U.S. v. Jeffus, No. 93-5126

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, BUTZNER; NIEMEYER
• Citation: 22 F.3d 554
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward Dane JEFFUS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Docket Number: No. 93-5126
• Decision Date: 22 April 1994

Page 554

22 F.3d 554 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Edward Dane JEFFUS, Defendant-Appellant. No. 93-5126. United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit. Argued Feb. 11, 1994.
Decided April 22, 1994.

Page 555

ARGUED: John Stuart Bruce, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, NC, for appellant. Paul Alexander Weinman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Greensboro, NC, for appellee. ON BRIEF: William E. Martin, Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, NC, for appellant. Benjamin H. White, Jr., U.S. Atty., Greensboro, NC, for appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge, and YOUNG, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Senior Circuit Judge BUTZNER and Senior District Judge JOSEPH H. YOUNG joined.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

Edward Dane Jeffus pled guilty to drug charges, reserving for appellate review his motions to suppress incriminating evidence seized in four separate searches. See Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 11(a)(2). The first search, from which the government obtained cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm, took place in August 1991 during a traffic stop on Interstate 95 in Florida after a trained dog sniffed the outside of Jeffus' vehicle and alerted positive for the presence of drugs. The second search, of a motel room in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, took place several months later. It was conducted pursuant to a warrant and yielded evidence of Jeffus' presence there and cocaine residue. The third search was of Jeffus' person incident to his arrest on the same day that the motel room was searched, and a significant quantity of cocaine was found as a result. And the final search, which was of Jeffus' jail cell pursuant to a warrant while he was being

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detained pending trial, produced incriminating letters between Jeffus and co-conspirators. Although each of these searches presents different Fourth Amendment issues, we affirm the district court's ruling that none of them violated Jeffus' Fourth Amendment rights. I

In the early evening hours of August 1, 1991, Officer Chet L. Tomlinson of the Florida Highway Patrol, who was entering Interstate 95 in Florida from a rest stop, observed Jeffus' 1986 Chevrolet Celebrity in the traffic lanes with a broken headlight. In order to make a traffic stop, Officer Tomlinson slowed as he approached the traffic lanes to let the Jeffus vehicle pass. But Jeffus, too, slowed his vehicle so as not to pass Officer Tomlinson's. After Officer Tomlinson reached the speed of 35 miles per hour and Jeffus still did not pass, the officer pulled over to the emergency lane and stopped to force Jeffus to pass. Officer Tomlinson then pulled Jeffus over to the shoulder.

After Jeffus produced a North Carolina driver's license, Officer Tomlinson advised Jeffus of the traffic violation for the broken headlight, as well as violations for a cracked windshield and a "busted" tail light. The officer gave Jeffus a faulty equipment notice and initiated a driver's license check. While completing the paperwork for the warning ticket for the various violations, Officer Tomlinson asked Jeffus about a beer bottle that the officer observed in Jeffus' car when he first approached it. When Jeffus went to retrieve the bottle, he opened the car door only wide enough to fit his body through and retrieve the bottle. In response to the officer's questions about Jeffus' trip plans, Jeffus indicated that he had been on business in Miami. Jeffus gave some conflicting answers in his response and began acting "nervous and fidgety," and the officer noticed that Jeffus' hands "trembled noticeably."

Officer Tomlinson returned Jeffus' license and registration, together with the faulty equipment notice, stating that he was still waiting for the report on Jeffus' license. By then, Officer Tomlinson testified he began to become suspicious about Jeffus' conduct. Officer Tomlinson asked Jeffus if Jeffus would permit a search of the vehicle. When Jeffus refused, the officer, who was a member of the canine patrol, had his specially trained dog sniff the outside of the vehicle, and the dog "alerted positive" to the presence of drugs. At that point, Officer Tomlinson searched the vehicle, discovering two plastic bags of cocaine, a firearm, and drug paraphernalia. The total time from the stop to the search was "no longer than" fifteen minutes. Thereafter, the officer received the report that Jeffus' driving license had been suspended by North Carolina.

Jeffus contends that the stop and the search were illegal because the traffic stop was pretextual and did not satisfy the test of whether a "reasonable officer" would have stopped the vehicle for the equipment violations. Urging us to adopt this "reasonable officer" standard for determining whether a traffic stop was pretextual, in lieu of an objective inquiry into whether the stop could legally have been made, he relies on United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir.1988), and United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir.1986). Jeffus also contends that the stop was "prolonged" and "beyond the scope of a traffic stop," again relying on Guzman.

In United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 876 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 351, 121 L.Ed.2d 266 (1992), we noted that a split of authority existed among the circuits with respect to whether a traffic stop, overtly made for a minor traffic violation but alleged to have been made to investigate for contraband, could properly serve as a basis for a subsequent search. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits had taken the position advanced by Jeffus in this case, "that an investigative stop is valid as not pretextual, not if an officer legally could have stopped the car in question because of the suspected traffic violation, but rather if 'a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation.' " Id. at 876 (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 708). We also observed that a different position had been taken by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, that "an investigative stop is justified at its inception if the

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officer was legally entitled to make the stop; 'so long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, an arrest is constitutional.' " Id. at 876 (quoting United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 428, 116 L.Ed.2d 448, 449 (1991)). In Rusher, however, we found it unnecessary to pronounce the Fourth Circuit's standard because the stop there was...