U.S. v. Juvenile Male

• Decision Date: 23 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-4062.,08-4062.
• Citation: 554 F.3d 456
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUVENILE MALE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

554 F.3d 456

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUVENILE MALE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-4062.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: October 27, 2008.

Decided: January 23, 2009.

ARGUED: Carmen D. Hernandez, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jonathan C. Su, Office of the United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; James M. Trusty, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before KING, Circuit Judge, HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge, and MARTIN K. REIDINGER, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by published opinion. Judge KING wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge HAMILTON and Judge REIDINGER joined.

OPINION

KING, Circuit Judge:

By way of this interlocutory appeal, CAM, who was seventeen years old when he was charged as a delinquent and arrested in 2005, seeks relief from the district court's transfer order of December 2007, authorizing his prosecution as an adult in the District of Maryland. See United States v. C.A.M., No. 8:05-cr-00401 (D.Md. Dec. 7, 2007) (the "Transfer Order").¹ In his appeal, CAM contends that the charging juvenile delinquency information contravenes the Constitution and is otherwise legally insufficient, that the transfer proceedings violated his procedural rights under the applicable statutes and the Constitution, and that the court abused its discretion in entering the Transfer Order. As explained below, we affirm in part and dismiss in part.

I.

A.

The Transfer Order was entered by the district court pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (the "Act"), specifically that part of the Act codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (" § 5032"). As we have previously recognized, the primary purpose of the Act is to "`remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation.'" United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 858 (4th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir.1990)).² The Act establishes several procedures for the handling and disposition of juveniles in the federal system, but does not create a substantive federal juvenile offense. See United States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 437 (8th Cir.1978). Accordingly, a proceeding concerning the potential transfer of a juvenile to adult prosecution in federal court addresses only the juvenile's status; it is not a criminal proceeding and does not result in an adjudication of guilt or innocence. See United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1322-23 (4th Cir.1996) (recognizing applicability of preponderance burden of proof in transfer hearing).³ Because such a proceeding is civil in nature, "[t]he procedures used at a hearing on the transfer of a juvenile ... do not need to conform to all the requirements of a criminal trial." United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1255 (5th Cir.1989). Significantly, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not generally apply in a juvenile transfer proceeding. See United States v. SLW, 406 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir.2005) (comparing transfer proceeding to preliminary examination in criminal case, in which evidentiary rules are inapplicable); In re A.M., 34 F.3d 153, 161-62 (3d Cir.1994) (same); Doe, 871 F.2d at 1255 & n. 2 (same); see also Fed. R.Evid. 1101(d)(3).

The Act establishes several procedural hurdles for the transfer of a juvenile under § 5032. First, the government may initiate a juvenile proceeding only by the filing of a delinquency information, and not by indictment. Second, a United States Attorney must certify one of three potential jurisdictional bases for proceeding in federal court: (1) that no state possesses, or is willing to exercise, jurisdiction over the juvenile; (2) that the state lacks adequate programs and services for the juvenile; or (3) that the juvenile has committed a felonious "crime of violence" or drug offense in which there is a substantial federal interest. See United States v. White, 139 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (4th Cir.1998).

Third, before a district court may exercise jurisdiction in a juvenile proceeding, it must satisfy itself that such jurisdiction has been properly invoked, by "reviewing the stated reasons underlying the government's decision to proceed in federal court." Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d at 1321; see also United States v. T.M., 413 F.3d 420, 423-24 (4th Cir.2005) (recognizing subject matter jurisdiction to review "the government's assertions in its § 5032 certifications"). In assessing a transfer motion, however, a court is not required to examine the veracity of the allegations lodged against the juvenile; it is entitled to accept the prosecution's allegations as true. See United States v. Juvenile, 451 F.3d 571, 576 (9th Cir.2006) (observing that seven courts of appeals—every "circuit to have considered the issue"—have "held that a district court may assume that the juvenile committed the alleged offense for purposes of transfer proceeding").⁴

After confirming its jurisdiction, a district court possesses the discretion to transfer the juvenile to adult prosecution, but must first assess the statutory factors specified in the fifth unnumbered paragraph of § 5032, which are as follows:

the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; [and] the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.

In order to grant a transfer request, the court must conclude that a transfer order "would be in the interest of justice by a preponderance of the evidence." Robinson, 404 F.3d at 858. As we have explained, "[t]he district court may determine what weight to give the various factors, although, in the weighing of the various factors, the nature of the crime clearly predominates." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). With this procedural background in mind, we turn to the specifics of this appeal.

B.

1.

CAM was arrested in Maryland on August 25, 2005, approximately three months before his eighteenth birthday, on the basis of a juvenile delinquency information filed one day earlier by the United States Attorney (the "Initial Information"). The Initial Information charged CAM with delinquency on the basis of his involvement in a "conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise, which would have been a crime in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(d), if he had been an adult." Pursuant to § 5032, the United States Attorney also filed a certification to proceed in federal court, endeavoring to specify the jurisdictional predicate of the proceeding (the "Certification").

CAM provided authorities with two statements that potentially implicate him as being involved in criminal activity. CAM made the first statement during an interview with federal agents on April 7, 2005, months before his arrest. The second statement was provided on the day of his arrest, after CAM had signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights. In the August statement, CAM discussed his involvement with a gang known as "MS-13." In addition to providing his statement, CAM assisted authorities in locating a firearm that had been used in a homicide. CAM asserts that the August statement was made during a twelve-hour delay between his arrest and his initial appearance, and that such delay contravened the "forthwith" mandate of the Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 5033 ("Whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, ... [he] shall be taken before a magistrate forthwith."). CAM also maintains that the April and August statements were taken in violation of his Miranda rights.⁵

On June 14, 2006, after weighing the statutory factors of § 5032, the district court transferred CAM to adult prosecution. See United States v. C.A.M., No. 8:05-cr-00401 (D. Md. June 14, 2006) (the "Initial Transfer").⁶ Invoking the collateral-order doctrine, CAM immediately appealed to this Court, and we vacated and remanded. In so doing, we ruled—primarily predicated on a concession of error by the prosecution—that the Initial Information and Certification were defective in failing to comply with § 5032, by insufficiently alleging a "crime of violence." See United States v. C.A.M., 251 F. App'x 194, 195 (4th Cir.2007). In remanding, we authorized the United States Attorney to "cure the jurisdictional defect by amending either the information or the certification." Id.

2.

On November 19, 2007, in an effort to secure another transfer, the United States Attorney filed the amended delinquency information underlying this appeal, specifying, inter alia, that the conspiracy involved violent acts of murder, attempted murder, kidnapping, and robbery (the "Amended Information").⁷ In support thereof, the Amended Information incorporated the affidavit of the investigating agent, which had been filed on August 24 2005 (the "Affidavit").⁸ The Affidavit stated, inter alia, that

• CAM was a member of MS-13 in Prince George's County, Maryland, and that the gang had engaged in a pattern of racketeering activities which affected interstate commerce;⁹

• CAM was a passenger in a vehicle when the driver engaged in a drive-by shooting;

• CAM had participated in an attack on a rival gang member, where a victim sustained life-threatening injuries caused by a machete; and

• CAM had participated in "jump ins," where members of MS-13 initiated new gang members by beating them for thirteen seconds.

Two weeks later, on December 6, 2007, the district court issued the Transfer Order now contested...