U.S. v. Jones
Decision Date | 09 March 1988 |
Docket Number | No. 86-2131,86-2131 |
Citation | 841 F.2d 1022 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Riley Mitchell JONES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Ronald H. Mook, Tulsa, Okl., for defendant-appellant.
John S. Morgan, Asst. U.S. Atty. (Layn R. Phillips, U.S. Atty., N.D. Okl., with him on the brief), Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before McKAY and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge *.
Defendant, Riley Mitchell Jones, was convicted on four counts of unlawful receipt of firearms by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 922(h)(1), 924(a) (1982), and on one count of unlawful possession of firearms by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1202(a)(1) (1982). These convictions are before this court for the second time on appeal. On the first appeal, this court, on its own motion, noted the possible invalidity of the multiple convictions, sentences, and special monetary assessments imposed upon the defendant. United States v. Jones, No. 85-1691, slip op. at 15-17 (10th Cir. May 8, 1986). The case was remanded for further proceedings on those issues. The district court subsequently vacated the Judgment and Sentence on three of the counts for unlawful receipt of firearms, leaving one remaining count for receipt of firearms and one count for possession. Defendant now asserts that the separate receipt and possession convictions still represent duplicative convictions, sentences, and monetary assessments, and that the district court erred when modifying the Judgment and Sentence.
The issue presented is whether the district court used the correct unit of prosecution under the circumstances of this case by allowing both a receipt conviction under section 922(h)(1) and a possession conviction under section 1202(a)(1) to remain after the court's modification.
"[W]hen the intent of Congress as to the unit of prosecution cannot be clearly discerned, doubt must be resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 293 (10th Cir.1983) ( ). Consequently, ambiguity in the definition of conduct to be punished must be settled against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. Bell, 349 U.S. at 83-84, 75 S.Ct. at 622-23; United States v. Long, 787 F.2d 538, 539 (10th Cir.1986); Valentine, 706 F.2d at 293.
Applying Bell 's rule of lenity, the courts considering the issue have uniformly resolved doubts regarding multiple offenses under section 922(h) or section 1202(a) in favor of a single offense. See, e.g., Valentine, 706 F.2d at 293 n. 10; United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 3544, 77 L.Ed.2d 1392 (1982). Specifically, courts considering section 922(h) have determined that absent a showing of separate receipt or separate storage, simultaneous receipt of multiple firearms constitutes one unit of prosecution and thus only one offense under section 922(h). Likewise, courts considering section 1202(a) have determined that simultaneous possession constitutes only one unit of prosecution and one offense. See Valentine, 706 F.2d at 293-94; Frankenberry, 696 F.2d at 244-45; see also Long, 787 F.2d at 539.
Doubt about conduct punishable under both section 922(h) and section 1202(a) has also been resolved in favor of one unit of prosecution. In Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985), the defendant was convicted and punished under both section 922(h) and section 1202(a) for receipt and possession of a firearm. The United States Supreme Court determined that when a single act is relied upon to establish receipt and possession of a firearm, the defendant cannot be convicted and punished under both section 922(h) and section 1202(a), even though the government is free to seek a multiple-count indictment. Id. at 865, 105 S.Ct. at 1673-74. The Court stated:
To say that a convicted felon may be prosecuted simultaneously for violation of Secs. 922(h) and 1202(a) ... is not to say that he may be convicted and punished for two offenses. Congress can be read as allowing charges under two different statutes with conviction and sentence confined to one. Indeed, "[a]ll guides to legislative intent," United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 109 [105 S.Ct. 611, 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 518] (1985), show that Congress intended a felon ... to be convicted and punished for only one of the two offenses if the possession of the firearm is incidental to receiving it.
Id. at 861, 105 S.Ct. at 1671.
We must now consider whether the rationale underlying Ball applies to multiple firearms under the circumstances of this case and, further, whether the legal standards set forth above permit the dividing of a collection of firearms to form separate receipt and possession convictions under sections 922(h) and 1202(a).
In August 1984, law enforcement officials seized nine firearms at defendant's residence while executing a search warrant. The firearms were all found in defendant's bedroom. Jones, No. 85-1691, slip op. at 4. Four of the firearms had been reported as stolen. Although the exact dates defendant received these firearms could not be established, the government could conclude that defendant received the firearms sometime between the date each was reported as stolen and the date of the search. Each firearm identified as having this "window of receipt" originally formed the basis for a separate charge and conviction under Counts I through IV. The five remaining firearms collectively formed the basis for the charge of possession under Count V.
The government agrees that the four counts for unlawful receipt were properly merged into one count on remand since the government could not establish separate dates of receipt for any of the stolen firearms. See Valentine, 706 F.2d at 293-94 ( ); Frankenberry, 696 F.2d at 244-45. Consequently, the firearms have now been identified to either a simultaneous receipt offense or a simultaneous possession offense; and the district court's modification of the Judgment and Sentence appears to comply with the standards set forth by this court in Valentine, 706 F.2d at 292-94, and Long, 787 F.2d at 539. The modified Judgment and Sentence also appears to comply with the holding in Ball, 470 U.S. at 865, 105 S.Ct. at 1673-74, since the firearms comprising the simultaneous receipt offense under combined Count I are not the same firearms comprising the possession offense under Count V. The government contends, therefore, that the district court was correct in permitting both a receipt and a possession conviction to stand.
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that since all nine firearms were found at the same time in the same place and since receipt could not be pinpointed for any of the firearms, the correct unit of prosecution for the entire collection of firearms allows for only one conviction. Under this reasoning, defendant's separate receipt and possession convictions must be further reduced to a single conviction and sentence.
Although only a single firearm was at issue in Ball, we believe that the rationale in Ball should be applied in the context of multiple firearms that are all discovered on the same date and seized from the same location. In this context, the government cannot simply divide the collection of firearms into separate receipt and possession offenses. Even though no single firearm would be the subject of both a receipt and a possession offense, when a single act is relied upon to establish the offenses, the multiple firearms must be viewed together and cannot support both convictions. This observes the reasoning in Ball. In light of the rule of lenity enunciated in Bell, 349 U.S. at 83-84, we are persuaded that Congress did not intend a felon to be convicted of and punished for both receiving and possessing multiple firearms under the circumstances of this case inasmuch as possession of the firearms is incidental to receiving them. Cf. Ball, 470 U.S. at 861-62, 105 S.Ct. at 1671-72. As the Supreme Court noted in Ball, Id. at 864, 105 S.Ct. at 1673 (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1144-45, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981)).
Although defendant necessarily received the firearms that were reported as stolen because defendant possessed them on the date of the search, the government did not implicate defendant in the...
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