U.S. v. Hanson
| fullCitation | U.S. v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986) |
| Decision Date | 07 October 1986 |
| Citation | 801 F.2d 757 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-1065,86-1065 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Michael HANSON and Carlos Jamie Garza, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Jerry R. Hoodenpyle, Thomas E. Myers, Arlington, Tex., (Court-appointed), for Hanson.
Jack W. Beech, Fort Worth, Tex., (Court-appointed), for Garza.
Terrence J. Hart, Asst. U.S. Atty., Marvin Collins, U.S. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
Before THORNBERRY, JOHNSON, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-appellants Robert Michael Hanson and Carlos Jamie Garza appeal the district court's denial of their motion to suppress evidence obtained from them as a result of a warrantless search at Dallas Fort-Worth International Airport ("DFW"). In addition, Hanson contends that the evidence presented to the district court is insufficient to support his conviction for conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. Because we believe that the district court correctly denied defendants' motion to suppress and received evidence sufficient to support Hanson's conviction, we affirm the decision of the district court.
The crucial events in this case took place during an "airport stop" of defendants Hanson and Garza at DFW airport by law enforcement officials on April 11, 1985. A full chronology of the relevant events, however, must begin on April 10 in San Diego.
On April 10, law enforcement officials at the San Diego International Airport observed two men purchasing one-way tickets to Miami. The individuals paid for their tickets in cash. They appeared nervous. A Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") official named Cooper attempted to question the two individuals, but they refused to respond to his inquiry. 1 A check of the flight manifest revealed that the two men had purchased tickets under the names of Rick and Bill Free. The individuals' behavior aroused the suspicions of the narcotics officers, who relayed those suspicions to officials in Houston, a connecting stopover for the Miami flight.
Sgt. Foehner of the Houston airport narcotics detail observed the men in Houston. Again, they appeared nervous. A check of the flight manifest revealed no passengers named Rick or Bill Free. The two individuals boarded the Miami flight without incident.
The following day, April 11, Sgt. Foehner again observed the two individuals returning from Miami. 2 He believed they were wearing the same clothes as they had worn the previous day. One of the individuals, later identified as Hanson, wore a distinctive wide-brim "Indiana Jones" type hat. Both men carried briefcases. Sgt. Foehner observed the two men board the flight to Dallas.
Sgt. Foehner relayed this information and his suspicions that the two men might be transporting narcotics to Sgt. Pinkston of the Department of Public Safety at DFW. Upon receiving this information, Pinkston called DEA agent Van Patten.
Van Patten and Pinkston identified the two men coming off the Houston flight on the basis of the description Pinkston had received from Sgt. Foehner. Pinkston and Van Patten followed the men to the baggage claim area. The individuals appeared nervous and watchful. One of the men, later identified as Garza, went to a public phone several times, apparently without making a call. Garza chain-smoked and paced about the baggage claim area while Hanson waited outside. When the bags arrived at the carrousel, Garza first claimed a green garment bag and set it beside the carrousel. He claimed a brown sports bag and brought it outside to the area where Hanson was standing. Then he went back to the baggage area to retrieve the garment bag.
Pinkston and Van Patten observed Hanson and Garza waiting outside the terminal. An airport shuttle bus pulled up in front of the defendants. Believing that they intended to board the bus, Pinkston and Van Patten (now joined by two other officers) ran outside the terminal and approached Hanson and Garza. All the officers wore plain clothes. Two of the officers stood behind the defendants while Pinkston and Van Patten stood either in front of them or slightly to one side.
Pinkston identified himself to Hanson as a police officer and asked if he could speak with him. Hanson agreed. Pinkston asked to see Hanson's airline tickets and Hanson produced both his own ticket and Garza's. The tickets bore the names of Bob and Charles Jenkins. Pinkston asked for further identification and Hanson produced his driver's license. Van Patten made the same request of Garza. Hanson produced a Texas driver's license under the name of Robert Hanson. Garza produced a license under the name of Carlos Garza. Van Patten returned Garza's license to him but Pinkston apparently did not return Hanson's.
Pinkston asked Hanson if he could speak with him apart from the others. Hanson complied, stepping several feet away from the group. Pinkston informed Hanson that, based on information he had received, he suspected Hanson and Garza of carrying narcotics. Hanson offered to let Pinkston search his briefcase. This initial search revealed nothing. Pinkston then asked for permission to search the other bags. Hanson agreed and informed Garza that he had done so. Garza either indicated approval or merely acquiesced.
At this point, one of the officers noticed what appeared to be a shotgun barrel protruding from the garment bag. A search of the bag revealed a shotgun, an automatic handgun, a boot knife, a bullet-proof vest and a device identified by Pinkston as a cocaine sifter.
