U.S. v. Hopkins
| Decision Date | 01 March 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1041,75-1041 |
| Citation | 174 U.S.App.D.C. 244,531 F.2d 576 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Tyrone C. HOPKINS, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Julian Tepper, Washington, D.C., (appointed by this Court), was on the brief for appellant.
Earl J. Silbert, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry and Richard A. Graham , Asst. U.S Attys., were on the brief for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, HASTIE, * Senior Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, and ROBB, Circuit Judge.
On November 10, 1972 the district court accepted appellant's plea of guilty to a charge of manslaughter, 1 and entered an order committing him to Lorton Youth Center for observation and study under the provisions of the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA). 2 Appellant was then nineteen years old.
The Classification Committee 3 recommended FYCA sentencing, 4 having determined that appellant would be 'amenable to a structured program such as that offered at the Youth Center.' In the cover letter sent, along with the Classification Committee's evaluation and recommendation, to the D.C. Board of Parole, the superintendent of the Youth Center indicated that he would concur with the FYCA sentence recommendation only if a federal facility could be designated. 5 The Parole Board rejected the superintendent's suggestion of transfer to a federal center, finding it 'not . . . possible,' and recommended adult sentencing. 6
The trial court on January 30, 1973, sentenced Hopkins to a term of imprisonment of 5 to 15 years. 7 In imposing this sentence the court stated:
. . . Well, let the record indicate that the Court did ask for a 5010(e) evaluation in view of the age, 19 years, of the defendant and received conflicting evaluations. One group, the Board of Parole, recommended that the Court impose sentence by way of the adult sentencing procedures. The Department of Corrections, without making a recommendation, said they would concur in a 5010(c) commitment; otherwise, they wouldn't, as an adult (sic), recommend it.
I have given a great deal of thought to that report and evaluation and the probation report which indicates that although he is only 19, this defendant has been the subject of criminal investigations since the age of 12 continuously. He has been charged as a youth since the age of 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, right up to the age of 19 when he was involved in what was originally charged as a felony murder, and he has been permitted to plead to a brokendown manslaughter charge.
In view of all that past record and the various recommendations, I am going to sentence him to a period of not less than five nor more than fifteen years as an adult on the manslaughter charge. 8
Appellant noted this appeal after several motions for post-conviction relief were denied by the district court. 9 The only issue confronting this court is whether Dorszynski v. United States 10 bars review of the court's denial of FYCA sentencing. In the circumstances of this case, we believe that it does not and that the case should be remanded so that the District Court may conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
With reference to the 'general proposition that once it is determined that a sentence is within the limitations set forth in the statute under which it is imposed, appellate review is at an end' 11 and the principle that 'limited review (of the exercise of sentencing discretion) is available when sentencing discretion is not exercised at all,' 12 the Court in Dorszynski held that the trial court must explicitly make a 'no benefit' finding before sentencing a youth offender as an adult.
An explicit finding that the youth would not benefit from treatment, the Court reasoned, would remove all doubt concerning whether the sentencing court actually exercised its discretion under the Act. 13 Notwithstanding its narrow interpretation of the congressional purposes in enacting the FYCA, and its observations concerning the virtually 'unfettered' discretion of sentencing judges, the Court refused to allow the no benefit finding to be left to implication. 'Literal compliance with the Act,' the Court stated, 'can be satisfied by any expression that makes clear the sentencing judge considered the alternative of sentencing under the Act and decided that the youth offender would not derive benefit from treatment under the Act.' 14
The district judge in the instant case clearly considered FYCA sentencing. As is indicated by the use of the conjunctive in the above quoted passage, however, explicit consideration of youth sentencing alone is inadequate. That the youth before the sentencing court would 'not derive benefit from treatment under the Act' 15 also must explicitly be established. Only by requiring such an explicit finding can consideration of the one factor deemed relevant to FYCA sentencing by Congress itself--amenability to treatment--be assured. The requirement of an express finding of no benefit ensures not only that the sentencing court is aware of the FYCA, but also that it focused on amenability to treatment in making its sentencing determination. 16 The wisdom of this approach may be best illustrated by example. In United States v. Van Buren 17 we remanded for resentencing because the trial judge failed to make an explicit no benefit finding, although he did rely on a host of negative findings in the § 5010(e) report in denying FYCA sentencing. On remand the same trial judge--unable to make that finding--sentenced Van Buren to a Youth Act term.
