U.S. v. Johnson, 91-3694

• Decision Date: 10 July 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-3694,91-3694
• Citation: 968 F.2d 765
• Parties: 36 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 47 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Evonna Victoria JOHNSON, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 765

968 F.2d 765

36 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 47

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Evonna Victoria JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. 91-3694.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted May 12, 1992.

Decided July 10, 1992.

Michael W. McNabb, Burnsville, Minn., argued, for appellant.

Margaret T. Burns, Minneapolis, Minn., argued, for appellee.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Evonna V. Johnson appeals from her conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). We affirm.

I.

On February 13, 1991, Minneapolis police officers executed a search warrant at Johnson's residence. The first officer to enter the residence testified that he saw two black females--Johnson and Demellon Horton--in the home. After the officers entered the home, Johnson was seen running into the bedroom and throwing a red pantyhose bag out of the window.

The police seized the red bag, which contained thirteen grams of cocaine base, and arrested Johnson. Following her conviction, Johnson was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. She now appeals from three evidentiary rulings made by the district court.

II.

"The admissibility of evidence is primarily a determination to be made by the district court ..., and [we] will not substitute its judgment unless there has been an abuse of discretion." United States v. Abodeely, 801 F.2d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir.1986) (citation omitted).

Johnson first argues that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence that one of the government's witnesses, Officer Doran, had been suspended from the police department for three days without pay in May 1991 for having left in-service training without permission, having worked on an off-duty job during a period of in-service training, and having lied to his supervisor about when he had reported to the off-duty job. Defense counsel sought to introduce the letter of suspension, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), to impeach Doran's credibility. ¹ The district court refused to admit the letter and refused to allow defense counsel to cross-examine Doran about the substance of the letter.

Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) does not permit specific instances of a witness' conduct to be proved by extrinsic evidence. United States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 788-89 (8th Cir.1992). "The purpose of barring extrinsic evidence is to avoid mini-trials on peripherally related or irrelevant matters." ² Id. To the extent that such evidence is ever admissible, the introduction of extrinsic evidence to attack credibility is subject to the discretion of the trial court. Id. at 788-89; United States v. Capozzi, 883 F.2d 608, 615 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918, 110 S.Ct. 1947, 109 L.Ed.2d 310 (1990). Given the broad discretion granted to the trial court and Rule 608(b)'s stricture against the introduction of such evidence, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to admit the letter of suspension.

Although Rule 608(b) states that specific instances of past conduct "may, however, in the discretion of the court, ... be inquired into on cross-examination," the district court did not allow defense counsel to inquire into the circumstances surrounding Doran's suspension. The district court did, however, allow the prosecution to impeach Ms. Horton, who testified that it was she who threw the cocaine base out of the window, with a pending charge of giving a false name to a police officer.

Defense counsel objected to the government's attempt to impeach Ms. Horton with the testimony that she had given a false name to the police, arguing that that evidence should be ruled inadmissible in view of the district court's earlier ruling prohibiting cross-examination regarding Doran's suspension. The district court resolved the apparent inconsistency by concluding that the two situations did not "fall in the same category." The court noted that when the police questioned Horton at Johnson's residence, she gave them a false name; when the police arrested Horton on another occasion, she gave the police a false name. The district court determined that evidence of Doran's internal suspension, in contrast, was "totally unrelated" to the issues involved in Johnson's trial.

As an additional reason for its ruling, the district court stated that "[i]nternal affairs investigations must, need to and have to reside within police departments." The court added that "a minor ... investigation report, ... should not be the public subject of cross examination of the witness at every time that he testifies [after] making an arrest."

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by disallowing questioning on the collateral issue of the internal police investigation. See Martz, at 788-89....