U.S. v. Jefferson
| Decision Date | 15 September 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-3136,91-3136 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Parris Raymond JEFFERSON, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (CR-90-00275-01).
Shawn Moore, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Michele A. Roberts, Washington, D.C., also entered an appearance for appellant.
Linda Otani McKinney, Asst. U.S. Atty., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, and Carol A. Fortine, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.
Parris Raymond Jefferson was convicted after a jury trial of possession of more than fifty grams of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii), and of using a firearm in connection with drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). He argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a continuance in order to change counsel on the day of trial and that insufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that he used a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking. Finding no merit in either contention, we affirm.
On November 7, 1989, District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Officers Phillip Parker and Nathaniel Covington received a radio broadcast directing them to report to 636 Quebec Place, N.W., to look for a man meeting a particular description who was said to have a handgun. Upon arriving at the address, the officers saw Jefferson on the sidewalk and noted that he matched the description. They then stopped and frisked him, but found no gun.
At that time, Jefferson's mother, Geraldine Hamilton, came outside and asked to speak to the officers. She told them that she suspected that her son was engaged in various "drug activities" and consented to a search of the backyard. On searching the area, the police found a loaded, sawed-off 12-gauge shotgun and over 300 multicolored ziplock bags containing over seventy grams of cocaine base (crack). The shotgun and a portion of the ziplock bags were discovered in a lawnmower grass-catcher bag in a stairwell beneath the back porch of the house; the remaining bags were found hidden in a shed.
The police then obtained a written consent from Jefferson to search his room. In it, the police recovered a safe, pager, razor blade, paint scraper/cutter, two ziplock bags with crack, and a number of multicolored ziplock bags. Jefferson was arrested, informed of his rights, and taken to the station for questioning.
At the station, Jefferson gave the following statement, which was read into evidence at trial:
The shotgun belongs to everyone in the neighborhood, and when they need it, they come and get it and do what they have to do and then put it back.
Do you know this boy named Eric who lives over on Quincy Street? We have some trouble with him, and there was some shooting, and the shotgun came in handy.
....
....
....
Trial Transcript, January 7, 1991 ("Tr.") at 85-87.
On the morning of trial, one year and two months later, Jefferson's attorney, Richard Stern, informed the court that Jefferson's family had retained Shawn Moore to represent him and moved for a continuance to allow Moore to prepare for trial. Moore stated that he had been contacted by the family three days earlier and was not ready to proceed. The court denied the motion for continuance, stating I have a trial calendar of criminal cases that is just chockablock. If I were to continue this, I don't know when I could try it. So I am denying the motion, and we will go to trial today.
Id. at 3. The court did invite Moore to "sit at the counsel table ... and participate." Id. at 4.
At trial, the Government offered testimony of the officers involved in the search and arrest, Jefferson's statement, and the expert testimony of Officer David Stroud. The officer testified that drug traffickers use safes to store money, drugs, and effects; razors to cut crack into smaller pieces; pagers to communicate with each other and customers; and guns to protect the drug operation or keep employees in line. The jury convicted Jefferson on both counts, and he was sentenced to consecutive periods of imprisonment of 120 months on the drug charge and sixty months on the firearm charge. This appeal followed.
Jefferson claims that his Sixth Amendment right to "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence[,]" U.S. Const. amend. VI, was violated by the district court's denial of his motion for a continuance. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that "[n]ot every restriction on counsel's time or opportunity to investigate or to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel[,]" as "judges necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials." Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 1616, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983). Thus, we have held that "[a] trial judge enjoys great discretion in ruling on a motion for a continuance," and we review the court's decision only to determine "whether the judge 'clearly abused' his discretion." United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C.Cir.1990) (citation omitted). The factors relevant to this inquiry include
the length of the requested delay; whether other continuances have been requested and granted; the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; whether the defendant has other competent counsel prepared to try the case, including the consideration of whether the other counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel; [and] whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial nature.
United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C.Cir.1978) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S.Ct. 837, 59 L.Ed.2d 34 (1979).
We conclude that the court acted well within its discretion in denying the motion for continuance. Plainly, it would have been extremely inconvenient to the court and the Government to reschedule the case on the day of trial. Moreover, while Stern had represented him for more than one year, Jefferson failed to offer a reason for his delay in retaining new counsel. The timing of his motion makes it appear dilatory. Without a doubt, Jefferson's failure to act earlier "contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance." Id. at 491. Furthermore, Stern was prepared to try the case and, by all accounts, did so professionally. Quite reasonably, the judge offered Moore the opportunity to assist in the case. No prejudice has been shown as the result of Stern's handling of the defense.
The facts of this case are similar to those in Poston, where we upheld the district court's denial of a motion for continuance. There, a court-appointed attorney represented Poston for the four months between his arraignment and the trial date. Poston sought to replace his counsel the day before trial. We held that "[a]t that point, granting a continuance would have significantly disrupted the schedules of the court and the prosecution." Poston, 902 F.2d at 97. We also stated that as "Poston provided no justification for the delay in selecting new counsel, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that his motion was 'dilatory, purposeful, or contrived.' " Id. (quoting Burton, 584 F.2d at 491 (footnote omitted)). See also United States v. Rettaliata, 833 F.2d 361, 362 (D.C.Cir.1987) (). Therefore, we hold that the district court's denial of the motion was a proper exercise of its discretion.
Jefferson also claims that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that he used the shotgun "during and in relation to" drug trafficking, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988). As a jury has found Jefferson guilty, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), recognizing that "[a] jury is entitled to draw a vast range of inferences from evidence[.]" United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, ...
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