U.S. v. Hartwell

• Decision Date: 25 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. Crim. 99-50057.,Crim. 99-50057.
• Citation: 67 F.Supp.2d 784
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Anthony Antoine HARTWELL and Darwin Jay Copeland, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

67 F.Supp.2d 784

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Anthony Antoine HARTWELL and Darwin Jay Copeland, Defendants.

No. Crim. 99-50057.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

October 25, 1999.

Charles A. Grossmann, Flint, MI, Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, Flint, MI, David S. Grant, Flint, MI, for Anthony Antoine Hartwell, defendant.

Daniel D. Bremer, Burton, MI, Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, Flint, MI, for Darwin Jay Copeland, defendant.

Mark C. Jones, U.S. Atty's Office, Flint, MI, for U.S.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT HARTWELL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE; DENYING DEFENDANT COPELAND'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND DENYING DEFENDANT COPELAND'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

GADOLA, District Judge.

The instant criminal action arises out of a traffic stop which occurred at approximately 1:45 a.m. on June 30, 1999. Presently before the Court is defendant Anthony Antoine Hartwell's motion to suppress evidence filed August 17, 1999. An evidentiary hearing was commenced regarding defendant Hartwell's motion on September 8, 1999. However, at that time, counsel for defendant Darwin Jay Copeland informed the Court that defendant Copeland intended to file his own motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, the evidentiary hearing was continued until October 14, 1999. On October 4, 1999, as promised, defendant Copeland filed a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to suppress statements. The government had responded to defendant Hartwell's motion on August 25, 1999. The government also notified the Court that it would not file a written response to defendant Copeland's motions prior to the October 14, 1999 evidentiary hearing. On October 14, 1999, an evidentiary hearing on both defendants' motions was held. At said hearing, the government sought leave to submit a supplemental brief regarding defendants' motions to suppress. Leave was granted. On October 15, 1999, the government filed its supplemental brief.

Both defendants Hartwell and Copeland are charged in Count I of a three-count first superseding indictment filed September 1, 1999. That count charges defendants with conspiracy to distribute controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). Defendant Hartwell is charged in Count II with being a felon in possession of firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Count III charges defendant Copeland with being a felon in possession of firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).

For the reasons set forth below, both defendants' motions to suppress will be denied. Specifically, the Court is persuaded that the Michigan state troopers who stopped the vehicle had probable cause to believe that at least one traffic violation had occurred as required under the applicable caselaw. Moreover, the Court finds no constitutional violations as a result of the subsequent searches of defendants and the vehicle.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND GERMANE TO BOTH DEFENDANTS

At the evidentiary hearing, the government presented Michigan State Troopers Thomas Weber and Michael John Gillette. The defense put forward no witnesses. Significantly, neither the government nor defendants disputed the crucial facts recounted below.

On June 30, 1999, at approximately 1:45 a.m., Troopers Gillett and Weber were on patrol when they observed a vehicle with its parking lights on, parked on the wrong side of the street, i.e. facing on-coming traffic. See police report, attached as Exh. 2 to the government's answer and brief in response to motion to suppress. The troopers also noted that the vehicle was partially blocking the roadway as it was parked at an almost 45 degree angle to the curb on its left side of the roadway. See id., p. 1. The troopers passed by the parked vehicle and decided to circle the block in order to return to investigate the situation. By the time they had returned, however, the suspect car had pulled away from the curb. The troopers followed and ultimately stopped the vehicle approximately three-fourths to one mile away.

Once stopped, the troopers approached the vehicle and observed that it was occupied by two males, later determined to be defendant Anthony Hartwell, the driver, and co-defendant Darwin J. Copeland, the passenger. As Trooper Gillett approached the passenger side of defendant's car, he observed a plastic cup which was approximately ¾ full of a suspected alcoholic beverage. Also observed was one bottle of suspected alcohol that was in a brown paper sack which was leaning into the center console on the driver's side. See police report, p. 2. At that time, Trooper Gillett asked the passenger whether the bottle contained alcohol. The trooper was advised by defendant Copeland that it did. See id.

According to the police report and the testimony, Trooper Weber asked the driver, defendant Hartwell, to exit the vehicle, and advised him that he was under arrest for transporting open intoxicants in a motor vehicle. Trooper Weber then placed his left hand on the left hip of defendant Hartwell. The trooper reported that he could feel a handgun in defendant's waistband. Defendant Hartwell was then placed in custody for carrying a concealed weapon. One .40 caliber handgun was seized from defendant's waistband.

Trooper Gillett placed the passenger, co-defendant Copeland, under arrest for possession of open intoxicants in a motor vehicle. At the same time, defendant Copeland advised the troopers that there was another handgun in the vehicle. Trooper Gillette then observed a .25 caliber handgun laying on the back seat passenger-side floorboard of the vehicle.

It should be noted that the troopers were assisted with taking both subjects into custody by Flint Police Department Officer Harlon Green.

As conceded in open court during the hearing October 14, 1999, defendants do not dispute the sequence of events enumerated above. Defendants argue, however, that the stop of defendant's vehicle was "pretextual." Although defendant Hartwell does not deny that he was "improperly parked," his counsel maintains that such an infraction does not constitute a violation of the "traffic laws" and thus the troopers had no probable cause to stop the vehicle.

III. DEFENDANT HARTWELL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

It is well-settled that an automobile stop is considered a "seizure" of persons pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (holding that "[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a `seizure' of `persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]"). The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against "unreasonable" searches and seizures conducted by governmental actors. Accordingly, "[a]n automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be `unreasonable' under the circumstances." Id. at 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769. As the Supreme Court noted in Whren, "[a]s a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 S.Ct. 330, 332, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977) (per curiam)) (emphasis added). The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

Defendant argues that the troopers' stop of defendant Hartwell's vehicle was pretextual. Although defendant concedes that a stop of the car would have been permitted if the troopers had observed defendant committing a "traffic offense," defendant maintains that violation of a parking regulation is an insufficient basis for the stop. Defendant Hartwell cites a number of cases in an attempt to distinguish the instant situation from other cases clearly involving moving traffic violations. See, e.g., Whren v. U.S., supra (inattentive operation of vehicle, improper turn and speeding); People v. Haney, 192 Mich.App. 207, 480 N.W.2d 322 (Mich.Ct. App.1991) (failure to signal a left turn); U.S. v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.1989) (surveillance of a known drug courier vehicle); U.S. v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir.1993) (no visible license plates); U.S. v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357 (6th Cir.1988) (illegal lane change); U.S. v. Crotinger, 928 F.2d 203 (6th Cir.1991) (speeding); and U.S. v. French, 974 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.1992) (speeding). Finally, defendant Hartwell brings a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause alleging that the officers stopped defendant's vehicle because defendant and his passenger were young black males, driving a new car in the early morning hours.

The government, in response, maintains that the stop was not pretextual. The government's position (at least as stated in its initial response) hinges upon the allegation that defendant was illegally parked in violation of M.C.L. § 257.675.¹ According to the government, the illegal parking represented a violation of a "traffic law" which allowed the troopers to permissibly stop the vehicle. Once the vehicle was stopped, the troopers observed open intoxicants inside the car in violation of M.C.L. § 257.624(a).² The government directs the Court's attention to U.S. v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385 (6th Cir.1993), for the proposition that a violation of a state traffic ordinance provides probable cause for a motor vehicle stop, and that such a stop cannot be successfully challenged in spite of the existence of other subjective motivations for the stop. Id. at 392.

The first and threshold issue is whether the troopers violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures by stopping defendant's vehicle. The crucial question...