U.S. v. Horton

• Decision Date: 29 April 1982
• Docket Number: Nos. 81-1155,81-1489 and 81-1178,s. 81-1155
• Citation: 676 F.2d 1165
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward Lee HORTON, a/k/a "Cornbread" Horton, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bragster G. HORTON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 1165

676 F.2d 1165

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward Lee HORTON, a/k/a "Cornbread" Horton, Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bragster G. HORTON, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 81-1155, 81-1489 and 81-1178.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

April 29, 1982.

Alexandra de Saint Phall, Londrigan & Potter, Springfield, Ill., for defendants-appellants.

Larry A. Mackey, Asst. U. S. Atty., Gerald D. Fines, U. S. Atty., Springfield, Ill., for the U. S.

Before SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge, and PELL and BAUER, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Edward "Cornbread" Horton and his brother, Bragster, challenge their conviction of numerous crimes connected with extortionate collection practices. We affirm.

On September 24, 1980 a fifteen count indictment was returned against Cornbread, Bragster, and four others. Cornbread was charged in ten counts of extortionate collection practices in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894; use of a firearm to commit a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924; interstate travel in aid of racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894; and making extortionate loans in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 894. Bragster was charged in two counts of aiding and abetting the extortionate collection practices.

Both men pleaded not guilty and filed motions to dismiss the indictment, challenging it for lack of specificity. These motions were taken under advisement and trial was set for November 24, 1980. On November 18, 1980, before the trial court had ruled on the pending motions, a six count superseding indictment was returned and the original indictment was dismissed. ¹ The superseding indictment charged Cornbread with two counts of extortionate collection practices and two counts of using a firearm to commit extortion. Bragster was again charged with aiding and abetting the extortionate practices.

Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., defendants moved for a continuance of the trial date. The court denied the motions and the trial commenced three days after Cornbread and Bragster had been arraigned on the superseding indictment.

The victims, Curtis Hardy and James Conkrite, testified for the government under a grant of immunity. Their uncontradicted testimony showed that both Hardy and Conkrite were heroin addicts who frequently purchased heroin from Cornbread.

During 1979 Hardy made numerous purchases of heroin, often paying Cornbread with checks on which he forged his father's signature. Three of these checks were honored by the bank. Subsequently, the bank discovered the forgery and refused to honor four later checks. Cornbread had additional checks from Hardy which he had never attempted to cash. Hardy promised Cornbread that he would reimburse Cornbread for the amount of the bad checks. In addition, on at least one occasion, Cornbread gave Conkrite $150 worth of heroin on credit.

By July 1979 Hardy and Conkrite owed Cornbread between $700 and $800 for the heroin he had supplied. On July 5, 1979 Hardy and Conkrite went to Cornbread's house with an air conditioner which they hoped Cornbread would accept in partial payment of their debt. Cornbread agreed. During their negotiations Cornbread pulled out a pistol and a machine gun and with the aid of another man forced Hardy and Conkrite into the basement where they were kept under constant watch at gunpoint by Cornbread, Bragster, and two other men. Cornbread berated his two victims for owing him money and hit the men with a pistol and a blackjack. A few hours later Cornbread shot Conkrite in the left knee. As he was going to shoot Hardy, who had both legs together, Bragster told Hardy to move his legs apart so he would not be shot in both knees. Cornbread then shot Hardy in one knee. During the time Hardy and Conkrite were held captive, Bragster urged them to "tell the man (Cornbread) what he wants to know."

The wounded men remained in the basement until Bragster put a tourniquet on Hardy's leg and assisted both men up the stairs. They then drove themselves to the hospital where they were admitted for medical treatment. When Hardy and Conkrite were interviewed by the police, they claimed that the shooting occurred on the street as they were trying to fix their truck.

The jury found Cornbread and Bragster guilty on all counts. Cornbread was sentenced to sixty years imprisonment, receiving the maximum sentence for each count to be served consecutively. Bragster was sentenced to four months imprisonment and four years and eight months probation.

Cornbread and Bragster (collectively Cornbread) filed a joint appeal assigning numerous errors. Initially, Cornbread challenges the sufficiency of both the original and the superseding indictments. Second, he alleges that the trial court's refusal to continue the trial date after the superseding indictment was returned violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. Third, he claims that the government instruction defining "knowingly" was erroneous. Fourth, Cornbread contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he engaged in the collection of credit by extortionate means or that his brother aided and abetted any extortionate activities. Finally, Cornbread assigns two errors concerning his sentence, contending that the trial court improperly imposed two separate sentences for one extortionate act and abused its discretion by imposing the maximum sentence for each count. None of these arguments has merit.

I

Cornbread claims that both the original and superseding indictments lack specificity because they contain little information about the alleged extensions of credit. The original indictment did not specify the amount of the credit extended or when these extensions were made. It identified the victims only by initials. The superseding indictment, premised on the same theories of prosecution as the original indictment, contained the full names of the victims and added the fact that the extensions of credit involved narcotics, but provided no information concerning the amounts or dates of the extensions of credit.

Cornbread argues that the omission of the approximate times, dates, and amounts of the alleged extensions of credit seriously hampered his ability to prepare a defense, precluding him from asserting that there had been no extensions of credit, that any The purpose of an indictment is to provide the accused with a sufficient description of the offenses charged so that the accused will be able to prepare a defense. United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1979). Generally, an indictment is sufficient if it contains the essential elements of each offense charged. United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1978). However, mere tracking of the statutory language is insufficient where additional information is necessary to provide the accused with a clear understanding of the specific charges against him. United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1979).

debt had already been extinguished, or that the assault was not connected with the debt. He argues that a valid indictment must state the essential elements of the offenses charged as well as a statement of facts and circumstances relating to each element. Relying on United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978), he concludes that the indictment was impermissibly vague and ambiguous.

Our reading of the superseding indictment convinces us that, although perhaps less detailed than desirable, it is nevertheless sufficient. Clearly, the superseding indictment contained sufficient information to notify Cornbread that he was being charged with selling heroin to Hardy and Conkrite on credit and then threatening them with firearms and other acts of violence when they failed to repay him. Thus, not only was Cornbread advised of the essential elements of the offenses with which he was charged, see United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952, 98 S.Ct. 1580, 55 L.Ed.2d 802 (1978), but unlike the indictment found to be insufficient in United States v. Tomasetta, 429 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1970), the superseding indictment here identified the victims by name and precisely located and described the violent acts of extortion. Since the superseding indictment specifically informed Cornbread that the extensions of credit arose from drug transactions, we do not believe that the lack of detail concerning the times and amounts of the extensions of credit which subsequently precipitated the violent acts in any way hampered the preparation of Cornbread's defense.

United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1978), relied upon by Cornbread, are inapposite. The indictment in Cecil, unlike the indictment against Cornbread, failed to identify any overt acts and specifically alleged only the state in which the offense was committed and the names of some of the co-conspirators. In King the indictment omitted essential elements of the crime. In contrast, the indictment here not only alleged the essential elements of each offense charged but provided substantially more information than the indictments in either Cecil or King. We conclude that the superseding indictment against Cornbread and Bragster was not fatally defective.

II

Cornbread challenges the trial court's denial of a thirty day continuance after the superseding indictment was returned on the grounds that the denial: (1) violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2) and (d); and (2) was an abuse of the court's discretion. Neither of these arguments withstands analysis.

Both parties agree that the question of whether the time limitation in 18 U.S.C. § 3161 begins to run anew with reindictment turns on which party is responsible for dismissal of the original indictment, but they disagree as to which party was...