U.S. v. James

• Decision Date: 14 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-3424.,02-3424.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederick R. JAMES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 953

328 F.3d 953

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederick R. JAMES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-3424.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 4, 2003.

Decided May 14, 2003.

Randy G. Massey (argued), Office of U.S. Attorney, Criminal Div., Fairview Heights, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Adam B. Goodman (argued), Lovells, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before POSNER, EASTERBROOK, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge.

Indicted for selling marijuana and possessing a gun in connection with that crime, Frederick James offered the "defense" that his ancestors came from Africa, that he is therefore a Moorish national, and that as a result he need obey only those laws mentioned in an ancient treaty between the United States and Morocco. This view of legal obligations is espoused by many adherents to the Moorish Science Temple, which was founded in 1913 by prophet Noble Drew Ali. Moorish Science is a heterodox Islamic sect based on teachings of Drew and his "Seven Circle Koran." It is a tenet of Moorish Science that any adherent may adopt any title, and issue any documents, he pleases. Drew told his followers that they are not U.S. citizens and distributed "Moorish Passports." Some members of this sect hand out what they call "security agreements" that purport to oblige strangers to pay hefty sums for using the members' names, which they deem copyrighted under their private legal system. James is among those who claim a right to compensation for every mention of his name. James demanded that the prosecutor, witnesses, and judge enter into compensation contracts before James would acknowledge the court's authority.

Needless to say, the combination of a wacky "defense" with the demand for payment every time James's name was spoken diverted attention from the criminal charges (which may have been his object). Laws of the United States apply to all persons within its borders. Even if James were not a citizen of the United States (though he is, having been born here), he would be obliged to respect the laws of this nation. Disdaining to obey federal law, James also refused to cooperate with his appointed lawyer, who would neither support his proposed defense nor enter into a compensation contract for the use of his name. Observing that James also contended that his arrest was a war crime and that the indictment was invalid (the grand jurors had not contracted for the right to use James's name, let alone put it in capital letters), appointed counsel asked the judge to refer James for a mental examination to determine whether he was able to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense. True to form, James refused to take a position on this issue (though he did deny ever being under care for mental problems). Instead of addressing the question at hand, James proclaimed:

I am the secured party in this matter and the name you have just called or used in this courtroom is my property. You do not have my permission to use my private property in this courtroom. I can be addressed as secured party. You do not have my authorization for using my copyrighted name in this courtroom without compensating me. Further use of any of my personal property executes the contract and the security agreement that you received in the mail. The terms of the contract reflect what I am saying here. I am here to do business. If you want to do business, let's do business, or let's call it off and go home.

James was not allowed to go home but was referred for a mental exam. Predictably, he refused to cooperate. A clinical psychologist reported (after interviewing James's sister and his Moorish counselor) that he had no reason to think James unfit for trial. No other evidence was available so the court accepted this assessment. Declared mentally fit, James dismissed his attorney, see Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (any defendant competent to stand trial also is competent to represent himself), and proceeded to illustrate the maxim that anyone who acts as his own lawyer has a fool for a client. James was convicted as charged and sentenced to 270 months' imprisonment.

Defendants' right of self representation does not extend to appeal. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000). In this court, therefore, James is represented by counsel, whose principal contention is that the district judge should not have allowed the trial to occur. James's professed beliefs, according to counsel, show that he is delusional (or at least that he hadn't a clue what the criminal prosecution was about), and the psychologist's report did not provide any contrary evidence. Instead, counsel contends, the judge essentially deferred to James's view of his own mental prowess; yet one sign of mental incompetence may be an unjustified belief in one's abilities. If the only way a defendant can be deemed incompetent to stand trial is to be mentally acute enough to prove it, then he must be competent after all. That's Yossarian's conundrum in Catch-22. (Only incompetent aviators could be removed from flight duty, but this required an application — and anyone who wanted to stay on the ground must be sane.) The point is sound; the district judge should not have required James to shoulder any burden and should not have given weight to a psychological report resting on a view that defendants are presumed competent until they prove otherwise. See United States v. Billingsley, 766 F.2d 1015, 1023-24 (7th Cir.1985). It does not follow, however, that the district judge must try to gather more evidence. Indeed, we do not think that the judge should have referred James for an exam in the first place.

The only reason adduced, in the district court or this one, for thinking James incompetent to stand trial is the unusual nature of his beliefs. His behavior (both in the marijuana trade and in court) is that of a person able to understand his surroundings. Many litigants articulate beliefs that have no legal support — think of tax protesters who insist that wages are not income, that taxes are voluntary, or that only foreigners must pay taxes; or think of homeowners who contend that because their property can be traced to a land grant signed by President Fillmore their mortgages can't be foreclosed. Sometimes these beliefs are sincerely held, sometimes they are advanced only to annoy the other side, but in neither event do they imply mental instability or concrete intellect (see Young v. Walls, 311 F.3d 846 (7th Cir.2002)) so deficient that trial is impossible. Airline pilots, see Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991), dentists, see United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955 (7th Cir.1991), and other persons of unquestioned competence have espoused ludicrous legal positions. No one suggested that Captain Cheek or Dr. Dunkel required a mental exam; if their weird legal views did not imply incompetence to be tried, why should James's? It is not as if James inhabited a private mental world. His beliefs are held by other adherents to the Moorish Science Temple. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553 (4th Cir.2000). Consider this exchange between the judge and one of the spectators in the gallery:

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER 2: I am a secure party in this matter —

THE COURT: Sir, I will address you when the time comes. Are you a lawyer?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER 2: I am not a lawyer or esquire. I am a secured party.

THE COURT: Sit down, please, sir.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER 2: I am a secure party ...

THE COURT: Remove him from the courtroom, please.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER 2: My...