U.S. v. Hsia

Citation24 F.Supp.2d 14
Decision Date13 August 1998
Docket NumberCriminal No. 98-0057(PLF).
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Maria HSIA, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Nancy Luque, Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, Washington, DC, for Maria Hsia.

OPINION

PAUL L. FRIEDMAN, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on fourteen pre-trial motions filed by defendant Maria Hsia.1 The Court heard argument on the motions on July 27 and 28, 1998.

The Court will issue separate opinions addressing defendant's Motion 1 (to Dismiss the Indictment for Violation of Due Process); Motion 2 (to Dismiss Counts in the Indictment for Their Positive Repugnance to the Federal Election Campaign Act); Motion 3 (to Dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment for Failure to State an Offense under 18 U.S.C. § 371); Motion 5 (to Dismiss Counts 2 through 6 for Failure to State an Offense Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 1001 (Causation)); Motion 6 (to Dismiss Counts 2 through 6 for Failure to State an Offense Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 1001 (False Statements)); Motion 7 (to Dismiss Counts 4 and 5 for Failure to State an Offense Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 1001 (Soft Money)); Motion 9 (to Dismiss Indictment Because It Offends the First Amendment); Motion 10 (to Dismiss Indictment Because It Selectively Prosecutes Maria Hsia); and Motion 11 (to Dismiss Indictment Because It is Tainted).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny Motion 4 (to Dismiss Count 1(FEC) and Counts 2-6 for Failure to State an Offense under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001 (Intent)) and Motion 13 (to Dismiss Count 1 for Lack of Venue). The Court will grant in part and deny in part Motion 8 (to Strike Surplusage); Motion 14 (to Compel Discovery and Disclosure of Exculpatory Information); and Motion 15 (for a Bill of Particulars).

I. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Election Campaign Act

The Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431 et seq., provides a detailed set of limits governing contributions to electoral campaigns and expenditures by candidates. Of specific relevance to this case, FECA provides that "[n]o person shall make contributions" that exceed certain limits set forth in the statute. 2 U.S.C. § 441a. The statute also prohibits any person from making contributions in the name of another or knowingly permitting her name to be used to effect such a contribution, 2 U.S.C. § 441f, and prohibits corporations from making contributions in connection with "any election at which presidential or vice presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices," 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a). The statute charges the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") with the administration and enforcement of FECA. 2 U.S.C. § 437c. It provides for both civil and criminal enforcement, and specifies criminal penalties for certain violations, up to a maximum of one year imprisonment and/or a fine. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d).

A "contribution" is defined by statute, in relevant part, as "money or anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office," see 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(A) (emphasis added), and the contribution limits set forth in FECA undisputably apply to contributions made to candidates for federal office, otherwise known as "hard money" contributions. In this case, the government does not dispute that FECA does not generally cover contributions for state or local campaigns and non-campaign activities such as issue advocacy, otherwise known as "soft money" contributions.2 National political parties that support both federal and state/local candidates have set up separate accounts: "hard money" accounts for contributions that are subject to FECA and that are used for candidates in federal elections and "soft money" accounts for funds to be used only for non-federal campaigns and for non-campaign activities.

FECA requires "political committees," including national political parties, to file reports with the FEC identifying each person who made "contribution[s]" in the aggregate annual amount of $200 or more. 2 U.S.C. § 434. FEC regulations go further, requiring national political party committees to report any receipt of funds over $200, regardless of whether the funds are deemed "hard money" or "soft money." 11 C.F.R. § 104.8(e) (requiring information, including name, address and occupation of all individuals or entities who "donate" an aggregate amount in excess of $200 in any calendar year to a national party committee's non-federal account(s)).

