U.S.A v. Key
| Decision Date | 05 March 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-51299.,08-51299. |
| Citation | 599 F.3d 469 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ravis Neal KEY, II, DefendantAppellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
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Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Ellen A. Lockwood (argued), Asst. U.S. Attys., San Antonio TX, for U.S.
John Richard Donahue (argued) (Court-Appointed), Waco, TX, for Key.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and SMITH and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
Ravis Neal Key, after ingesting a cornucopia of intoxicating drugs, crashed a car into a vehicle driven by Sergeant Andre M Araujo, who died as a result. Key pled guilty to intoxication manslaughter and now challenges his 216-month sentence contending that the sentencing court failed to adequately explain its reasons for imposing an above-guidelines sentence and that the sentence is, in itself, substantively unreasonable. Finding no sentencing error, we affirm. We also hold that the Texas offense of intoxication manslaughter was properly assimilated as the crime of conviction.
On the morning of Monday, June 30 2008, Ravis Key awoke in the driver's seat of a borrowed car. The aftereffects of thedrugs and alcohol he had consumed with friends the previous night lingered, but he felt sober enough to drive home. Shortly thereafter, he approached the intersection of Tank Destroyer Boulevard and Clarke Road, which is located within the Fort Hood Military Reservation. Sergeant Andre M. Araujo's vehicle was stopped at the red light in Key's lane of traffic. Key's car collided with Araujo's at 75 miles per hour. Key did not brake; his vehicle left no skid marks. Araujo's car was propelled into the intersection, where it was struck by another vehicle and caught fire. Sergeant Araujo died from the massive head injury he received in the collisions.
Key appeared intoxicated to the military police who arrived at the accident scene. Tests revealed that his blood contained cocaine, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), benzodiazepines, amphetamines, and cannabinoids (marijuana). Approximately three to five grams of cocaine were found in Key's vehicle. The federal government charged Key with driving a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, and by reason of that intoxication causing Sergeant Araujo's death, in violation of Tex. Penal Code § 49.08 ("Intoxication Manslaughter"), assimilated through the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13. Key pled guilty, without a plea agreement. The state offense carries a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison. Tex. Penal Code § 12.33(a).
The pre-sentence report concluded that the most analogous federal sentencing guideline to the offense of conviction was that for involuntary manslaughter. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2X5.1, 2A1.4 (2008). Pursuant to that guideline, Key's base offense level was 22 because his "offense involved the reckless operation of a means of transportation, " id., but the department subtracted three offense levels for acceptance of responsibility. Key's criminal history—in cluding one conviction of evading arrest with a vehicle, two convictions of evading arrest, and two convictions of burglary of a vehicle—resulted in a score of nine and a criminal history category of IV. Based on these factors, the guidelines range of imprisonment was from 46 to 57 months.
The pre-sentence report proposed an upward variance based upon the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, and the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Key had made a conscious decision to drive the vehicle, knowing that he was still under the influence of drugs. Further, he had admitted daily use of cocaine, beginning in early 2008, and of marijuana, beginning in early 2005. Therefore, he had undoubtedly operated a motor vehicle under the influence of dangerous drugs before committing the instant offense. For these reasons, the department urged the district court to consider a variance and sentence Key to a term of imprisonment that was "significantly higher than the established guidelines range."
Key objected that a variance was not warranted. The guidelines sentence, he argued, considered the consumption of intoxicants, driving a vehicle, and the accidental death of an individual. He also claimed that the PSR did not adequately reflect his profound regret for causing Sergeant Araujo's death. In addition, Key asserted that lack of sleep, not just intoxication, was a factor in the accident.
The government, in turn, advocated a non-guidelines sentence that was "close to" the 20-year statutory maximum. In support of this argument, it related the extreme "nature and circumstances of the offense, " as well as the "history and characteristics of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). According to testimony, Key had borrowed the vehicle in exchange for cocaine, an arrangement that the government characterized as a "crack rental." It also argued that § 2A1.4, the guideline that determined Key's base offense level, encompasses a broad array of conduct and includes crimes that do not involve intoxication. The guideline applies to conduct that is minor when compared to Key's conduct, such as when a sober person drives recklessly. Because so many scenarios could be considered "reckless, " the base offense level of 22 did not adequately account for Key's conduct, which involved multiple controlled substances, excessive speed, and a collision without braking into a person who was stopped at a red light. The government further argued that it was hard to imagine a greater disregard for human life than Key's and asserted that, in such a situation, the defendant would likely be charged with second-degree murder.
The government also stated that a greater sentence was necessary to comply with the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). First, a longer sentence would be commensurate with the seriousness of the offense. Second, it was necessary to promote respect for the law and deterrence of criminal conduct, given the nature of the offense and Key's criminal record. Third, it would provide just punishment in light of the offense's tragic impact on the victim and his family. Fourth, the purpose of "protect[ing] the public from further crimes of the defendant, " § 3553(a)(2)(C), warranted a significant variance from the guidelines range because the instant offense, and several of Key's prior offenses, threatened public safety.
Finally, the government argued that a lengthy sentence would avoid sentencing disparities.
The district court agreed with the government and imposed a sentence of 216 months of imprisonment, far above the guidelines range and slightly below the statutory maximum. The court explained that the guidelines range was "completely inadequate" to achieve the purposes of § 3553(a), and it explicitly adopted the government's argument in support of the sentence. It elaborated on its rationale in a written Statement of Reasons explaining its imposition of a sentence outside the guidelines range.
Key objected to the sentence as unreasonable and has now timely appealed.
In general, this court reviews a district court's sentencing decision under a "deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Further, "Appellate review is highly deferential as the sentencing judge is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) with respect to a particular defendant." United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 339 (5th Cir.2008). When an objection has not been raised below, however, plain-error review governs that issue. United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 (5th Cir.2009), cert. denied (October 5, 2009) (No. 08-11099). A plain error is one that is clear or obvious and that affects the party's substantial rights. United States v. Baker, 538 F.3d 324, 332 (5th Cir.2008), cert denied, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 962, 173 L.Ed.2d 153 (2009). This court will correct plain errors only if they seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.
On appeal, Key raises two issues. First he argues that the district court committedprocedural error by failing to adequately explain its reasons for imposing a nonguidelines sentence. Second, he challenges the sentence itself as substantively unreasonable. In addition, at the request of this court, the parties briefed a third issue, whether the Texas offense of Intoxicated Manslaughter was properly assimilated under the Assimilative Crimes Act. We address each issue in turn.
Key complains that the district court committed a significant procedural error by failing adequately to consider the policy factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) and document its reasoning for imposing a non-guidelines sentence, as required by § 3553(c). Because Key did not raise this objection before the district court, it is subject to plain error review. Puckett v. United States, — U.S. —, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429, 173 L.Ed.2d 266 (2009).
Section 3553(c) states that the district court, "at the time of sentencing shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence... (2) is not of the kind, or is outside the [Guidelines range], the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described." The district court's statement of "reasons should be fact-specific and consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated in § 3553(a)." United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704, 707 (5th Cir.2006). The court's justification for a particular sentence must be sufficient "to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the...
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