIZABETH WAGI; BYRON ADAMS; KEVIN BLAKE; AMY BOISSONNEAULT; BALDO DINO; STEPHEN ELLIOT; SHERYL FITZPATRICK; MARY FOLEY; DENNIS GREEN; GEORGE LYNCH; RAYMOND MICCO; ALEXIS MULRENAN; RALPH TRAPHAGEN; JAMES TROTT; KIMIKO TROTT; FRANCIS S. PAGNANELLI, APPELLANT IN NO. 99-5205 NOS. 99-5079, 99-5124, 99-5205 Argued: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
On Appeal From the United States District Court For the District of New Jersey, D.C. Civ. No. 97-cv-02020, District Judge: Honorable John C. Lifland
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Counsel for Appellants/Cross-Appellees: Faith S. Hochberg, Esquire United States Attorney Colette R. Buchanan, Esquire Assistant United States Attorney Federal Building, Suite 700 970 Broad Street Newark, NJ 07102-23535, Bill Lann Lee, Esquire Acting Assistant Attorney General David K. Flynn, Esquire Jennifer Levin, Esquire (argued) Department of Justice Civil Rights Division P.O. Box 66078 Washington, DC 20035-6078
Counsel for Appellee/ Cross-Appellant Francis S. Pagnanelli: Edward J. Gilhooly, Esquire (argued) 14 Franklin Street Morristown, NJ 07960
Counsel for Appellee Eva Alvarado: Michael C. Pelletier, Esquire 335 Route 24, P.O. Box 700 Chester, NJ 07930
Counsel for Appellees/ Cross-Appellants William Raiser, Rose Kidd, James Soderna, James Sweatt, Elizabeth Wagi, Baldo Dino, Raymond Micco: Russell J. Passamano, Esquire 65 Madison Avenue Morristown, NJ 07960
Counsel for Appellee Joseph O'Hara: Donald Desmond Campbell, Esquire 186 Sherman Avenue Berkeley Heights, NJ 07922
Counsel for Appellee Joseph H. Roach: Ralph Coti, Esquire Herriot, Coti & Sugrue 36 West 44th Street, Suite 400 New York, NY 10036
Counsel for Appellee Byron Adams: William C. Cagney, Esquire Lane & Mittendorf 99 Wood Avenue South Metro Corporate Campus I Iselin, NJ 08830
Counsel for Appellee Kevin Blake: Michael O. Cummings, Esquire Morgan, Finnegan, Pine, Foley & Lee 345 Park Avenue New York, NY 10154
Counsel for Appellee George Lynch: Peter M. Burke, Esquire Cooper, Rose, & English 480 Morris Avenue Summit, NJ 07901
Before: Becker, Chief Judge, Weis and Oakes,* Circuit Judges.
OPINION FOR THE COURT
In this case, the United States appeals the decision of the District Court for the District of New Jersey (John C. Lifland, Judge) that the defendants are jointly and severally liable, rather than individually liable, for statutory damages of $5,000 "per violation" of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("FACE" or "the Act"), 8 U.S.C. S 248 (2000). Several defendants filed cross appeals, arguing that FACE is a violation of Congress's authority under the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause and of the First Amendment. We conclude that damages under FACE are properly awarded jointly and severally among defendants and that FACE is constitutional. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
On April 18, 1997, the United States, through the United States Attorney General, filed a complaint for injunctive relief and statutory damages against thirty defendants1 who, the Attorney General alleged, were an ongoing threat to the Metropolitan Medical Associates ("MMA"), a reproductive health clinic in Englewood, New Jersey, its employees and persons seeking reproductive health services at MMA. Specifically, the Attorney General alleged that each defendant participated in one, two, or three protests that obstructed access to MMA in violation of FACE. In the prayer for relief in the Complaint, the Attorney General elected to pursue statutory damages of $5,000 per defendant in lieu of proving actual damages to MMA.
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on July 8-10, 1997, on the Attorney General's motion for a preliminary injunction. The evidence at the hearing demonstrated that five of the named defendants blocked access to MMA on August 7, 1996, twelve of the named defendants blocked access to MMA on January 18, 1997, and nineteen of the named defendants blocked access to MMA on March 15, 1997. Accordingly, on December 22, 1997, the district court enjoined defendants and their employees, agents, and others acting in concert with them, from blocking and impeding access to MMA, intimidating or attempting to intimidate or interfere with persons seeking access to MMA, and entering or being on MMA premises.
After the preliminary injunction was granted, the parties informed the district court that they disagreed over the proper interpretation of the civil remedies available under FACE. At the district court's request, the parties submitted briefs addressed to the proper interpretation of statutory damages under FACE. On June 18, 1998, after considering the parties' pleadings, the district court issued a memorandum wherein, rejecting the Attorney General's argument that statutory damages should be assessed on each defendant per violation, it concluded that the $5,000 statutory damages were to be assessed per violation and that all defendants who participated in each violation would be held jointly and severally liable for $5,000.
On December 11, 1998, the district court granted the Attorney General's motion for summary judgment and issued a Memorandum and Order Entering Final Judgment. See United States v. Gregg, 32 F. Supp. 2d 151 (D.N.J. 1998). The district court found that the defendants violated FACE when they conducted the three blockades. See id. at 153-58. The district court determined that Congress intended statutory damages of $5,000 to be assessed per violation and against all responsible persons severally. See id. at 160-61. Accordingly, the defendants were held jointly and severally liable for $5,000 in statutory damages for each violation in which they participated. See id. at 161 ().
The Attorney General timely appealed the district court's decision and eight of the defendants2 cross appealed. The Attorney General appeals that portion of the district court's decision that imposed the statutory damages jointly and severally. Defendants do not dispute the district court's findings that they violated FACE. Rather, Defendants contend that the Attorney General does not, under FACE, have the authority to elect statutory damages in lieu of proof of actual damages. In addition, they argue that FACE is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power and that it violates defendants' rights guaranteed under the First Amendment of the Constitution.
We review the district court's award of summary judgment de novo. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 439 (3d Cir. 2000).
The task of resolving how statutory penalties are to be awarded under FACE is a question of statutory interpretation which begins by discerning the plain meaning of FACE's statutory penalty provision. If Congress's intent as to this issue is plain, referral to other canons of statutory construction is unnecessary. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Nernberg, 3 F.3d 62, 64 (3d Cir. 1993); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ().
To determine a law's plain meaning, we begin with the language of the statute. See United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); New Rock Asset Partners v. Preferred Entity Advancements, 101 F.3d 1492, 1498 (3d Cir. 1996); Santa Fe Medical Services, Inc. v. Segal (In Re Segal), 57 F.3d 342, 345 (3d Cir. 1995). If the language of the statute expresses Congress's intent with sufficient precision, the inquiry ends there and the statute is enforced according to its terms. See Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. at 241. Where the statutory language does not express Congress's intent unequivocally, a court traditionally refers to the legislative history and the atmosphere in which the statute was enacted in an attempt to determine the congressional purpose. See New Rock, 101 F.3d at 1498. Once the plain meaning of the statute is determined, it is conclusive "except in rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." Id. (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
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