U.S. v. Jones

Decision Date20 November 2000
Docket Number99-11259,No. 99-11250,99-11250
Parties(5th Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NAPOLEON JONES, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDUARDO GABRIEL DANIEL, Defendant-Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Appeals from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas

Before DUHE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

In these appeals, which were consolidated for oral argument, both defendants Napoleon Jones and Eduardo Gabriel Daniel appeal their convictions arising out of a traffic stop where narcotics were found in their rental car. Because the narcotics were the fruit of an illegal seizure, we vacate the convictions and sentences and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 2, 1999, at approximately 11:57 a.m., Officers Tommy Russell and Barry Ralston initiated a traffic stop of a car just inside the city limits of Amarillo, Texas, for a speeding violation. Inside the vehicle were the two defendants, who were traveling from Los Angeles to Memphis. Upon being pulled over, Russell approached the vehicle on the driver's side while Ralston moved towards the passenger's side. Russell asked Daniel, the driver of the car, for his driver's license and proof of insurance. After Daniel produced his California driver's license and a rental car agreement for the vehicle, Russell asked Daniel to step outside the car.

With Ralston by his side, Russell notified Daniel that he had been stopped for speeding and would be issued a warning citation. Russell then asked a series of questions including: 1) whether the vehicle was a rental car; 2) who had rented it; 3) what was the identity of the passenger; 4) where the defendants were going; and 5) why they were going to their destination. Daniel answered that the car was a rental, that his mother had rented the vehicle, that the passenger was his uncle, that the defendants were going to Memphis, and that they were going to Memphis for a couple of weeks to do some promotional work for Street Institute Records ("Street Institute"). Subsequent to further questioning, Daniel replied that he and Jones were from California, specifically Los Angeles County, and that they had worked together on other promotional deals in various other states.

At about 12:00 p.m., after instructing Daniel to stay by the road median, Russell began to question Jones. First, Russell advised Jones that the car had been stopped for speeding and that the defendants would be issued a warning ticket. Then, Russell inquired about the defendants' destination. Jones responded "Memphis." When Russell asked what the purpose of the trip was, Jones stated, "Well, let me show you in the trunk." On the way to the trunk, Jones volunteered that he was originally from Memphis and that he was doing some promotional work for a record company in Beverly Hills. Russell inquired as to the duration of the defendants' stay in Memphis, and Jones replied "about a week." After rummaging through the trunk, Jones handed Russell a CD, explaining that it was a promotional CD produced by Sage Stone Entertainment ("Sage Stone"). At approximately, 12:02 p.m., Russell directed Jones to return to his seat in the car.

Thereafter, Russell instructed Daniel to sit in the back of the patrol car. Russell and Ralston then took seats in the front and initiated a conversation with Daniel concerning the issuance of the warning ticket. As Russell was filling out the warning citation, he asked Daniel where he and Jones were going to be staying in Memphis. Daniel explained that Jones had family in Memphis and that if they did not stay with family, then they would go to a hotel. Russell then asked for a second time who had rented the car for Daniel. Daniel responded that his mother had. Russell informed Daniel that the rental agreement did not state that there were any additional authorized drivers, to which Daniel explained that the "insurance" said it was permissible to complete the agreement in that fashion. At 12:04 p.m., Russell requested Ralston to run a criminal history check on Daniel. After Ralston forwarded Daniel's information to the dispatcher, the dispatcher instructed to standby. Russell continued with the questioning and again asked Daniel what company he was with, to which Daniel replied, "Street Institute." Daniel further explained the nature of his relationship with the company and that he managed a singer named Tracy. Around this time, Russell asked Daniel if he had ever been arrested. In response, Daniel stated that he had been arrested for possession of crack cocaine.

