U.S. v. Jennings
| Decision Date | 26 May 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-6117,92-6117 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ernest Lee JENNINGS, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
John A. Lentine, Sheffield, Sheffield, Sheffield & Lentine, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for defendant-appellant.
Frank W. Donaldson, U.S. Atty., and Raymond L. Johnson, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before COX and DUBINA, Circuit Judges, and GODBOLD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Appellant Ernest Lee Jennings ("Jennings") was charged with (1) knowingly forcibly assaulting, resisting, impeding and interfering with Officer Kevin Lee Poole ("Poole") of the Bureau of Prisons while he was engaged in his official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (Count I); and (2) knowingly forcibly assaulting, resisting, impeding and interfering with Lieutenant Edwin L. Hughston ("Hughston") of the Bureau of Prisons while he was engaged in his official duties, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (Count II). After a trial by jury, Jennings was acquitted on Count I but convicted on Count II.
Jennings appeals his conviction on the grounds that the district court (1) committed reversible error by refusing to quash the indictment, declare a mistrial or grant a continuance based on prosecutorial misconduct or improprieties regarding the grand jury that indicted him; (2) abused its discretion by failing to grant an evidentiary hearing regarding his motion to quash the indictment and dismiss prosecution on the ground of selective prosecution; and (3) committed reversible error by failing to give his proposed jury instructions. In addition, Jennings appeals his sentence on the ground that the district court erred in applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or the "Guidelines"). While we find no merit in Jennings' arguments regarding his conviction, we hold that the district court erred in applying the Guidelines. Accordingly, we affirm Jennings' conviction but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
At the time of the offenses charged in the indictment, Jennings was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institute, Talladega, Alabama, serving a prison sentence for several convictions. Poole, a correctional officer, stopped Jennings and asked him to produce his identification card. Jennings responded that he did not have the card. Poole told Jennings to get the card and Jennings refused. Poole detained Jennings and called Hughston, who was Poole's supervisor. Hughston had basically the same conversation with Jennings and then told Poole to handcuff Jennings and take him to segregation. With Hughston watching, Poole began to handcuff Jennings, and Jennings struck Poole in the mouth with his right fist causing him to lose consciousness for a moment. Jennings then turned on Hughston and struck him twice. Additional correctional officers arrived and subdued Jennings.
As a result of the altercation, Poole had a three-quarter inch cut through his upper lip requiring a three-level suture and several other abrasions and cuts. Hughston also received multiple abrasions and cuts. Both men were treated at a local hospital and immediately released.
During the trial the government disclosed the grand jury testimony of the single grand jury witness pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (). The disclosed portion of the grand jury proceeding contained a statement by an unidentified grand juror that he/she was a friend of Hughston. After thanking the grand juror for that information, the Assistant United States Attorney promised to get back to the grand juror concerning his/her statement. Although it is not part of the record, the government alleges that it did get back to the grand juror and that it asked additional questions about the relationship between the grand juror and Hughston. The government did not disclose the additional information, however, because it was not related to the witness' trial testimony, and therefore was not Jencks material.
After Jennings received the disclosed portion of the grand jury proceeding, he moved the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the matter and to give him additional time to investigate; in the alternative he moved for a mistrial or to quash the indictment on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. 1 The district court denied the motion because Jennings failed to show how he was prejudiced by the relationship between the grand juror and Hughston.
Jennings contends that the district court erred in requiring him to show that he was prejudiced by the grand juror's relationship with Hughston because the district court refused to grant a continuance or conduct an evidentiary hearing to allow him to discover evidence of prejudice. Jennings' argument is flawed because he has failed to consider the impact of the harmless error rule, Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). We have applied the harmless error rule to similar facts in a habeas corpus case and have determined that a conviction on an indictment makes this type of grand juror problem harmless. Porter v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 930 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 3195, 96 L.Ed.2d 682 (1987).
