U.S. v. Griffin
| Decision Date | 22 May 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-3846,94-3846 |
| Citation | 84 F.3d 820 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven C. GRIFFIN, Marvin M. Rux, and Andrae Scurlock, Defendants-Appellants. Appeal of Stanley L. Hill. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Patrick M. Collins (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Criminal Division, Chicago, IL, Barry Rand Elden, Chief of Appeals, Office to the United States Attorney, Criminal Appellate Division Chicago, IL, for United States.
David C. Thomas (argued), Chicago-Kent College of Law, Chicago, IL, for Stanley L. Hill.
Before KANNE and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges, and SKINNER, District Judge. **
A jury trial presents the inevitable tension between the necessary control a district judge must exercise to achieve the fair presentation of evidence in an impartial forum and the methods for the submission of evidence used by counsel in aggressive representation of their clients. Experienced trial lawyers know that the adversarial nature of a trial--particularly in the presence of a jury--provides an opportunity to achieve an advantage for their clients if they can gain control of the forum. On the other hand, experienced federal trial judges are not unfamiliar with the range of tactics trial lawyers engage in to advance their clients' interests. At bottom, of course, it is not the advocate but the adjudicator who must regulate the conduct of the proceeding to guarantee a fair trial. The ultimate means of ensuring the judge's control of the trial is the power of direct contempt--an extraordinary power which must be exercised with appropriate discretion.
Stanley L. Hill is a member of the Illinois Bar who engaged in obdurate behavior in the course of defending his client against assorted criminal charges. Rather than proceeding summarily against Mr. Hill and interrupting the multi-defendant criminal trial, the district judge waited until after sentences were imposed and then issued an order directing Mr. Hill to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his conduct during the trial. After receiving his written and oral responses, the district judge found Mr. Hill in direct contempt of court. We are asked in this appeal to examine both the procedural sufficiency of Mr. Hill's contempt judgment and the basis in the record for the district judge's finding of contempt as a matter of law. Upon our review of the record, we find that the district judge did not deny Mr. Hill the process due him under applicable law and that the record demonstrates an evidentiary basis sufficient to sustain an adjudication of criminal contempt.
A grand jury sitting in Chicago handed down an indictment charging Marvin M. Rux and two others with twenty-three counts of unlawful activity stemming from their alleged conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The grand jury specifically charged Rux with aiding and abetting the conspiracy, knowingly engaging in financial transactions to launder proceeds of cocaine distribution, and structuring transactions so as to evade the currency transaction reporting requirements of federal law. Mr. Hill was appointed to represent Rux in the ensuing jury trial conducted before Judge James B. Zagel in the Northern District of Illinois.
The prosecution came to trial armed with an impressive amount of inculpatory evidence concerning the unlawful activities of Rux and his two codefendants. Included in this body of evidence was the testimony of Special Agents Kevin Moss and William Maloney of the Internal Revenue Service's Criminal Investigation Division. It was during Mr. Hill's cross-examination of these two witnesses that the events leading to the finding of contempt took place.
The first two specified instances of contempt occurred during the cross-examination of Agent Moss. The government called Agent Moss as an expert on the unlawful practices of money laundering and structuring. 1 1] On direct examination by Assistant U.S. Attorney Scott, Agent Moss explained certain terms used in the description of money laundering and structuring offenses codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 and 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5324. He also described the means and methods by which persons attempt to conceal the profits of criminal enterprises and the efforts of the federal government to identify and investigate these activities. At no time did the government ask Agent Moss about any of the evidence specifically pertaining to the transactions that formed the heart of the government's case against Rux.
Mr. Hill repeatedly asked Agent Moss on cross-examination whether the government had asked him to examine any of the financial records involved in the present case. These questions before the jury elicited repeated objections from AUSA Scott, which Judge Zagel sustained.
BY MR. HILL:
Q. Have you had occasion to look at the real estate transactions in this case?
Q. All right. Your testimony is talking generally about what you know from other cases, correct?
A. From my experience.
Q. Now, has the government asked you as a result of your expertise to look at the transactions involving Marvin Rux?
A. No.
Q. I mean, you have been involved in other cases where you've been asked to look at financial transactions to see whether they were legal or not, haven't you?
Q. Let me just ask you this one last question. Have you been asked to review any transactions involving Marvin Rux, sir?
At the sidebar conference, Judge Zagel told Mr. Hill that his questions were designed to put the government on trial--a tactic Judge Zagel said he would not allow. It was during this same sidebar conference that Mr. Hill made a request that led to the second instance of contempt.
Judge Zagel suggested to Mr. Hill at the sidebar conference that he was doing no service to his client because the government could easily ask Agent Moss to examine and testify about the records of the transactions.
The sidebar conference ended, and Agent Moss was then subjected to redirect examination by AUSA Scott and recross by counsel for Rux's codefendants. Judge Zagel then engaged Mr. Hill at a sidebar conference prior to Mr. Hill's opportunity to recross Agent Moss.
Judge Zagel determined from this exchange that Mr. Hill's only purpose in requesting at the sidebar conference that Agent Moss examine the records was to pursue the proscribed line of questioning and that the request constituted a material misrepresentation to the court.
The third and fourth specified acts of contempt occurred during Mr. Hill's cross-examination of Agent Maloney, who prior to trial had conducted the very analysis that had concerned Mr. Hill during his cross-examination of Agent Moss. Agent Maloney's testimony was crucial to the government's case against Rux. He analyzed and...
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