U.S. v. Jackson

Decision Date20 October 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-3583.,02-3583.
Citation347 F.3d 598
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Shawn JACKSON, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Richard W. Smith-Monahan, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Mona Guerrier, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Richard W. Smith-Monahan, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.

Mona Guerrier, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: NELSON, GIBBONS, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Shawn Jackson was convicted of one count of post office robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2115. During jury selection, the government exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude Anthony Turner, who at the time was the only African-American on the jury panel. Jackson did not object to the government's decision to strike Turner until the jury and two alternates were selected. The district court asked the government for an explanation for its decision to strike Turner, and Jackson did not argue that the proffered explanation was a pretext for discrimination. The district court found that the government offered a race-neutral explanation and overruled Jackson's objection. Jackson now appeals this ruling, as well as the district court's refusal to give the jury instructions he requested regarding his theory of the defense and the reliability of certain identification testimony offered at his trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

On August 28, 2001, Jackson was indicted by a federal grand jury in the Southern District of Ohio for one count of post office robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2115. The indictment alleged that on May 24, 2001, Jackson robbed a United States post office in Dayton, Ohio, of approximately $1,333.00. Jackson's trial began on November 5, 2001. During voir dire, the district court asked the potential jurors to indicate if they had ever been government employees, and if so, whether their government service would affect their ability to serve as a juror. Anthony Turner, juror number 41, responded by saying, "I served in the United States Air Force for twenty years. And that would not affect my participation in the court." The government did not ask Turner any follow-up questions to his response.

Nonetheless, the government later exercised a peremptory challenge to exclude Turner. At the time, Turner was the only African-American on the jury panel. Jackson did not raise an objection to the government's peremptory challenge until after the jury and two alternates were selected. Counsel for Jackson did not object earlier because he believed that Turner had no chance of being on the panel, but once the selection process was over it became clear that Turner would have been an alternate if the government had not struck him from the panel. In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the court asked the government to give its reasons for the challenge. In response, Assistant United States Attorney Richard Chema stated that:

The gentleman was unresponsive ... to a question of the Court. The Court asked ... if anyone had been involved in the government and [would that] in some way affect your ability to serve on the jury. He stood up and said, he was in the Air Force for 21 years and retired from the Air Force and that wouldn't affect him.

Counsel for the government, both Miss Guerrier and myself believe that this gentleman wanted to get up and give a speech for one reason or another. The government didn't like the kind of attitude that we believe he was putting forth and his demeanor. That's the reason the strike was made.

Jackson did not object to the government's proffered explanation, nor did he argue that it was a pretext for discriminatory animus. The district court concluded that the government had offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason in response to Jackson's Batson challenge, and Jackson did not object to that ruling or request a more detailed record of the judge's rationale.

On the third day of trial, the government revisited the issue of Jackson's Batson objection in a conference with the district court judge. The government's lead counsel, Mona Guerrier, volunteered that she was the one who initially felt uncomfortable with Turner's demeanor and she also indicated for the record that she is an African-American. The court indicated that her explanation could not be considered because it was being offered three days into the trial. Once again, at the conclusion of the government's comments, Jackson made no additional objections or arguments with respect to the Batson issue.

The evidence presented at trial established that on the day of the robbery, Jackson went to the Dayton post office with his girlfriend's brother, Tim Anderson. While in the post office, Jackson observed a transaction involving approximately $1,900.00. As he was leaving, Jackson told Anderson that he had "cased [his] spot." According to Anderson, at the time Jackson was wearing a dark-colored windbreaker, dark pants, white tennis shoes, and a baseball cap with a New York logo on it. After visiting the post office, Jackson borrowed a red and white bicycle from his friend Tony Harris.

Barbara Barnett, a postal clerk, testified that on May 24, 2001, a black male between the ages of eighteen and twenty, wearing a New York baseball hat and a dark jacket approached the counter and gave her a note stating, "Hand me your cash. I have a gun." She then "looked at him in the eyes and said, `Are you sure you really want to do this?'" The robber became angry and leaned toward her and said "give me the damn cash." During this exchange, Barnett noticed that the robber had a gap between his front teeth. Barnett then gave him the cash from her drawer.

Shortly after the robbery, Barnett viewed a photo line-up and identified Jackson as the robber. Barnett indicated that she was sixty to seventy percent sure of her identification. At trial, Barnett again identified Jackson as the robber. During her testimony, Jackson was asked to smile and expose his teeth to Barnett and the jury, and Barnett confirmed that Jackson had a gap between his front teeth.

The government produced additional eyewitness testimony that was incriminating to Jackson. Brian Butterbaugh, the other postal clerk on duty on the day of the robbery, testified that he observed a gap between the robber's two front teeth when the robber approached his window at the post office. Catherine Green, a customer who was at the post office on the day of the robbery, testified that she saw a red bike by the door of the post office when she entered. Green further testified that she had observed a black male wearing a dark jacket and a dark hat reposition himself at the back of the line several times for no apparent reason. After completing her transaction at the postal window, she observed the same man exiting the post office, and she saw him jump on the red bicycle and ride away very fast. She also identified Jackson as the man she saw at the post office riding away on the bike. Several of Jackson's acquaintances testified that Jackson had a gap between his front teeth. Jackson's girlfriend testified that he owned clothes matching the description provided by the postal clerks and confirmed that he was wearing those clothes on the day of the robbery. During the course of the trial, the government presented additional circumstantial evidence suggesting that Jackson had committed the robbery.

At the close of the trial, Jackson submitted several proposed jury instructions. Specifically, Jackson requested the following instruction on his theory of defense:

The defense says that Shawn Jackson was misidentified as the robber of the post office by the witnesses who were there that day. The defense further says that the acquaintances of Shawn Jackson had motivations which show they were being untruthful.

The district court declined this request because it found that the instruction was unnecessary and not required by law.

Jackson also requested the following instruction regarding some of the identification testimony that had been offered at his trial:

You have heard the testimony of Barb Barnett and Catherine Green, who have identified the defendant as the person who robbed the post office. You should carefully consider whether this identification was accurate and reliable.

The proposed instruction also set forth factors that Jackson wanted the jurors to consider in determining whether the identification was accurate and reliable. The district court again declined to give the instruction, stating: "My concern is that I think the accuracy of the identification can be argued under credibility. I don't think a separate instruction is necessary." The court did provide a general instruction to the jury on assessing the credibility of each witness:

Consider carefully the circumstances under which each witness testified. Remember the witness's response to questions, his or her assurance or lack of it in answering, and the entire demeanor or appearance of that witness while on the witness stand.

Consider also any relation that a witness may bear to either side of the case and his or her reasons for testifying, any interest he or she may have in the outcome of the case. Any prejudice or bias he or she may have shown including any reason or motivation to bear hostility or animosity toward a party and any partiality he or she may have demonstrated.

On November 9, 2001, the jury returned a guilty verdict. On May 15, 2002, the district court sentenced Jackson to ninety-six months...

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