In Porter a grand juror was related by marriage to the murder victims, but we held that even assuming arguendo that the grand juror's presence was error, the error was harmless because the defendant was convicted of the murders. Following United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S.Ct. 938, 941-42, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986), in which the Supreme Court held that a subsequent conviction on an indictment made harmless the error of having two witnesses testify before a grand jury simultaneously, we stated that while a grand jury's function is to prevent a defendant from having to defend against a crime for which there is no probable cause, a petit jury's guilty verdict establishes both probable cause and guilt. Porter, 805 F.2d at 941. We went on to say that the error of a grand juror knowing a victim was no different from the error held harmless by the Supreme Court in Mechanik of having two witnesses testify before a grand jury simultaneously. Id. at 942. Furthermore, we held that Mechanik controlled the issue of whether any error created by the prosecutor failing to reveal the grand juror's relationship with the victims was harmless. Id. We held that the conviction made harmless the government's failure to disclose the relationship between the grand juror and one of the victims and since the defendant could not prevail on this claim he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Id.
While the holding in Porter is directly applicable to this case and would dictate that Jennings' conviction renders harmless the grand juror's relationship with Hughston and any prosecutorial misconduct related to the disclosure of the relationship, its holding may have been cast in doubt by the Supreme Court's decision in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 2373, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988). In Bank of Nova Scotia the Court addressed the appropriate standard for determining whether to dismiss an indictment for nonconstitutional error prior to the conclusion of a trial. The Court adopted the standard articulated by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion in Mechanik: "dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only 'if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations." Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256, 108 S.Ct. at 2374 (quoting Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 78, 106 S.Ct. at 945-46 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). In Mechanik Justice O'Connor had stated that this standard rather than the majority's reliance on the defendant's subsequent conviction should be used to determine whether an error in grand jury proceedings is harmless. 475 U.S. at 76-78, 106 S.Ct. at 945.
We do not need to decide the impact of Bank of Nova Scotia on Porter, however, because even if we apply the Bank of Nova Scotia standard here the errors, if any, remain harmless. A grand jury need find only that there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant was the party who committed the crime. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 617, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). Applying the Bank of Nova Scotia standard, we must determine whether the grand juror's friendship with Hughston substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict or whether there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of the relationship. The government presented overwhelming evidence to the grand jury for it to find probable cause to believe that Jennings committed the offenses against Hughston and Poole. The grand jury witness testified that Jennings intentionally forcibly struck and injured Hughston and Poole, both federal officers engaged in their official duties at the time, and Jennings was not acting in self-defense. Therefore, we do not have a grave doubt that the grand juror's friendship with Hughston had a substantial influence on the decision to indict. Likewise, the government's failure to disclose the remainder of the colloquy with the grand juror is also harmless. Even if Jennings had this information, whatever it may be, his argument still fails because there was overwhelming evidence to support the grand jury's decision to indict.
Regardless of whether we apply the Mechanik/Porter conviction standard or the Bank of Nova Scotia substantial influence standard the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
U.S. v. Brenson
...requesting party cannot show any one of the elements, then the district court did not commit reversible error." United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725, 731 (11th Cir.1993). In reviewing the district court's decision to refuse the instruction requested by Brenson, the court recognizes that ......
-
U. S. v. Farrow
...underlying offense is aggravated assault on a federal officer, relying on the language of Application Note 5. See United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725, 734 (11th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Valdez-Torres, 108 F.3d 385, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reading §3A1.2(b) to apply to aggravat......
-
People v. Moreno
...the officer is abiding by laws and regulations in effect at the time of the incident....’ ”) (citation omitted); United States v. Jennings, 991 F.2d 725, 732 (C.A.11, 1993) (“The test is not whether the officer is abiding by laws and regulations in effect at the time of the incident, but wh......
-
United States v. Goldstein, 18-13321
...that the grand jury's decision to indict was not substantially influenced by any improper testimony. See United States v. Jennings , 991 F.2d 725, 729 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a grand juror's friendship with one of the victims was harmless because "[t]he government presented overwhelm......