U.S. v. Ivery

Decision Date04 August 1993
Docket NumberNo. 93-1232,93-1232
Citation999 F.2d 1043
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Willie J. IVERY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Sheldon Light, Office of U.S. Atty., Federal Building, Detroit, MI (argued and briefed), for plaintiff-appellant.

Anthony T. Chambers, Detroit, MI (briefed), Bonnie M. Warmack, Highland Park, MI (argued and briefed), for defendant-appellee.

Before: GUY and SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judges; and DOWD, District Judge. *

DOWD, District Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

I.

The United States appeals the sentence imposed on Willie J. Ivery by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G." or "guidelines").

This appeal presents the issue of whether the upward adjustment required for "more than minimal planning" in a guidelines sentence in a multi-defendant case is determined by focusing on the planning efforts of the defendant to be sentenced or on the overall planning involved in the criminal conduct.

Ivery, along with co-defendants Anthony J. Satariano and Angela Melton, was charged in an indictment returned on February 27, 1992, with bank fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1343, 1956, and 371. Shortly before trial, he entered a plea of guilty to wire fraud (Count Two of the indictment) pursuant to a plea agreement with the government.

The district court determined that the total offense level for the defendant was twelve (12) and the criminal history category was I providing a sentencing range of ten (10) to sixteen (16) months with permission for a split sentence. Consistent with the guilty plea agreement, the government takes the position that the total offense level should be sixteen (16), which includes six (6) levels for the base offense, ten (10) additional levels for the fraud which exceeded $500,000 and an additional two (2) levels for "more than minimal planning," offset by the two (2) level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Consistent with the Presentence Report, the district court did not add the two (2) levels for "more than minimal planning," granted two (2) levels of reduction for acceptance of responsibility and an additional two (2) levels because of his finding that the defendant was a "minor participant."

A second issue presented for our review is whether it was error for the district court to apply a downward sentencing adjustment for "minor participant."

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand the cause for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

II.

Ivery was involved in a scheme to defraud NVR Savings Bank, a federal savings bank in McLean, Virginia, of over $763,000, and to launder the proceeds of the scheme.

Anthony Satariano, the Chief Financial Officer of NVR, saw an opportunity to embezzle funds from the bank and, through his sister Angela Melton, solicited the help of Ivery, a Detroit accountant. Ivery, in turn, recruited the help of Clifton and Roslyn Trotter. All of these parties expected to be compensated for their part in the scheme.

Ivery directed the Trotters' activities based on instructions obtained from Satariano through Melton. Ivery told the Trotters that "Tony," 1 an officer at a Virginia bank, had access to funds, and that their help was needed to establish a bank account to funnel the funds back to "Tony." Ivery told the Trotters to set up a corporate bank account using the name International Risk Services, to be known as "IRS." "Tony" would then wire transfer the funds at his disposal, destroying all records of the transfer. The purpose of the procedure was to conceal the true identity of "Tony" and to disguise the transaction as a tax payment to the Internal Revenue Service (hence, "IRS").

The Trotters set up the phony company and bank account in Philadelphia. On August 22, 1991, Satariano arranged for NVR to wire in excess of $763,000 to this account. After obtaining control of the funds, the Trotters undertook several efforts, again at Ivery's direction, to return the proceeds to Satariano. They purchased $100,000 in gold coins, which Mrs. Trotter delivered to "Tony" in Delaware. They also delivered to Satariano a number of signed blank checks for his use in obtaining access to the stolen funds.

In September of 1992, the Trotters had second thoughts and reported the scheme to the FBI. In return for an agreement that they would not be prosecuted, the Trotters cooperated with the FBI. The scheme was halted and the government recovered approximately $492,000 of the $763,000 taken.

On August 17, 1992, shortly before trial, Ivery entered a plea of guilty to wire fraud, as charged in Count Two of the indictment, pursuant to a plea agreement with the government.

