U.S. v. Jernigan, 00-4042

Decision Date13 June 2001
Docket NumberNo. 00-4042,00-4042
Citation257 F.3d 865
Parties(8th Cir. 2001) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF - APPELLEE, v. DEWAYNE ALAN JERNIGAN, DEFENDANT - APPELLANT. Submitted:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

Before Loken, Hall,* and Morris Sheppard Arnold, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam.

Dewayne Alan Jernigan pleaded guilty to manufacturing and possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine. He was sentenced to 262 months in prison and five years of supervised release based upon the district court's finding that he is a "career offender" under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. Jernigan appeals, arguing that the district court erred in sentencing him as a career offender because his 1993 Arkansas conviction for negligent homicide was not a "crime of violence" for purposes of the career offender guideline. We affirm.

Section 4B1.1 subjects a defendant who is a career offender to an increased offense level and criminal history category. An adult convicted of a controlled substance offense is a career offender if he "has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense." It is undisputed that Jernigan has a prior controlled-substance felony conviction. Thus, his sentence as a career offender turns on whether his prior conviction for negligent homicide was a "crime of violence" for career offender sentencing purposes. A "crime of violence" is defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a):

The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that --

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or

(2) . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

After listing specific offenses that are crimes of violence, including manslaughter and aggravated assault, Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 provides that other offenses are included if "the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted . . . by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."

The following conduct led to Jernigan's negligent homicide conviction. Shortly after midnight on May 19, 1993, while he was attempting to pass another vehicle during a rainstorm, Jernigan's truck collided with the rear of the other vehicle, forcing it off the road into a tree and killing the other driver. Blood-alcohol tests at the scene indicated that Jernigan was driving under the influence of alcohol, as defined by Arkansas law. He was initially charged with manslaughter. He ultimately pleaded guilty to negligent homicide while operating a vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence, a felony violation of ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-105(a)(1).

In United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 924 (1995), the Seventh Circuit held that a felony assault conviction for causing serious bodily injury while driving under the influence of alcohol was a crime of violence for career offender purposes. The majority concluded that felony driving-while-intoxicated falls within the "otherwise" clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) because "[d]runk driving is a reckless act that often results in injury, and the risks of driving while intoxicated are well-known." 54 F.3d at 376...

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10 cases
  • U.S. v. McCall
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • March 15, 2006
    ...object to these PSR recitals, he did object to the § 924(e) enhancement. At sentencing, relying on our opinion in United States v. Jernigan, 257 F.3d 865, 867 (8th Cir. 2001), both counsel and the district court understandably believed that the relevant inquiry was the conduct underlying th......
  • U.S. v. Chauncey
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • August 25, 2005
    ...held that involuntary manslaughter is a "crime of violence." This holding is undisturbed by Leocal. See also United States v. Jernigan, 257 F.3d 865 (8th Cir.2001) (per curiam) (holding that negligent homicide resulting from driving while intoxicated is a "crime of Chauncey also was granted......
  • U.S. v. Banks
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • January 9, 2008
    ...a deadly weapon, either one of which places his conviction squarely within the ambit of section 4B 1.2(a)(2). See United States v. Jernigan, 257 F.3d 865, 866 (8th Cir.2001) (rejecting argument that negligent homicide was not a crime of violence because defendant was less culpable than if h......
  • U.S. v. Walker, 04-1815.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • January 6, 2005
    ...(a)(2), and (b); and it avoids a construction that renders any part of § 4B1.2 superfluous. The government relies on United States v. Jernigan, 257 F.3d 865 (8th Cir.2001), where this Court held that negligent homicide while operating a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of Ark.Code Ann......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Federal Sentencing Guidelines - Rosemary T. Cakmis
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 55-4, June 2004
    • Invalid date
    ...Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1995) (first-degree assault conviction for DUI causing serious injury); United States v. Jernigan, 257 F.3d 865, 866 (8th Cir. 2001) (negligent homicide while driving under the influence); United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Ci......

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