U.S. v. Hinds

Decision Date27 July 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87-1128,87-1128
Citation856 F.2d 438
Parties26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1360 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. David HINDS, Defendant, Appellant. . Heard
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Barbara A. McCarthy, by Appointment of the Court, for defendant, appellant.

Mitchell D. Dembin, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Frank L. McNamara, Jr., U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., was on brief for appellee.

Before BOWNES, TORRUELLA and NOONAN, * Circuit Judges.

BOWNES, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant David Hinds appeals his jury conviction of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 846, 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2. David Hinds' codefendants Timothy Letren and Grady Milton were also found guilty on both counts. The other indicted defendant, Keith Matthews, entered a guilty plea prior to trial.

There are four issues on appeal: (1) whether the search warrant was invalid because of failure to specify the items to be seized; (2) whether the search conducted was invalid because it covered an area not described in the warrant; (3) whether the admission of hearsay evidence by coconspirators against defendant was error; and (4) whether the admission of testimony that a gun had been seized during the search violated Federal Rule of Evidence 403.

I. THE FACTS

This case started on May 22, 1986, when Special Agent Doherty of the Drug Enforcement Administration was introduced to Keith Matthews. Doherty, working as an undercover agent, posed as a cocaine buyer looking for a source of supply. He offered to buy a pound of cocaine. Matthews agreed to the sale and left to get the cocaine. When Matthews returned, he said the deal could not go through because there were police around. He gave Doherty two telephone numbers to call.

A number of telephone calls were made to the numbers, all of which were recorded. On June 4, Doherty talked twice to Matthews' half brother, Timothy Letren, known as Rick. On June 6, Doherty arranged by phone to meet Letren at the Ground Round Restaurant in downtown Boston. At the meeting Letren identified himself as Matthews' half brother. He told Doherty that Matthews was the one to see for buying kilograms (keys) of cocaine, that he sold only ounces and pounds. Doherty gave Letren his beeper number so that Matthews would have it.

Doherty telephoned Matthews on June 10 and asked Matthews to meet him at the Victoria Station Restaurant near the South Station in Boston. Matthews met Doherty and it was agreed that Doherty would buy two kilograms of cocaine at a price of either $31,000 or $32,000 per kilogram. Matthews agreed to give Doherty a sample and they drove in Doherty's car to Matthews' house at 41 Braddock Park in Boston. Matthews went into the house and returned with about two grams of cocaine as a sample.

On June 10, another undercover agent, Bonnie Alexander, who had been introduced to Matthews as a friend of Doherty's, called Matthews to confirm a meeting at the Westin Hotel to consummate the "buy." Matthews and Letren drove to the hotel. Letren waited outside while Matthews went inside. Matthews and Doherty dickered about the price, which Matthews said had to be higher than previously agreed. There was more negotiating outside the hotel between Doherty and Letren. A price of $35,000 per kilogram was finally agreed upon. Matthews and Letren then drove to the house at 41 Braddock Park. Letren called Doherty and told him everything was set and Matthews was on his way.

Surveillance of 41 Braddock Park by the DEA commenced at about 5:00 p.m. on the same day, June 11. The surveillance team saw Letren and Matthews return to the house at about 6:45. Just before 7:00 p.m. codefendant Grady Milton arrived at the house by automobile. Milton knocked or rang the bell and then returned to his car. A short time later Matthews and defendant Hinds came out of the house. Matthews was carrying a bag containing, as a subsequent analysis proved, one kilogram of cocaine. Both men got into Milton's car and it drove away.

The car arrived at the Westin Hotel a short time later. Matthews went into the hotel and returned with Doherty. Doherty got into the car and sat in the rear seat behind Milton, the driver. Hinds was seated in the passenger's seat in the front. Matthews, who was in the rear seat behind Hinds, opened the bag and showed the cocaine to Doherty. Doherty broke off a piece, ostensibly to take it back to his hotel room for a test. Doherty and Matthews then got out of the car. Matthews left the bag containing the kilogram of cocaine in the car. Doherty gave a prearranged signal and Matthews, Milton and Hinds were arrested. Letren was arrested a short time later at 41 Braddock Park.

