U.S. v. Juvenile Male

• Citation: 864 F.2d 641
• Decision Date: 27 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-3091,87-3091
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUVENILE MALE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 641

864 F.2d 641

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JUVENILE MALE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87-3091.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 12, 1988.

Decided Dec. 27, 1988.

Priscilla L. Seaborg, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Portland, Or., for defendant-appellant.

William Youngman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, Or., for plaintiff-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.

Before SCHROEDER, PREGERSON and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.

SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:

Appellant is an Indian who, while a juvenile, committed an assault against another Indian within Indian country. Appellant was found to have violated 18 U.S.C. Sec. 113(c)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986), assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm. Federal courts have jurisdiction pursuant to the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1153 (Supp. IV 1986). Appellant appeals his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent based on the assault.

The principal issues in this appeal relate to the interplay between the jurisdictional provisions of the Major Crimes Act and the jurisdictional provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 5031-42 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Major Crimes Act provides that any Indian who commits one of a certain list of major crimes (including assault) against another Indian on an Indian reservation is subject to federal jurisdiction. ¹ Because appellant was a juvenile at the time of the crime, the special provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act apply. Under that Act, a judicial finding that the juvenile committed the crime does not lead to a criminal conviction, but rather to an adjudication of the juvenile as a "juvenile delinquent." ² A prosecution under the Act results not in a criminal conviction but in an adjudication of status. United States v. Frasquillo-Zomosa, 626 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 405, 66 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980).

To establish jurisdiction for such an adjudication, the juvenile delinquency procedures require the government to file a special certification regarding the juvenile before it can proceed against that juvenile:

A juvenile alleged to have committed an act of juvenile delinquency ... shall not be proceeded against in any court of the United States unless the Attorney General, after investigation, certifies to the appropriate district court of the United States that

(1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to such alleged act of juvenile delinquency,

(2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or

(3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony ... and that there is a substantial federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction.

If the Attorney General does not so certify, such juvenile shall be surrendered to the appropriate legal authorities of such State.

18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032. In the proceedings below, the Attorney General filed a certification under both the first and third provisions of this section. He certified that no state has jurisdiction and that there is a substantial federal interest in the felony committed.

Appellant's major contentions on appeal go to the adequacy of the government's certification. He argues that further certifications were required in order to take into account his status as a member of an Indian tribe. Appellant raises a number of other claimed errors in the trial court proceedings, including failure to disclose exculpatory evidence per Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), insufficient evidence to find the requisite intent, and abuses of discretion in evidentiary rulings. We find that none of the appellant's contentions have merit and therefore affirm.

The facts are not complex. Both appellant and his victim are residents of the Warm Springs Reservation in Oregon. During the evening of March 23, 1987, the appellant visited the victim, who was eight months pregnant, at her home. She knew the appellant and invited him in. During the visit appellant left the room for a few moments, returning with a kitchen knife, his shirt off, his pants unbuttoned and his genitals exposed. For the next forty-five minutes, appellant attempted, by brandishing the butcher knife, to force the victim to lie down on her couch. After appellant stabbed the victim in the neck she ran out of the house and found help. Appellant was arrested the next morning. He claimed he had taken LSD the night before and did not remember the incident at the victim's home. The federal court assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Attorney General's certifications under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032(1) and (3), held a delinquency hearing, and adjudged the appellant a juvenile delinquent.

Certification Under the Juvenile Justice Act

The certification requirements in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032 were added to the juvenile delinquency statute in 1974. See Pub.L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1974). Their purpose was to help ensure that state and local authorities would deal with juvenile offenders wherever possible, keeping juveniles away from the less appropriate federal channels. See S.Rep. No. 1011, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 5283. The certifications were designed to remove juveniles from the federal system except for juveniles who would not fall under a state plan, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032(1)-(2), or who committed crimes involving a substantial federal interest. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 5032(3).

The Attorney General's certification under section 5032(1) comports with the literal requirements of the section. The state of Oregon, where the Warm Springs Reservation is located, has no jurisdictional authority over appellant as he is a member of the Warm Springs Tribe and resides on the reservation. See United States v. E.K., 471 F.Supp. 924, 927-28 (D.Or.1979).

Appellant contends, however, that the government should additionally have certified that the tribe, as well as the state, would not exercise jurisdiction or, if the tribe would exercise jurisdiction, had an inadequate program for his needs. Appellant argues that given Congress' express intent to keep juveniles out of the federal court system wherever possible, Congress must have intended such further certifications. He asks that we, as a matter of statutory interpretation, hold that such certifications are statutorily required.

This court, however, cannot read into the intent or actions of Congress what is simply not there. Despite Congress' desire to channel juveniles into state and local treatment programs, clearly expressed in the legislative history of section 5032, the section and its history are completely silent as to tribes. ³ The language and history provide Congress certainly had within its power the ability to include tribes within the certification requirements, but it did not do so. This is explained fully by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Allen, 574 F.2d 435, 438-39 (8th Cir.1978), holding that certification as to tribal jurisdiction is not required by this section. We agree with the Eighth Circuit's analysis. Furthermore, after United States v. Allen, Congress reviewed and revised the section 5032 certification requirements. See Pub.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). It made no change to subsections (1) or (2) at that time. It added subsection (3), the "substantial federal interest" certification alternative. This had the effect of enlarging federal court jurisdiction to some extent. There is no indication that Congress intended to diminish federal jurisdiction concerning tribes. See S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 389, reprinted in 1984 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 3182, 3529.

no basis for assuming that Congress intended Indian juveniles otherwise subject to federal jurisdiction under the Major Crimes Act to be subject to tribal jurisdiction. The Major Crimes Act places jurisdiction over serious crimes, including assault, squarely in the hands of the federal government. Federal law limits the punishment a tribe can impose for any crime to $5,000 and one year imprisonment. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1302(7). By contrast, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 113(c) carries with it a maximum penalty of $1,000 and five years imprisonment.

In the alternative, appellant contends that if the statute does not require any certification with respect to tribal, as opposed to state authority, then we must hold the statute unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. The equal protection clause targets distinctions made between individuals on impermissible bases, including race. Appellant contends here that he is the victim of an impermissible race distinction. He claims that because he belongs to the Indian race the certification provisions of section 5032(1) and (2) deprive him of the benefit of local treatment programs. If a white juvenile living on an Indian reservation were charged with appellant's identical crime against the same victim, the white juvenile would not be sent into the federal system unless no state with jurisdiction and an adequate program could be found, or a substantial federal interest were involved. However, since members of the Indian race living on a reservation are rarely subject to state jurisdiction, the first two certifications in section 5032 always apply to Indian juveniles charged under the Major Crimes Act, assuring that they will always be funneled into the federal system. Appellant contends this is a classification based on race.

The difficulty with appellant's position is that the Supreme Court held in United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 97 S.Ct. 1395, 51 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977), that the distinctions made between Indians and non-Indians as a result of...