The circumstances in the instant case similarly compel the conclusion that we must remand for the explicit no benefit finding Dorszynski requires. 18
The extent to which further appellate exploration of the deficiencies in the sentencing process is permissible has been constricted by the Supreme Court's opinion in Dorszynski. The Court held that the 'no benefit' finding required under § 5010(d) 'is not to be read as a substantive standard which must be satisfied to support a sentence outside the Act' and that a sentence outside the Act 'need not be accompanied by a statement of reasons why the court chose such a sentence.' 19
The Court in Dorszynski, however, was careful to point out that appellate courts do have a limited role to play in the sentencing area. By citing United States v. Tucker, 20 and noting that appellant had not contended that 'the District Court relied upon improper or inaccurate information,' the Court reaffirmed the principle that appellate courts have a duty to scrutinize sentencing decisions to insure that they are not based on improper or unreliable information. 21
The Court in Dorszynski also distinguished between 'appellate modification of a statutorily-authorized sentence' 22 and 'careful scrutiny of the judicial process by which the particular punishment was determined.' 23 Rather than being an 'unjustified incursion into the province of the sentencing judge,' the Court observed that this latter responsibility is 'a necessary incident of what has always been appropriate appellate review of criminal cases.' 24 Its aim is to guarantee that the trial judge's discretion actually has been exercised, 25 and that the information relied on in sentencing is not unreliable, 26 improper, 27 or grossly insufficient. 28
An examination of the documents that served as a foundation for the punishment imposed in this case, undertaken in the performance of this duty to scrutinize the judicial process, reveals flaws fatal to the kind of knowledgeable sentencing called for by an act as carefully engineered as the FYCA. The FYCA reflects the Congressional mandate to substitute rehabilitation for retribution in the sentencing of young offenders. 29 As the Supreme Court noted, there were
two principal motivating factors behind the enactment of the Act: first, the period of life between 16 and 22 years of age was found to be the time when special factors operated to produce habitual criminals. Second, then-existing methods of treating criminally inclined youths were found inadequate in avoiding recidivism. H.R.Rep.No.2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 2--3 (1950) (hereinafter H.R. 2979). The Act was thus designed provide a better method for treating young offenders convicted in federal courts in that vulnerable age bracket, to rehabilitate them and restore normal behavior patterns. Ibid. 30
As a sentencing statute, the Act is unparalleled in its comprehensiveness. In addition to the four alternative sentences that may be imposed, 31 there are numerous other special provisions emphasizing the distinctive character of the sentencing of a youth offender. 32 A new Youth Correction Division was created within the United States Board of Parole to implement the system. 33 There are elaborate procedures for the study, classification and periodic examination of committed youths, 34 and detailed provisions governing conditional and unconditional release of offenders and procedures for supervising those released. 35
As part of this elaborate scheme Congress provided for the preparation of § 5010(e) reports, designed to supply 'additional information as to whether (the) youth offender will derive benefit from treatment.' 36 The observation and study period furnishes an invaluable opportunity to discover why these youths committed crimes, whether and in what way society has failed them, and what might be done to foster productive, law-abiding conduct in the future. The reports prepared are potentially useful presentencing aids to assist the judge in discharging his awesome responsibilities under the Act.
Hearings held by the District Court, however, have revealed serious procedural and substantive problems in the § 5010(e) process at the Lorton Youth Center which impede the preparation of the type of thorough and knowledgeable reports courts require to exercise their FYCA...
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