The officers next directed their attention to the brown sports bag. The bag was locked. Van Patten inquired as to the existence of a key. Hanson produced one and either Hanson or Van Patten unzipped the bag and searched its contents. He discovered a white powdery substance, later identified as cocaine, in the false bottom of an aerosol spray can. Both men were immediately arrested and advised of their Miranda rights. Both men were searched incident to this arrest. The search revealed additional quantities of cocaine concealed on their persons.
Both men were indicted on charges of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. Sec. 846) and of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1)). Both defendants filed motions to suppress the evidence seized at DFW airport, arguing that the officers obtained the evidence in violation of the fourth amendment. The district court denied the motion. The government proceeded to trial on the conspiracy count only. After a joint trial to the bench on stipulated facts, defendants were convicted and sentenced to six years in prison.
On appeal, Hanson and Garza muster two primary arguments. First, they argue that the initial contact between themselves and the officers amounted to an arrest requiring probable cause but that probable cause was not established until after the officers had discovered the cocaine, a discovery tainted by the illegal arrest. In the alternative, they argue that, even if the contact did not amount to a full scale arrest, it was at least an investigatory stop requiring reasonable suspicions on the part of the detaining officers that defendants were engaged in criminal activity. Defendants contend that reasonable suspicion is not presented on these facts. 3 A proper resolution of these contentions requires a brief overview of conventional fourth amendment analysis.
The leading case in this circuit on the interplay of airport drug investigations and the fourth amendment is United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.1982) (Unit B) (en banc). In Berry, this court noted that the Supreme Court has recognized three distinct levels or tiers of police-citizen contact within the context of the fourth amendment. On the first level is mere communication between a citizen and an officer, involving no element of detention or coercion. Such contact does not implicate the fourth amendment. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, n. 116, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). On the second level are brief detentions or investigatory stops which must be supported by "reasonable suspicion" on the part of the detaining officer based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant an intrusion." Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879. Full scale arrests occupy the third tier, involving the types of restrictions on liberty imposed by formal custody. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498-501, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324-1326, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Under the fourth amendment, an arrest cannot be conducted in the absence of probable cause.
This three-tiered approach presents this court with two questions: when were the defendants "seized" within the meaning of the fourth amendment and which tier does that seizure occupy?
In Berry, this circuit adopted a test formulated by Justice Stewart in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980): a seizure has occurred if "in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave." 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. The district court apparently held the view that no seizure ever occurred (prior to the arrest) in the contact between defendants and the officers at DFW, although the court's brief order is unclear on this point. In any event, we find that, for fourth amendment purposes, a seizure occurred at the point Pinkston took Hanson aside and informed him that he was suspected of carrying narcotics. United States v. Glass, 741 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.1984). As this Court noted in Berry, "statements which intimate that an investigation has focused on a specific individual easily could induce a reasonable person to believe that failure to cooperate...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Stovall
...does not, in and of itself, create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop" (quoting United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1986))); cf. State v. Casey, 296 S.E.2d 473, 480 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (approving use of drug courier profile as basis for inve......
-
Com. v. Bennett
...a defendant does not, in and of itself, create a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigatory stop." United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir.1986), citing United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 600 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc). However, while the characteristics listed......
-
US v. Wright
...were not invoked." Id. at 523 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. at 1338 n. 3. 9 Royer, 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S.Ct. at 1323-24. 10 Cf. United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 761 (5th Cir.1986) (seizure of defendant occurred when he was asked to step aside, his drivers license was retained, and he was informed ......
-
Iglesias v. Com., 0651-86-2
...v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679, 682 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct. 700, 98 L.Ed.2d 651 (1988); United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 760-61 (5th Cir.1986). Because Iglesias did not raise the third type of confrontation in the trial court, 3 we are concerned in this case w......
-
§ 17.03 "REASONABLE SUSPICION"
...of reasonable suspicion. See § 7.03, supra.[56] See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam).[57] United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1986).[58] United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).[59] "[I]t cannot be said with assurance what combination of factors fro......
-
§ 17.03 "Reasonable Suspicion"
...of reasonable suspicion. See § 7.03, supra.[58] See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980) (per curiam). [59] United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 1986).[60] United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989).[61] "[I]t cannot be said with assurance what combination of factors fr......
-
TABLE OF CASES
...App. 2006), 118 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), 53 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), 527 Hanson, United States v., 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986), 276 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), 469 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), 198 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S......
-
Table of Cases
...App. 2006), 127 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), 578 Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), 574 Hanson, United States v., 801 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1986), 296 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), 407 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), 143, 215 Hayes v. Florida, 4......