After the arrests a warrant was obtained to search the house at 41 Braddock Park. A strainer and metal dish with a glass pulverizer, all of which had cocaine residue on them, and a scale were found in Hinds' bedroom. In a bathroom next to Hinds' bedroom, there was an empty jar with a lactose label on it. An empty bottle of mannitol and an empty bottle of lactose were found in a trash can in the kitchen, which adjoined the bedroom. 1 Three wet plastic bags with traces of white powder in them were found in the doorway between the kitchen and the bedroom. On analysis, the white powder was found to be cocaine. The final items seized were a five-shot Smith & Wesson revolver and a small box of ammunition. The revolver and ammunition were found between the kitchen stove and the wall behind it.

II. THE WARRANT

The description in the warrant of the property authorized to be seized was:

Coaine [sic]; cocaine paraphernalia, proceeds from the illegal distribution of cocaine, including United States currency; documents and records showing evidence of the illegal distribution of cocaine and showing ownership or dominion over the above-described premises. All being evidence of violations of title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).

The question is whether the words "cocaine paraphernalia" are sufficient to describe the items seized from Hinds' bedroom and adjoining kitchen and bathroom. We do not at this time consider the seizure of the gun, which will be treated separately.

We reject appellant's contention that this was a general warrant. Broad and general search warrants are, of course, proscribed by the fourth amendment. See United States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.1980); Application of Lafayette Academy, Inc., 610 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.1979). Here, the nature of the items to be searched for was sufficiently described by the phrase "cocaine paraphernalia." We find no suggestion in any case that "paraphernalia"--much less "cocaine paraphernalia"--is unduly generic where the nature of the offense, in this case cocaine trafficking, is clear. It cannot reasonably be argued that cutting agents, scales, a strainer, metal discharge and pulverizer, and plastic bags with cocaine residue are not cocaine paraphernalia. In fact, "cocaine paraphernalia" can only include a highly restrictive set of items, and the agents who searched 41 Braddock Park did not engage, in a "general rummaging for evidence." Indeed, appellant concedes in his brief that the agents "knew what were looking for regarding cocaine paraphernalia (i.e., cutting agents, scales)." Appellant's brief, p. 23. There is no suggestion that the agents were searching for items unconnected to the cocaine trade. The term "cocaine paraphernalia" sufficiently described the items seized.

III. THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH

Appellant contends that the search of his bedroom and the adjoining kitchen and bathroom was not authorized by the warrant. The warrant description of the premises to be searched is:

41 Braddock Park, being a single family 3-story red brick building with white wooden trim, a brown front door which is located at the top of a stair landing on the first floor, said door bearing the numbers 41 in gold color, the entire premises are occupied by Lloyd, Alice, Richard and Keith Letren.

Appellant's argument that the search and seizure exceeded the scope of the warrant can be stated as follows. The building was a four-story house, not three, as the warrant states. The fourth story, which was the one that yielded the "cocaine paraphernalia" was occupied by the Hinds family, not the Letrens. The search, therefore, went beyond the premises described in the warrant.

The fourth amendment requires that a warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched...." This is an important proscription, for it serves to protect the "indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630, 6 S.Ct. 524, 532, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886). As we have said before, the authority to search must be limited to places described in the warrant. United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 868 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1632, 95 L.Ed.2d 205 (1987); United States v. Principe, 499 F.2d 1135, 1137 (1st Cir.1974). "However, search warrants and affidavits should be considered in a common sense manner, and hypertechnical readings should be avoided.... For example, warrants authorizing a search of 'premises' at a certain address authorize a search of the buildings standing on that land." Bonner at 868 (citations omitted). In United States v. Asselin, 775 F.2d 445 (1st Cir.1985), we held that "premises" included a disabled cadillac next to a carport, and a birdhouse hanging 15 feet away from the trailer home.

We find appellant's argument unpersuasive for three reasons. First, whether David Hinds lived on the third or fourth floor depends entirely on what is considered as the first floor. The record contains a photograph of 41 Braddock Park. It shows that the building is a brownstone with stairs leading up to the front door from the street. The front door opens on the main level of the premises, and two floors...

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