U.S. v. Hyde, CR 04-S-094-NE.
Decision Date | 25 September 2006 |
Docket Number | No. CR 04-S-094-NE.,CR 04-S-094-NE. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Samuel Steven HYDE. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Paul Marc Sandlin, Huntsville, AL, for Samuel Steven Hyde.
Alice H. Martin, U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, U.S. Marshal, United States Marshal's Office, U.S. Probation, United States Probation Office, Birmingham, AL, Mary Stuart Burrell, U.S. Attorney's Office, Huntsville, AL, for United States of America.
Defendant, Samuel Steven Hyde, was sentenced on October 28, 2004, to concurrent terms of seventy months for receiving material containing images of child pornogrphy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), and possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The case now is before the court' on defendant's motion for an amended judgment and a revised commitment order. See doc. no. 21. The motion is based upon the following statement in defendant's judgment and commitment order: "Alternatively, should the sentencing guidelines be determined unconstitutional, the defendant is committed to . . . be imprisoned for a term of 16 months . . .." Doc. no. 19, at 2. That language was included because defendant's sentences were imposed during the period of uncertainty following the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), which addressed the State of Washington's determinate sentencing scheme, and held that such sentencing regimens violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury whenever a trial judge imposed a sentence that was not based solely upon "facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Id. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531.1 That holding cast a long and foreboding shadow over the United States Sentencing Guidelines, created as a result of the, Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and generated doubt about their continuing validity.
During the interregnum between the Blakely opinion and the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), specifically addressing the United States Sentencing Guidelines, it was the practice of some judges in this district, as well as other districts, to pronounce alternative sentences.2 In such cases, the sentences actually imposed were based upon facts that, if disputed by a defendant, were judicially determined under a preponderance of the evidence standard. Further, and as stated in the language that is the focus of the present ' motion, the alternative sentence was intended to apply only in the event the Supreme Court subsequently extended the rationale for the decision in Blakely to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, declared those Guidelines to be "unconstitutional," and directed district courts to resentence defendants solely upon the basis of facts that were admitted by a defendant, or pled in an indictment and proven to the unanimous satisfaction of a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.3
As is so often the case, the crisp clarity of hindsight causes this court to doubt the wisdom of pronouncing alternative sentences. Nevertheless, this case is an example of that (in retrospect) ill-conceived practice.
Samuel Steven Hyde waived indictment4 and, on April 20, 2004, entered pleas of "guilty" to both counts of a two-count Information.5 Sentencing was postponed until July 21, 2004. A presentence investigation report was disclosed on June 15, 2004, and defendant filed written objections on June 24, 2004. See doc. no. 9. The following day, defendant filed a motion for permission to file additional, "out-of-time objections" to his presentence report.6 The pertinent portion of that motion read as follows:
1. The United States Supreme Court decided the case [of] Blakely v. Washington on June 24, 2004.
2. The Blakely case may apply to some of the sentencing issues in this case. However, the undersigned has not had the opportunity to closely review the Blakely opinion to determine [its] possible applicability to the instant case.
Wherefore, premises considered, the undersigned moves . . . for permission to file possible out of time objections to the pre-sentence investigative report.
Doc. no. 10. The motion was granted, and sentencing was continued until October 28, 2004.
Defendant filed a "Supplement to [his] Previously Filed Objections" on August 17, 2004. See doe. no. 12. Significantly, that pleading did not contain any objections based upon the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington. Instead, it submitted a psychological evaluation in support of defendant's objection to the probation officer's opinion that defendant met "the criterion for the classification of a Pedophile."7
Defendant subsequently filed, on August 31, 2004, an "Amendment to [his]' Previously Filed Objections." See doe. no. 14. Again, it is significant to note that this pleading also did not contain any objections based upon the rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington. Instead, the amendment (a) withdrew five objections that had been lodged in defendant's original, June 25, 2004 filing, and (b) amplified defendant's objections to the four and five level enhancements of his base offense level referenced in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the presentence report, respectively, based upon defendant's contention that the probation officer should have consulted the 2002 edition of the Guidelines Manual, rather than the November 5, 2003 edition.
The probation officer issued a revised presentence report, and an "Addendum" to the revised report, on September 10, 2004. The "Addendum" stated the probation officer's response to each of defendant's written objections, and clarified that the presentence report had been revised in order to:
to update the disposition of the pending case in paragraph 43, and
to delete the first sentence of paragraph 83. [Italicized emphasis supplied.]
Thus, the final version of the presentence report before the court on the date of sentencing contained two sets of offense level computations.9 The first group contemplated the possibility that this court might extend the rationale of Blakely v. Washington to the United States Sentencing Guidelines and, accordingly, took into account only those facts admitted by defendant in his plea agreement and Rule 11 plea colloquy.10 That portion of the report read as follows:
A total offense level of 14, when combined with a criminal history category of I, yielded a Guidelines sentence range of 15 to 21 months of imprisonment, and a...
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