On December 15, 1992, the district court imposed a sentence of five (5) months in a community treatment center to be followed by 180 days of home confinement and three years of supervised release. This sentence was consistent with that recommended by the Presentence Report. However, it was imposed over the government's objections.

III.

Appellate review of guideline sentences is generally governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3742. See, U.S. v. Morrison, 983 F.2d 730 (6th Cir.1993). Under section 3742, we review de novo a sentencing court's interpretation of the guidelines, but we must uphold a sentencing court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Those factual findings need not be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence. U.S. v. Carroll, 893 F.2d 1502, 1506 (6th Cir.1990). With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the government's appeal.

A.

The government argues first that it was error for the district court to refuse to apply the upward adjustment for "more than minimal planning" under U.S.S.G. §§ 2F1.1(b)(2) and 1B1.1, in the face of the stipulation in the plea agreement that such adjustment was applicable. We review this issue de novo.

The district court stated as follows:

I am not going to apply the two-level enhancement. I do not feel that Mr. Ivery did more planning than typical to commit this offense, and I think other parties are far more involved in this than he.

(Joint Appendix, at 83). It is apparent that the judge made his determination based on his perception of Ivery's role in the offense.

This is an incorrect legal standard to apply. The applicable guideline for this offense is U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2), which provides that "[i]f the offense involved ... more than minimal planning ..., increase by 2 levels." "More than minimal planning" is defined as follows:

"More than minimal planning" means more planning than is typical for commission of the offense in a simple form. "More than minimal planning" also exists if significant affirmative steps were taken to conceal the offense, other than conduct to which § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) applies.

"More than minimal planning" is deemed present in any case involving repeated acts over a period of time, unless it is clear that each instance was purely opportune. Consequently, this adjustment will apply especially frequently in property offenses.

* * * * * *

In an embezzlement, a single taking accomplished by a false book entry would constitute only minimal planning. On the other hand, creating purchase orders to, and invoices from, a dummy corporation for merchandise that was never delivered would constitute more than minimal planning, as would several instances of taking money, each accompanied by false entries.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment (n. 1(f)).

Although we have not yet directly addressed this point, the Eighth Circuit has specifically held that "more than minimal planning" is determined on the basis of the overall offense, 2 not on the role of an individual offender. U.S. v. Wilson, 955 F.2d 547 (8th Cir.1992); U.S. v. West, 942 F.2d 528 (8th Cir.1991).

In U.S. v. Rust, 976 F.2d 55 (1st Cir.1992), the government appealed from the sentence imposed, arguing that the district court clearly erred by finding that the offense did not involve more than minimal planning under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2). In reversing the sentence, the court of appeals observed:

Thus, the Guidelines set out three situations, any one of which warrants an enhancement for "more than minimal planning": cases where more planning occurs than is typical for commission of the offense in a simple form; cases involving significant affirmative steps to conceal; and cases involving repeated acts over a period of time, unless each instance was purely opportune. United States v. Maciaga, 965 F.2d 404, 407 (7th Cir.1992).

U.S. v. Rust, 976 F.2d at 57. 3

In the instant case, all three situations are present. The offense involved substantial planning in order to pass instructions from Satariano through Melton to Ivery and to establish the phony company and bank account. There were significant affirmative acts to conceal: the use of intermediaries to avoid detection of "Tony's" identity and role, the use of a phony bank account in the name "IRS," the destruction of NVR's records. Finally, the scheme also involved repeated acts over a period of time, none of which were "purely opportune." 4

It is clear that the district court wrongly interpreted the guidelines and committed reversible error on this issue.

B.

The district court gave Ivery the benefit of a two-level downward adjustment in offense level based on the court's conclusion that Ivery was a "minor participant" in the offense under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b), despite the parties' stipulation to the contrary in the plea agreement. The government contends that this was clearly erroneous.

At the sentencing, the court reviewed the involvement of the various principals as follows:

Melton and Ivery's...

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