U.S. v. Harris, 87-1354
Decision Date | 16 October 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 87-1354,87-1354 |
Citation | 832 F.2d 88 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Orbin HARRIS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Robert Kuhnmuench, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendant-appellant.
Joseph P. Stadtmueller, U.S. Atty., Milwaukee, Wis., Elsa C. Lamelas, Matthew L. Jacobs, James L. Santelle, Asst. U.S. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before WOOD, CUDAHY, and COFFEY, Circuit Judges.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution provides, "... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...." U.S. Const., amend. 5. Orbin Harris was charged with and pleaded guilty to violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(d), committing an armed robbery of a savings and loan institution, and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c), using a firearm to commit a federal felony. Harris moved to have the firearm count of his indictment, Count 2, dismissed, arguing that in light of the charge of armed robbery, the charge of using a firearm to commit a felony was "multiplicitous" and, hence, a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription against multiple punishments for the same offense. The district court denied Harris' motion. The question presented on appeal is one of first impression in this circuit. We affirm.
The facts of this case may be stated briefly. On November 18, 1986, a federal grand jury returned a superceding indictment against Orbin Harris. Count 1 charged Harris with the October 17, 1986 armed robbery of a savings and loan institution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(d), while Count 2 charged Harris with using a firearm during the commission of a federal felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c). The underlying offense in Count 2 of the indictment was the bank robbery charged in Count 1. Harris moved to dismiss Count 2 of the indictment on various grounds, only one of which, the Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy, serves as the basis for this appeal. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1)(B), Harris' motion was referred to a magistrate who recommended that it be denied. Harris filed timely objections to the magistrate's recommendation but, on December 31, 1986, after conducting a de novo review of the motion, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and denied Harris' motion to dismiss Count 2. As a result, on February 6, 1987, Harris pleaded guilty to both Counts 1 and 2 1 and was sentenced, inter alia, to serve consecutive sentences of seven years on Count 1 and five years on Count 2.
On appeal, Harris asserts that his indictment offends the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal Constitution because each count of the indictment charges him with the "same offense." 2 Harris relies chiefly on Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 98 S.Ct. 909, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend to authorize, in the case of a bank robbery committed with a firearm, the already enhanced penalty prescribed in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(d) 3 as well as the additional consecutive penalty prescribed under what was then 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c). 4 The Court in Simpson, however, expressly declined to reach the constitutional issue of whether cumulative punishments for violations of Secs. 2113(d) and 924(c) were constitutionally permissible and instead concluded that the legislative history of the statutes demonstrated that Congress did not intend to authorize the imposition of the additional penalty of Sec. 924(c) for commission of a bank robbery with a firearm, an offense already subject to enhanced punishment under Sec. 2113(d). Id. at 11-13.
Since the Supreme Court's 1978 Simpson decision, Congress has amended Sec. 924(c) in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. The amendment altered Sec. 924(c) to provide in relevant part:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device, for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for ten years ... (emphasis added).
On its face, Sec. 924(c) clearly indicates that a conviction and sentence under Sec. 924(c) is authorized even when, as here, the underlying offense, Sec. 2113(d), already contains an enhancement provision of its own. Thus, application of the Simpson analysis to Sec. 924(c), as amended, can yield but one conclusion--that Congress specifically did intend to authorize an additional penalty for use of a firearm in the commission of the already enhanced charge of armed robbery of a savings and loan institution. We proceed to the question of whether punishment for a violation of both Secs. 924(c) and 2113(d) is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. Recent Supreme Court precedent is dispositive of this question.
In Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983), the Supreme Court held unequivocally that where, as here, Congress "specially authoriz[es]" cumulative punishments for even the same offense, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended. Id. at 367, 103 S.Ct. at 679 (citing Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1438, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980)). More specifically, the Court in Hunter held that with respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause "does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." 459 U.S. at 366, 103 S.Ct. at 678. Our earlier discussion of the 1984 amendment to Sec. 924(c) establishes the clear intent of Congress to authorize cumulative punishments for those who violate Sec. 2113(d) while possessing a firearm. Because Sec. 924(c) satisfies the litmus test of legislative intent articulated in Missouri v. Hunter, the consecutive sentences imposed on Harris do not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause.
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