While awaiting for the response from the dispatcher, Russell exited the patrol car and again approached Jones and requested identification. As Jones was retrieving his wallet, Russell inquired as to the nature of Daniel's business dealings. Jones explained that Daniel worked part-time with Jones's company on promotions. Upon further questioning, Jones responded that Daniel was his son-in-law's brother. At 12:09 p.m., Russell obtained Jones's California driver's license. Russell then asked whether Daniel actually managed anyone, and Jones replied that Daniel only did promotional work. Russell and Jones communicated for a few more moments about Jones's promotional trips with Daniel. Thereafter, Russell advised Jones that the rental agreement did not list any additional drivers, but indicated that this oversight was "alright." He then told Jones to sit down in the rental car. During the time Russell spoke with Jones, the dispatcher responded, and Ralston requested the dispatcher to run criminal history/wanted checks and driver's license verification on Daniel.

When Russell returned with Jones's driver's license to the patrol car at 12:10 p.m., the dispatcher advised that it could not completely hear the information Ralston had given because of the wind. Hence, Russell had Daniel close the back door of the patrol car. Ralston then repeated the information about Daniel and requested the appropriate checks as to Jones. Russell again inquired as to the name of Daniel's company, how long Daniel had been with them, and his relationship with Jones. Again, Daniel responded "Street Institute." Moreover, Daniel clarified that Jones was not really his uncle, but his brother's father-in-law. Russell next turned to questioning Daniel about his prior arrest. Daniel explained that he was currently involved in a drug diversion program and that upon completion of the required classes, the possession charge would be dismissed.

At 12:14 p.m., the dispatcher reported that neither Daniel or Jones had a criminal history and that both drivers' licenses were current. At 12:15 p.m., Russell exited the patrol car and returned Jones's driver's license. Russell continued to question Jones, asking him where the defendants were going to stay in Memphis, how long Daniel had been with Jones's company, the nature of the defendants' business relationship with Sage Stone, and the relationship between Sage Stone and Street Institute. Jones responded accordingly and volunteered to show Russell a compact disk with the name of both Street Institute and Sage Stone on the label.

Without accepting Jones's offer, Russell returned to the patrol car. He then asked Daniel if there were any narcotics in the car. Daniel replied in the negative. The time was 12:17 p.m.1 Notwithstanding Daniel's answer, Russell asked Daniel if Ralston could "take[] a look in the car." Daniel replied in the affirmative. Nearly a minute after obtaining consent, Russell returned Daniel's rental car agreement, but he still retained Daniel's driver's license and the warning citation.

Thereafter, Ralston approached Jones and asked him to join Daniel in the back seat of the patrol car. Ralston then began a search of the luggage in the trunk of the car and the trunk itself. At 12:22 p.m., Ralston motioned Russell to take a look in the trunk, having found what appeared to be a bundle of narcotics under the trunk's carpet lining. As a result, Daniel and Jones were taken out of the patrol car, handcuffed, and then returned to the back seat of the patrol car. The officers continued with the search of the car with the aid of a screwdriver and discovered additional narcotics. During this search, Daniel and Jones made allegedly incriminating remarks that were surreptitiously recorded by the patrol car's microphone. At 12:44 p.m., the officers placed Jones under arrest and warned him of his Miranda rights. At 12:46 p.m., the officers placed Daniel under arrest in the same manner.

Both Daniel and Jones were indicted for: 1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846; 2) possession of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and 3) possession of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Daniel and Jones both filed motions to suppress evidence, which were referred to a magistrate judge. An evidentiary hearing was held on the motions, and the magistrate judge entered separate Reports and Recommendations ("R&Rs") denying the defendants' motions. Both defendants objected to the R&Rs, but the district court overruled the objections and adopted the R&Rs. Thereafter, Daniel entered a conditional plea of guilty to Count One of the indictment pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He was sentenced to a term of 135 months imprisonment, to be followed by a five-year period of supervised release. On the government's motion, the district court dismissed the other two counts. Jones, on the other hand, went to trial before a jury. After the government rested its case, Jones moved for judgment of acquittal, which motion the district court denied. He reurged his motion before presentation of the jury...

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