U.S. v. Hadaway, 92-8552

• Decision Date: 20 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-8552,92-8552
• Citation: 998 F.2d 917
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip Wynens HADAWAY, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 917

998 F.2d 917

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Phillip Wynens HADAWAY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-8552.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Aug. 20, 1993.

James C. Marshall, Macon, GA, for defendant-appellant.

G.F. Peterman, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., Macon, GA, for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

BLACK, Circuit Judge:

Phillip Hadaway pled guilty to possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841 and 5861(d). Because police discovered and seized the sawed-off shotgun in Hadaway's home on November 20, 1990, the district court used the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines or U.S.S.G.), as amended through November 1, 1990, to calculate the applicable guideline range. Facing twenty-one to twenty-seven months in prison, Hadaway sought to persuade the district court to impose a shorter sentence. He contended that the district court could depart downward because (1) his case was atypical, falling outside the "heartland" of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 and threatening "lesser harms," see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.11, and (2) the penalty prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines was far too harsh under "community standards" in rural Georgia. Hadaway also argued that the district court should have applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 as in effect before November 1, 1990. The district court declined to depart downward, apparently deciding that it lacked the authority to do so and rejecting Hadaway's request that it apply U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 as if it had not been amended.

Although we conclude that the district court correctly applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, as amended, and that a district court may not depart downward based on community standards, we vacate Hadaway's sentence and remand this case so that the district court may determine whether Hadaway's possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun was truly atypical or threatened lesser harms.

I. BACKGROUND

Phillip Hadaway was stopped on the evening of November 19, 1990, by a Jones County, Georgia deputy sheriff who observed him weaving on the highway. With Hadaway's consent, the deputy sheriff searched the car. He found a small quantity of marijuana and two handguns. The deputy sheriff arrested Hadaway and took him to jail. There it was discovered that one of the two handguns in Hadaway's car had been reported stolen from another county. ¹

The following morning, Hadaway executed a written consent to a search of his home. A bottle containing amphetamine residue and a sawed-off shotgun were found.

Hadaway was subsequently indicted for and pled guilty to possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. Applying U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, as amended through November 1, 1990, the district court determined that the appropriate sentencing range was twenty-one to twenty-seven months. ² The district court declined to depart downward, apparently concluding that it lacked the authority to do so, and sentenced Hadaway to twenty-one months in prison.

II. DISCUSSION

We address at length only Hadaway's arguments that the district court could have departed downward in this case. ³

A.

The threshold issue is whether Hadaway has raised an issue within the scope of appellate review. Appellate review of downward departure issues is limited. We may not, for example, review a district court's refusal to grant a downward departure on the merits. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We may, however, determine whether a district court erred in concluding that it lacked the authority to depart downward. E.g., United States v. Fossett, 881 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir.1989).

Although the record in this case is somewhat ambiguous, it appears that the district court declined to depart downward because it believed that it lacked the authority to do so rather than because it determined that the facts did not warrant a departure. The district court commented that "there is not the flexibility that your counsel suggests to the Court that there ought to be.... The flexibility that the Court has is within the guideline range that applies." Furthermore, the district court did not correct Hadaway's counsel when he said: "[i]f I understood the Court's decision correctly, the Court, essentially, was saying that the Court felt it had no discretion." We, therefore, review each of the arguments advanced by Hadaway to determine whether the district court erred in concluding that it lacked the authority to depart.

B.

Hadaway argued first that a downward departure in this case was appropriate because his conduct was atypical. He contended that his possession of a sawed-off shotgun fell outside the heartland of cases Congress sought to address when it outlawed possession of sawed-off shotguns, see U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, n. 4(b), and that his conduct did "not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue," U.S.S.G. § 5K2.11. In an affidavit submitted at sentencing, Hadaway averred that, on a whim, he exchanged a bucket of sheetrock mud and some sheetrock tape for the sawed-off shotgun, intending to keep it as a curiosity or to use it for parts. Hadaway further averred that he did not keep the sawed-off shotgun among his admittedly large collection of firearms because he wasn't sure it worked. ⁴ On appeal, Hadaway argues that he had the "sawed-off shotgun for reasonable purposes with no intent to use it in the fashion that our gun laws are designed to deter." ⁵ This, according to Hadaway, takes his case outside the heartland of possession cases and indicates that his conduct threatened lesser harms.

Because it is clear that the district court had the authority to depart downward if it were persuaded that Hadaway's case truly was "atypical ... where conduct significantly differs from the norm," U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, n. 4(b), or that Hadaway's conduct threatened lesser harms, U.S.S.G. § 5K2.11, we vacate the sentence. On remand, the district court should acknowledge that it possesses authority to depart downward on this basis and determine whether a downward departure is warranted in this case.

C.

Hadaway also argued that the district court possessed the authority to depart downward because members of the rural Georgia community in which he lives find the sentence prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines to be excessive. According to Hadaway, rural Georgians routinely violate federal firearms statutes ⁶ and those of his neighbors whom he or his lawyer polled were startled to learn that the penalty for possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun is approximately two years in prison. Hadaway argues, more generally, that the Sentencing Guidelines must give way if a community views a crime less seriously than did Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission. We disagree, and we join the First and Fifth Circuits in holding that departures based on "community standards" are not permitted under the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Barbontin, 907 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir.1990) (rejecting upward departure based on local intolerance for drug trafficking and large amount of drugs involved by "San Antonio standards"); United States v. Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d 347 (1st Cir.1989) (rejecting upward departure based on high incidence of and local antipathy toward cocaine trafficking in Puerto Rico).

Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission in 1984, see Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984), 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98, and charged it with the task of developing uniform national sentencing guidelines. "A primary goal of sentencing reform [was] to eliminate sentencing disparity." S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong.2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235. Congress explicitly directed the Sentencing Commission to "avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), because Congress concluded that "[s]entencing disparities that are not justified by differences among offenses or offenders are unfair both to offenders and to the public," S.Rep. No. 225 at 45, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3228. ⁷

While Congress also instructed the Sentencing Commission to consider, inter alia, "the community view of the gravity of the offense [and] the public concern generated by the offense," 28 U.S.C. § 994(c), Congress indicated that "community standards" should influence the determination of an appropriate sentence "only to the extent they do have relevance," id. Like the First Circuit, "we have no reason to believe that the Commission failed to consider such community-related factors." Aguilar-Pena, 887 F.2d at 351. Accordingly, it cannot be said that "community standards" are "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).

Moreover, departures based on community standards conflict fundamentally with the requirement that departures be based on the characteristics of the offense and the offender and be limited to the rare circumstances where "a particular case presents atypical features." U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, n. 2 (emphasis added). Downward departures based on community standards, in contrast, would apply generally to every violation of a specific federal statute by any person in a particular community. ⁸ Consequently,...