U.S. v. Juvenile No. 1, 3
| Decision Date | 17 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-40575,No. 3,No. 4,D,3,4,96-40575 |
| Citation | 118 F.3d 298 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUVENILE NO. 1; Juvenile; Juvenileefendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Heather Harris Rattan, Sherman, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
G. Patrick Black, Amy R. Blalock, Federal Public Defender's Office, Tyler, TX, for Juvenile No. 1, Defendant-Appellant.
William Stephen Loveless, Denton, TX, for Juvenile No. 3, Defendant-Appellant.
Teresa Gayle Sanchez, Boyd and Veigel, McKinney, TX, for Juvenile No. 4, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and FOLSOM, * District Judge.
This case presents an issue of first impression in this circuit concerning the prosecution of juveniles in federal court: whether the Attorney General's certification under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042, that there exists a "substantial Federal interest" to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction in a juvenile prosecution is subject to judicial review. In holding that the Attorney General's certification of a "substantial Federal interest" under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is not subject to judicial review, we join the majority of circuits that have considered the issue. In addition, we must decide whether the particular facts of this case support the district court's order that the juveniles be transferred for adult criminal prosecution. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order of the district court.
During a two-week period in the spring of 1995, a series of armed robberies took place in Denton and Dallas counties in northeast Texas. In connection with the robberies, the government filed a thirteen-count complaint on March 25, 1996, against four juvenile males identified as J.R.P., J.C.L., 1 G.A.B., and B.G.B. The complaint alleged that the juveniles conspired to interfere with interstate commerce by threats and violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, used and carried firearms during and in relation to crimes of violence in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and aided and abetted the commission of offenses against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. A sealed information containing identical charges was filed on April 8, 1996.
The alleged overt acts in support of the charges are as follows. Just after midnight on May 16, 1995, J.R.P. and B.G.B. approached an individual at an automated teller machine ("ATM") in Carrollton and demanded that the individual hand over the cash that he intended to deposit. One of the two juveniles pointed a handgun at the victim and also hit him with the handgun. A few hours later, J.R.P. and G.A.B. entered an Exxon service station in Dallas, pointed a handgun at the clerk, and took approximately $250 from the cash register. This early morning spree continued at a Carrollton Texaco station, where J.R.P. and G.A.B. pointed a gun at the clerk, pulled the trigger (for unknown reasons, the gun did not discharge), and took over $200 in cash and lottery tickets. On the night of May 29, 1995, J.R.P., B.G.B., J.C.L., and a fourth individual entered a Dairy Queen in Dallas armed with a sawed-off shotgun, two handguns, and a broom handle. They pointed the guns at the restaurant employees, beat the employees with the guns and broom handle, and took approximately $1633 from the restaurant. Two days later, on May 31, 1995, G.A.B. and two other individuals robbed a Budget Inn in Lewisville at gunpoint, taking approximately $800. Also on May 31, 1995, J.R.P., J.C.L., and three others drove to the Fun Time Pizza Restaurant in Carrollton, armed with two sawed-off shotguns and a handgun, apparently intending to commit a robbery. Finally, on the night of June 1, 1995, J.R.P., armed with a shotgun, entered a Little Caesar's Pizza Restaurant in Lewisville and robbed both the restaurant and a customer. It is undisputed that appellants were juveniles at the time of these alleged acts. 2
On the same date that the complaint was filed, the government also filed a certification to proceed against the juveniles in federal court and a motion to transfer the juveniles for adult criminal prosecution, both pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Consistent with the requirements of § 5032, the certification averred that the charged offenses are felony crimes of violence, and:
3. There is substantial federal interest in the case to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction due to the extremely serious nature of the crime and the fact that interstate commerce was affected.
4. Furthermore, the State of Texas does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of the Defendants.
Appellants filed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the certification failed to state a substantial federal interest and that the State of Texas does have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles.
While appellants' motions to dismiss were pending, hearings on the government's transfer motions were held before a magistrate judge. On May 3, 1996, the magistrate judge filed a separate report and recommendation as to each juvenile in which he recommended transfer for adult prosecution. Appellants filed timely objections. On May 23, 1996, the district court entered an order overruling these objections and adopting the reports and recommendations of the magistrate. In the same order, the district court denied appellants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that, absent an allegation of bad faith, the court was without authority to review the substantive assertions of the government's certification under 18 U.S.C. § 5032.
J.R.P., G.A.B., and B.G.B. appeal the district court's order granting the government's motion to transfer them for adult criminal prosecution. Specifically, appellants contend that there is no basis for federal jurisdiction because the government did not meet its burden of proof regarding a "substantial Federal interest" in the case. 3 Each appellant also argues that his particular circumstances do not warrant transfer for criminal prosecution under the relevant statutory factors, and that therefore the district court abused its discretion in granting the government's transfer motion.
The government argues that the Attorney General's certification to proceed under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is akin to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and is not reviewable absent an allegation of bad faith. The government argues in the alternative that the evidence does establish that a substantial federal interest exists in this case. Finally, the government contends that the detailed factual findings underlying the decision to transfer appellants for criminal prosecution indicate that the court below weighed the statutory factors properly and thoroughly and did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to transfer.
We consider two issues in this appeal: first, whether the government's certification that the juvenile offenses involve a "substantial Federal interest" to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 5032 is subject to judicial review 4 and second, whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding, based on an evaluation of the relevant statutory factors, that appellants should be prosecuted as adults. This court has jurisdiction to review the district court's order under § 5032 transferring appellants for adult criminal prosecution based on the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. United States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 914 (5th Cir.1994).
We begin with a brief overview of the relevant statutory framework. To proceed against a juvenile in federal court, the Attorney General 5 must certify to the appropriate district court, after investigation,
that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or an offense described in section 841, 952(a), 955, or 959 of title 21, and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.
If the Attorney General does not so certify, such juvenile shall be surrendered to the appropriate legal authorities of such State.
18 U.S.C. § 5032. 6
If federal jurisdiction is retained, the juvenile will be proceeded against in juvenile delinquency proceedings unless he requests to be proceeded against as an adult or the district court, upon motion by the Attorney General and after a hearing, determines that transfer for adult criminal prosecution would be "in the interest of justice." 18 U.S.C. § 5032. 7 Section 5032 sets forth six factors that the district court must consider in making such determination:
Evidence of the following factors shall be considered, and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice: the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.
Congress has made clear that certification and transfer are distinct processes in a federal action against a juvenile:
The criteria for prosecution of a juvenile as an adult...
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