U.S.A v. Havvard, 01-1092

• Decision Date: 18 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 01-1092,01-1092
• Citation: 260 F.3d 597
• Parties: (7th Cir. 2001) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wade M. Havvard, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 597

260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001)

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wade M. Havvard, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01-1092

In the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Argued June 13, 2001

Decided July 18, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. No. 00 CR 43--David F. Hamilton, Judge.

Susan H. Dowd (argued), Office of the U.S. Atty., Indianapolis, In, for Plaintiff Appellee.

William E. Marsh (argued), Indiana Federal Community Defenders, Inc., Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Bauer, Coffey, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.

Bauer, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Wade M. Havvard guilty of one count of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g)(1), and the district court sentenced him to 120 months' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, a $1000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. On appeal Havvard argues that the district court erred in admitting a fingerprint expert's opinion that a latent print lifted from a gun recovered at the house where Havvard was arrested matched an exemplar obtained from him. We affirm.

On June 23, 1998, Indiana State Police officers and members of the FBI Fugitive Task Force executed a search warrant at the residence of Havvard's grandmother. Law enforcement officials believed that Havvard was currently staying there, and when he did not respond to requests to come downstairs, the officers searched the home and eventually located him hiding in a closet in a second-floor bed room. Several firearms and rounds of ammunition were recovered from the second-floor bedrooms, including the bed room where Havvard was found. A latent fingerprint lifted from one of the handguns was later matched to an exemplar fingerprint obtained from Havvard.

Prior to trial Havvard moved to exclude the government's offer of expert testimony that the fingerprints matched, arguing as relevant here that the government had not established the scientific reliability of fingerprint comparisons to render such evidence admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. The district court ordered a hearing based on the standards for admitting expert testimony established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). At that hearing the government called FBI fingerprint expert Stephen Meager to explain the general process of latent print identification. Meager, who has studied the success rates of fingerprint comparisons in national research surveys, described the physical characteristics of fingerprints and detailed the three-step process by which latent prints are compared with exemplars.

According to Meager, the examiner first determines whether the flow of the ridges--the lines and grooves observable on the fingertips--follows the same pattern on both the latent print and the exemplar. During this initial phase the examiner also determines the orientation of the imprint left by the fingerprint ridges. Meager pointed out, however, that at this first level of study an examiner can only exclude prints that do not share these basic similarities; a match cannot be made without more in-depth, individualized comparison.

Next, the examiner studies each separate ridge in the fingerprint and determines its relationship to the other ridges in the print. Four elements of each ridge-- location, type, direction, and relationship--are considered in the aggregate at this stage. Meager stated that this closer analysis allows the examiner to begin individualizing fingerprints and possibly match a latent print with an exemplar.

Finally, in the third phase, the examiner compares individual ridges to determine whether those in the latent print match each ridge in the exemplar. Meager explained that at this level the examiner will also compare the unique sweat pores in each print.

Meager also testified that the error rate for fingerprint comparison is essentially zero. Though conceding that a small margin of error exists because of differences in individual examiners, he opined that this risk is minimized because print identifications are typically confirmed through peer review. Meager did acknowledge that fingerprint examiners have not adopted a single standard for determining when a fragmentary latent fingerprint is sufficient to permit a comparison, but he suggested that the unique nature of fingerprints is counterintuitive to the establishment of such a standard and that through experience each examiner develops a comfort level for deciding how much of a fragmentary print is necessary to permit a comparison.

The government presented no other witnesses, and Havvard offered no evidence. At the close of the hearing, Havvard argued that, because there is no objective standard defining when a latent print is sufficient for a comparison, fingerprint analysis is simply the subjective assessment of the individual examiner and not a scientific process that can satisfy the Daubert/Kumho standard for admission under Rule 702.

In a published entry, see United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), the district court concluded that because the fingerprint evidence was obviously relevant--an expert matched a latent print found on one of the firearms with Havvard's left index finger--the only issue was its reliability. See id. at 850. The district court further found that claims of the uniqueness and permanence of fingerprints are "scientific"claims because those assertions can be "falsified," id., and that much of the fingerprint comparison process is "completely objective," id. at 853. The district court also observed that the methods of comparison are easily testable such that both parties can subject prints to comparison to verify a purported match. See id. at 854. Furthermore, the district court noted that the peer-reviewed results of fingerprint comparisons, although not often published as scholarly articles, have been used in "adversarial testing for roughly 100 years," which offered a greater sense of the reliability of fingerprint comparisons than could the mere publication of an article. See id. Emphasizing the minimal error rate of fingerprint comparisons, though acknowledging that fingerprint analysis lacks a unified objective standard for determining when a latent print is adequate to allow comparison, the district court concluded that fingerprint analysis is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the Daubert/Kumho standard and denied Havvard's motion.

At trial the government called Officer Michael Knapp, a fingerprint expert employed by the Indianapolis Police Department. After relating his extensive knowledge, training, and experience with fingerprint identifications, Officer Knapp described the general scientific basis for fingerprint analysis and the particular comparison techniques he uses to match fingerprints. He then stated that a latent print found on the .45 caliber pistol recovered at the time of Havvard's arrest matched an exemplar print of Havvard's left index finger. Havvard cross-examined Officer Knapp but did not offer a fingerprint expert of his own. The jury ultimately found Havvard guilty of one count of possession of a firearm by a felon.

In this court Havvard first argues that the district court did not properly conduct its Daubert hearing to determine the admissibility of fingerprint evidence under Rule 702, a determination that we review de novo. See United States v. Cruz-Velasco, 224 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2000). Specifically, he contends that fingerprint evidence is inadmissible under Daubert because it is not "scientifically" based. The standards of Daubert, however, are not limited in application to "scientific" testimony alone. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147 (holding that "the basic gatekeeping obligation" of Daubert applies to all expert testimony)...