U.S. v. Griffin, 75--1130
| Decision Date | 20 November 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 75--1130,75--1130 |
| Citation | 525 F.2d 710 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Joseph E. GRIFFIN, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Paul F. Markham, Boston, Mass., by appointment of the Court, with whom Edward F. Harrington, and Gargan, Harrington, Markham & Wall, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for appellant.
John F. Conroy, Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom J. Stanley Pottinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., James N. Gabriel, U.S. Atty., and Robert A. Murphy, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on brief, for appellee.
Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, and ALDRICH and CAMPBELL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant, found guilty by a jury on both counts of an indictment, appeals because of the court's admission of certain testimony, and its failure to direct acquittals. Title 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(4)(A), count 1, forbids willfully injuring 'any person . . . in order to intimidate . . . any other person or any class of persons from . . . without discrimination on account of race, color . . . (attending any public school.)' Title 18 U.S.C. § 1509, count 2, forbids forcefully and willfully attempting 'to prevent, obstruct, impede, or interfere with, the due exercise of rights . . . under any order . . . of a court of the United States.' The questions arise because of the court's permitting the jury to find that the clubbing of one Andre Yvon Jean Louis, a black, by the defendant in South Boston on October 7, 1974, could be found to be in violation of both statutes.
In June, 1974, the Massachusetts District Court issued an order for enforced busing in the South Boston public schools. We take judicial notice that the ensuing busing received substantial publicity and aroused widespread resentment. In October police details were assigned to South Boston to protect person and property. On the afternoon of October 7 a detail was assigned to the intersection of Old Colony Avenue and Dorchester Streets, some blocks away from the Patrick Gavin School, and through which buses returning blacks from that school normally passed. In fact that afternoon the buses were rerouted, but this was not publicly known. A crowd of 400 to 500 had gathered on the street and sidewalks. Some objects were thrown, and there was much shouting. Initially the shouts were adjurations to the police to leave so that the crowd could 'take care of these niggers,' but when the usual hour for the buses had passed, the cry was as to their whereabouts. Defendant, prominent because he wore a checkered lumberjacket on a hot afternoon, and was the only adult in the street crowd, was heard shouting inquiries as to where were the buses; 'Where are the (obscene) niggers?'; 'Get the (obscene) cops out of here.' Traffic was moving slowly when Jean Louis sought to drive by. Defendant called out, 'Let's get the (obscene) nigger.' Thereupon a segment of the crowd ran to Jean Louis' car, broke the widows and dragged him out. When he sought to escape defendant pursued him and beat him with a club--a hammer handle previously observed in defendant's pocket--incapacitating him for several weeks.
Jean Louis, a black adult, was not a student, nor a parent, nor otherwise connected with any Boston public school. We agree with defendant that there was no direct evidence that by the act of beating him defendant intended to prevent black students from attending school. On the other hand, defendant presented no evidence, and there was no affirmative testimony supporting the assertion in his brief that his action was born simply out of frustration and his hatred for blacks, and 'was not carried out with the thought that as a result of the beating busing would be prevented.' We cannot agree that this conclusion was established by the fact that defenant 'initiated his act of assault (by) 'let's get the (obscene) nigger,' not 'let's intimidate the students." Given the circumstances, the jury could well find that defendant intended the indiscriminate beating of an innocent black on the public street near a school at school release time, with the police unable to prevent it, to have a chilling effect upon other blacks, parents or children. The general inculcation of fear in order to further a specific objective is familiar practice.
Equally unacceptable is defendant's argument that his inquiries as to the whereabouts of the school children, and adjurations to the police to leave, were irrelevant because, in fact, the buses did not come. Nor does the nature of defendant's expressed interest and intent change simply by reason of counsel's conclusion that his state of mind was one of frustration. At the least, there was a jury question as to a more specific intent.
It was, of course, unnecessary...
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