U.S. v. Jones, 78-5022

• Decision Date: 20 September 1978
• Docket Number: No. 78-5022,78-5022
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George R. JONES, Defendant-Appellant. Summary Calendar. *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 785

580 F.2d 785

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. George R. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-5022

Summary Calendar. ^*

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Sept. 20, 1978.

George Reynold Jones, pro se.

Franklyn Louderback, St. Petersburg, Fla. (Court-appointed), for defendant-appellant.

John L. Briggs, U. S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., Marvin L. Rudnick, Asst. U. S. Atty., Tampa, Fla., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before GOLDBERG, AINSWORTH and HILL, Circuit Judges.

AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:

Appellant George R. Jones was convicted after a jury trial of the manufacture and possession, with intent to defraud, of counterfeit Federal Reserve Notes in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 471 and 472 and sentenced to serve concurrent terms of five years under each section. He appeals his conviction asserting numerous errors in the trial below.

During April 1977 Jones picked up two hitchhikers, Dale Quarles and Kathleen McNabb. On taking them to their home he raised the subject of counterfeiting and offered Quarles the opportunity to pass some counterfeit bills to be produced by the middle of 1977. About ten days later Quarles visited the Secret Service to inform them of Jones' offer. He did this, at least partly, in the hope of securing help with a pending marijuana prosecution against him.

From April to August Jones purchased a variety of printing supplies and equipment, including a succession of three presses at least one of which was capable of printing counterfeit notes. Appellant purchased this latter press on July 8. When it was repossessed several weeks later due to failure of payment, examination by the vendor and Secret Service agents revealed black and green ink in certain parts of the press.

On July 25, appellant met Frank Burt who moved into appellant's apartment the following day and lived there for over a week. Burt had a key to the apartment and kept some clothes there; he was free to come and go as he pleased. Appellant Jones asserts in his brief that he told Burt to leave after two nights but this contention is without support in the record. While there Burt discovered two sheets with three incomplete ten-dollar bills on each sheet; on returning home the evening of August 2 he found a printing press in the dining room. Burt then called the Tampa police whom he allowed to enter the apartment and to whom he showed the sheets and the press. Jones was arrested later that evening on his return from work.

The following day Secret Service agents procured a search warrant and seized from appellant's apartment some Southworth paper, a stack of paper cut to dollar size, a finished, counterfeit ten-dollar bill, some ashes of notes from a hibachi grill, and some cans of ink.

Appellant Jones raises six issues on appeal. After careful consideration we find his contentions to be without merit. Jones first argues that the failure of the Tampa police to secure a warrant prior to their entry of his apartment and their seizure of the press and the sheets on August 2 required the exclusion of this evidence at trial. At a pretrial suppression hearing the trial court found that the police officers had entered the apartment pursuant to the lawful invitation and consent of Frank Burt who enjoyed equal rights to the common areas of the apartment. See, e. g., Moffett v. Wainwright, 5 Cir., 1975, 512 F.2d 496; United States v. Hughes, 5 Cir.,441 F.2d 12, Cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849, 92 S.Ct. 156, 30 L.Ed.2d 88 (1971). The trial court's decision that Burt could lawfully consent to a search finds ample support in the record.

Second, appellant contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process and his Fifth Amendment right to due process of law by the trial court's refusal to subpoena his mother at government expense under Rule 17(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. Jones asserts that his mother would have testified as to his character, prospective employment, location and financial condition between July 14 and August 2 and that she could have accounted for his activities during six of the days between July 7 and July 18. He argues that this eleven-day period was the only time he had the equipment necessary to print counterfeit bills and that his mother's testimony was, therefore, relevant to the defense that he had insufficient time to perform the acts charged. The trial court granted the subpoena but denied the motion for expenses since the court found that appellant had not sufficiently demonstrated that his mother's presence was necessary to an adequate defense. "The decision to grant or deny a Rule 17(b) motion is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court." United States v. Hegwood, 5 Cir., 1977, 562 F.2d 946, 952, Cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1079, 98 S.Ct. 1274, 55 L.Ed.2d 787 (1978); United States v. Moudy, 5 Cir., 1972, 462 F.2d 694, 697-98. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of appellant's motion.

Third, Jones contends that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty. The standard for review is that "the verdict must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Vomero, 5 Cir., 1978, 567 F.2d 1315, 1316. In the instant case there is a wealth of evidence to support the verdict. Appellant's statements to Quarles establish the requisite intent to defraud. Sheets of incomplete ten-dollar bills and one finished, counterfeit ten-dollar bill were found in Jones' apartment. Appellant was in possession of at least one press capable of printing counterfeit notes and subsequent examination of this press revealed the presence of black and green ink. Finally, appellant admitted making the complete, counterfeit ten-dollar bill but claimed to have made it in 1974 prior to a previous arrest and conviction for counterfeiting. Later testimony established, however, that the paper on which this note was printed had not been manufactured until 1976.

Fourth, Jones asserts that the trial court erred in permitting him to conduct his defense pro se absent a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to assistance of counsel. After the denial of a motion for acquittal at the conclusion of the prosecution's case in chief, appellant decided to proceed pro se for the remainder of the trial. He felt that his knowledge of printing and of the facts of the case would enable him to present a more effective defense representing himself. Of course, a defendant in a criminal case may elect knowingly and intelligently to relinquish his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); Chapman v. United States, 5 Cir., 1977, 553 F.2d 886. We find nothing in the record to indicate that appellant's decision to conduct his defense pro se was other than knowing, intelligent and voluntary. Before granting appellant's request the trial court conducted a lengthy colloquy with him, recommending that he continue his representation by counsel. The court found for the record that Jones was in possession of his faculties, literate and reasonably articulate. Further, at the court's request, counsel remained at the...