B. The Indictment

Count 1 of the indictment charges that Ms. Hsia conspired with the International Buddhist Progress Society ("IBPS"), a tax-exempt religious organization doing business as the Hsi Lai Temple (the "Temple"), and other unnamed co-conspirators to defraud the United States by impairing, obstructing, impeding and defeating the lawful functions and duties of the FEC and the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.3 The indictment alleges that Ms. Hsia solicited IBPS to make contributions through "straw" donors or "conduits" (some of whom were monks, nuns and volunteers from IBPS) and made campaign contributions in her own name knowing that the IBPS would reimburse her. The indictment alleges that Ms. Hsia (1) impaired and impeded the FEC by concealing the fact that IBPS was the true source of the contributions, and (2) impaired and impeded the INS by submitting documents to the INS stating that IBPS was not participating in political campaigns so that the INS would permit foreign nuns and monks associated with IBPS to enter or remain in the United States when she knew that IBPS in fact was making political contributions.

Counts 2-6 charge Ms. Hsia with causing the making of false statements to the FEC in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1001. The indictment alleges that Ms. Hsia knowingly and willfully caused various political committees to submit material false statements to the FEC by concealing the identity of the true source of contributions from the committees which then relayed the false information to the FEC. Each count addresses a different report submitted to the FEC by a political committee which allegedly contained false statement(s) about the identity of actual contributors. Count 2 pertains to a July 18, 1995 report and Count 3 to an October 17, 1995 report by the Clinton-Gore '96 Committee; Count 4 relates to an April 15, 1996 report and Count 5 to a July 15, 1996 report by the Democratic National Committee; and Count 6 pertains to an October 24, 1996 report by the Patrick Kennedy Committee. Counts 2 and 3 do not identify the actual source of the contributions, but Counts 4-6 allege that IBPS was the actual contributor. Counts 2-6 all allege that Ms. Hsia solicited the contributions at issue, but only Count 6 alleges that Ms. Hsia herself wrote a contribution check for which she was reimbursed by IBPS.

II. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A. Defendant's Motion 4, to Dismiss Count 1(FEC) and Counts 2-6 for Failure to State an Offense under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001

Ms. Hsia contends that Counts 2-6 (false statements) and the portion of Count 1 that is based on alleged false statements to the FEC must be dismissed because the indictment fails to allege that Ms. Hsia knew that the political committees were required to report to the FEC. This Court previously has held that "when a contributor is charged as an aider and abettor in the federal election context for causing an intermediary to make a false statement to the FEC, the prosecution must prove that `defendant knew of the [political party] treasurers' reporting obligations, that he attempted to frustrate those obligations, and that he knew his conduct was unlawful.'" See United States v. Trie, 21 F.Supp.2d 7, 14 (D.D.C.1998) (quoting United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir.1994)). The Court in Trie explained that the government is required to prove this knowledge because "a showing of `willfulness' requires" such proof in the federal election context where the government relies on a combination of Section 2(b) and Section 1001. United States v. Trie, 21 F.Supp.2d at 16. The Court in Trie also found that the indictment sufficiently alleged the essential element of willfulness by alleging that Mr. Trie acted "knowingly and willfully" and therefore "[w]hether Mr. Trie knew of the reporting requirement of the DNC is a matter for proof at trial and the crafting of proper jury instructions." Id. at 20.

Each of the false statements counts of Ms. Hsia's indictment alleges that Ms. Hsia "knowingly and willfully caused the submission of a material false statement to the FEC." Relying on cases in which courts have created intent elements where the statutes at issue did not specify intent, Ms. Hsia maintains that the Court in Trie created a new element of intent and that the indictment therefore is defective because it does not specifically allege that Ms. Hsia knew of the political committees' reporting obligations. See United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir.1979) ("Although an indictment tracking the language of a statute is usually adequate because statutes usually include all elements of a crime, an indictment is inadequate when it fails to allege an essential element of the offense even when it tracks the language of the statute"). Ms. Hsia has read more into the Trie opinion than exists.

Ms. Hsia is correct that the willfulness standard articulated by the Court in Trie applies to Ms. Hsia as the solicitor of the alleged conduit contributors just as it applied to Mr. Trie as the alleged conduit...

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