U.S. v. Iglesias

Decision Date25 July 2008
Docket NumberNo. 06-4426.,06-4426.
Citation535 F.3d 150
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Enrique IGLESIAS a/k/a Agent Henry Enrique Iglesias, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Robert A. Zauzmer, Ewald Zittlau, Office of United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Appellee.

Cheryl J. Sturm, Chadds Ford, PA, Attorney for Appellant.

Before: FISHER, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal, Enrique Iglesias seeks to overturn his conviction on various drug and weapons charges. He claims that the evidence was insufficient and that the District Court abused its discretion when it admitted into evidence testimony from a suppression hearing. Iglesias also claims that the District Court erred at sentencing when it failed to deduct from the total drug quantity attributable to him an amount reserved for personal use. We will affirm.

I.

Early in the morning on August 19, 2004, federal and state law enforcement agents executed a search warrant at the home of Elliott Shisler and seized a small quantity of methamphetamine. Shisler agreed to cooperate with law enforcement and informed the agents that Iglesias had sold him the drug. As the officers were transporting Shisler downtown for an interview, he pointed out that Iglesias lived in a duplex at 3625 Red Lion Road in Philadelphia.

After arriving at the station house, the agents interviewed Shisler and he agreed to telephone Iglesias to arrange a drug buy. In a recorded conversation, Shisler asked Iglesias whether he could come to the duplex on Red Lion Road. Iglesias consented, telling Shisler to "hurry." Based on that telephone call and other statements Shisler made, a search warrant was issued for Iglesias's residence.

Late that same evening, the search warrant was executed at 3625 Red Lion Road, Apartment A, which was in a duplex owned by Iglesias's brother. In the master bedroom, agents found a wallet containing Iglesias's driver's license and a bag of methamphetamine in plain view on the bed. A woman's purse containing two bags of methamphetamine was found atop a bureau in the same room. In the closet of the master bedroom, agents found two Atlantic City casino cards bearing Iglesias's name, a black canvas bag containing unused food saver bags and a bag sealer, and a bundle of cash totaling $15,611. In the master bathroom, agents discovered a can of hairspray with a false bottom in which was hidden a bag of methamphetamine.

In a bedroom which had been set up as an office, agents found a plastic bag containing 2.7 grams of methamphetamine along with photographs of Iglesias, a Social Security card bearing his name, and a receipt made out to "Henry Iglesias," which was a moniker that Iglesias used. In that same room was a briefcase containing an unloaded Taurus 9 millimeter semi-automatic handgun with an obliterated serial number and a magazine loaded with 9 millimeter ammunition, and hundreds of unused Ziploc® bags.

During their search of the kitchen, agents found a coffee can containing eight Ziploc® bags of methamphetamine weighing approximately 135 grams. In all, thirteen bags of methamphetamine — weighing a total of approximately 156 grams — were found in Apartment A.

On the dining room table, agents found a keyring which included keys to the front door of Apartment A and a silver Volvo parked behind the duplex. In the trunk of the Volvo, agents found a cooler that contained three food saver bags with 1146 grams of methamphetamine.1

As a result of the evidence seized during the search, Iglesias was indicted on four counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute more than 500 grams of a substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of a substance containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2); (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); and (4) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Before trial, Iglesias filed a motion to suppress evidence. At an evidentiary hearing held two days before trial, Shisler testified that Iglesias had sold him methamphetamine "once or twice" at the Red Lion Road duplex in 2004. Shisler also explained that sometimes he did not pay Iglesias until he had sold the drug to his customers. The District Court denied the motion to suppress and the case proceeded to trial.

At trial, the government called Shisler as a witness, but when asked "who supplied you with the methamphetamine that you sold," Shisler responded: "I can't answer that question because it has been brought to my attention that charges may be brought against me." In light of this about-face, the prosecutor proceeded to impeach his own witness by revisiting the questions that had been asked of Shisler at the suppression hearing. Thereafter, the government offered into evidence Shisler's prior testimony from the evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The jury subsequently found Iglesias guilty of all charges.

The District Court sentenced Iglesias to 420 months in prison, representing 360 months for each of the drug counts, to run concurrently, plus a 60 month consecutive sentence on the firearm count under 18 U.S.C. § 922(c)(1). The District Court also sentenced Iglesias to a concurrent sentence of 120 months for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). This timely appeal followed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

II.

Iglesias raises myriad challenges to his conviction and sentence. In this opinion, we focus on the three most substantial arguments, in which Iglesias claims: (1) insufficient evidence supported his convictions for conspiracy, drug and weapons possession, and possession of a handgun in furtherance of a drug crime; (2) the District Court abused its discretion in admitting into evidence at trial Shisler's testimony from the suppression hearing; and (3) the District Court erred at sentencing when it failed to exclude from the drug quantity methamphetamine earmarked for Iglesias's personal use. The latter two arguments involve questions of first impression for this Court.

A.

Iglesias claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him in three respects. First, he argues that he should not have been convicted of conspiracy because he and Shisler had merely a buyer-seller relationship. Second, Iglesias contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he possessed the methamphetamine or the Taurus firearm because others had access to Apartment A. Finally, he maintains that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he had kept the Taurus in furtherance of a drug crime.

"The burden on a defendant who raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is extremely high." United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 203-04 (3d Cir.2005) (citation omitted). As we explained in Lore:

In reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence ... we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and affirm the judgment if there is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 204 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the government may defeat a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on circumstantial evidence alone. See United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir.2006).

The essential elements of a drug distribution conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 are: "(1) a shared unity of purpose, (2) an intent to achieve a common goal, and (3) an agreement to work together toward the goal." Bobb, 471 F.3d at 494 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Among the factors courts have considered in determining whether a conspiracy has been shown are "the length of affiliation between the defendant and the conspiracy; whether there is an established method of payment; the extent to which transactions are standardized; and whether there is a demonstrated level of mutual trust." United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 199 (3d Cir.1999) (citation omitted).

Although he purchased drugs from Iglesias "once or twice" at Iglesias's apartment on Red Lion Road, Shisler testified that Iglesias gave him drugs on credit and awaited payment until after Shisler had sold the drugs to his customers. This arrangement is sufficient evidence of a conspiracy. See Bobb, 471 F.3d at 495. Also, the fact that Iglesias invited Shisler to Apartment A with drugs in plain view reflects a level of mutual trust consistent with a conspiracy. See Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199.

Furthermore, the government was not required to prove that all of the Gibbs factors supported the conspiracy because "the presence of one or more of these factors furthers the inference that the buyer knew that he was part of a larger operation and hence can be held responsible as a coconspirator." Id. at 200 (emphasis added). Based on the evidence adduced at trial, a reasonable juror could conclude that Shisler and Iglesias shared a common goal (the distribution of methamphetamine), the intent to achieve that goal, and a tacit agreement to cooperate to achieve it (via a credit arrangement). No more was required to prove a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846.

Iglesias next argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed the methamphetamine and the Taurus firearm because others had access to Apartment A. We reject this argument because it erroneously assumes that Iglesias's dominion and control over Apartment A had to be exclusive.

"The essential elements of the substantive offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute are that the defendant (1) knowingly possessed a controlled substance...

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