U.S. v. Holloway, No. 05-2229.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (1st Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Howard
• Citation: 499 F.3d 114
• Decision Date: 31 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-2230.,No. 05-2229.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Curtis HOLLOWAY, True Name: Curtis Kareem Holloway, a/k/a Curtis H. Holloway, a/k/a Curtis K. Holloway, Defendant, Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

499 F.3d 114 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v.
Curtis HOLLOWAY, True Name: Curtis Kareem Holloway, a/k/a Curtis H. Holloway, a/k/a Curtis K. Holloway, Defendant, Appellant/Cross-Appellee. No. 05-2229. No. 05-2230. United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit. Heard February 9, 2007. Decided August 31, 2007.

[499 F.3d 115]

Syrie D. Fried, for appellant.

Mark T. Quinlivan, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Michael J. Sullivan, United States attorney was on brief, for appellee.

Anne C. Goldbach, President, on brief for amicus curiae Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge and HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

HOWARD, Circuit Judge.

Curtis Holloway conditionally pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of ammunition, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and he was sentenced to time served. The government appeals the sentence, and Holloway cross-appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.

I.

We recount the facts in the light most favorable to the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress, but only to the extent that they have support in the record and are not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Sealey, 30 F.3d 7, 7 (1st Cir.1994).

On December 26, 2001, special officers¹ Anthony Crutchfield and Shaheed Hall were patrolling the streets around housing projects in the Roxbury section of Boston, Massachusetts. At 10:30 p.m., the officers saw Holloway chasing another individual, Memogne Lamothe. As Holloway drew closer, the officers saw him reach into his pants pocket, as if for a weapon. Lamothe ran inside the building at 144 Seaver Street, and the door locked behind him, preventing Holloway from following him. Holloway waited outside for several minutes, speaking with various individuals. Ultimately, Gerald Scott arrived and spoke with Holloway. Scott proceeded to shuttle back and forth between Holloway and the entryway to the building at 144 Seaver Street, apparently talking to someone inside. Holloway and Scott were then "buzzed" into the building.

Fearing a continuation of the earlier chase, Crutchfield and Hall immediately called their supervisor, Patrick Bailey, and the three officers entered the building using their pass key. Once inside, the officers saw Holloway, Scott, and Lamothe talking on the stairway in a common area of the building. The officers approached the men and asked what was going on. Holloway stated that nothing was going on, but Lamothe responded that he lived in the building, that he knew they should not be loitering in a common area, and that they would continue their conversation in his apartment. At this point the officers asked the three to provide identification. Scott and Lamothe cooperated, but Holloway

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refused. The officers persisted, and Holloway continued to say that he did not have to give them identification. Lamothe then unlocked his apartment door, but the officers directed him not to move. Lamothe complied, but Holloway suddenly shoved Lamothe into the officers and ran into the apartment. Hall and Crutchfield followed, with Hall entering first and immediately yelling "Gun." Upon entering, Crutchfield saw Holloway sitting on a chair and ordered him to the ground. Holloway was arrested after a struggle, and the officers recovered a loaded pistol that Hall had seen Holloway shove under the seat of his chair. Holloway was subsequently indicted for being a felon in possession of ammunition that traveled in interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Holloway moved to suppress the ammunition on the grounds that the officers had neither reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot to justify a Terry² stop nor probable cause to arrest when they seized Holloway. Therefore, Holloway maintained, any evidence that resulted from the wrongful seizure must be suppressed. After an evidentiary hearing, at which only Crutchfield testified, the district court denied the motion without opinion. Thereafter, Holloway entered a plea of guilty, conditioned on the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

At sentencing, the government argued that Holloway should be sentenced to a mandatory fifteen-year prison term under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),³ on the basis of Holloway's three Massachusetts convictions for assault and battery. The government argued that each conviction was a "violent felony"⁴ under the ACCA because each was based on a charging document which alleged that Holloway did "assault and beat" the victim. Holloway argued that assault and battery under Massachusetts law includes two types of conduct—harmful (violent) conduct and nonharmful (offensive or nonconsensual) conduct—and only convictions under the first prong are crimes of violence. Holloway emphasized that the "assault and beat" language was used to charge both types of batteries, and thus the charging language was mere "boilerplate" that said nothing about the nature of the underlying crime. Holloway further contended that the convictions could not be deemed predicate violent offenses under the ACCA without violating the principles set forth in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) because there were no other relevant judicial materials describing the facts of the Massachusetts convictions. The district court accepted Holloway's position and sentenced him to time served.

499 F.3d 117

II.

A. Motion to Suppress

Holloway maintains that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officers lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop. Holloway emphasizes that the officers only saw three men having a...