U.S. v. Koubriti
| Decision Date | 24 March 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-80778.,01-80778. |
| Citation | 252 F.Supp.2d 437 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Karim KOUBRITI, Ahmed Hannan, Abdel Ilah el Mardoudi, and Farouk Ali-Haimoud, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Richard G. Convertino, United States Attorney's Office, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff.
Richard M. Helfrick, Leroy T. Soles, Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, James C. Thomas, Joseph A. Niskar, Detroit, MI, Stephen T. Rabaut, St. Clair Shores, MI, Federal Defender, Federal Defender Office, William W. Swor, Margaret S. Raben, Gurewitz & Raben, Kevin S. Ernst, Ernst Assoc., Robert M. Morgan, Detroit, MI, for Defendants.
As the Court embarked upon the process of jury selection in this case, involving charges of conspiracy to provide material support or resources to terrorists, conspiracy to engage in document fraud, and document fraud, the United States commenced hostilities against Iraq. As a result, the national landscape has been reshaped in certain respects, as it is in the wake of any such momentous event. The four Defendants in this case, all of whom are of Middle Eastern ethnicity, contend that this changed national mood is no longer compatible with their constitutional right to a fair trial, at least while fighting continues in Iraq. Consequently, by motion filed on March 20, 2003, they request that their trial be adjourned until the hostilities have ceased.
As discussed in detail below, the Court finds an adjournment legally unwarranted, as well as imprudent. Recent media reports and this Court's own opinions have observed that this is the first post-September 11 case involving allegations of international terrorist support to proceed to trial. Further, three of the four Defendants here were arrested within days of the September 11 attacks, as the direct result of a government effort to locate another individual, Nabil Al-Marabh, who was thought to have knowledge or information concerning those terrorist attacks. Although Defendants have not been linked in any way to the specific events of that day, there is no doubt that charges of the sort made in this case stand in a different light now than before the attacks on New York and Washington. If the war against Iraq has altered the mood of the nation, the impact of September 11 surely has been far greater and more enduring. Moreover, if the present conflict is a reminder of the challenging times in which we live, September 11 is perhaps the font of that wisdom.
The parties and the Court alike have long recognized the shadow that September 11 casts upon these proceedings, and the need to take steps to ensure that Defendants' rights are fully protected in this post-September 11 environment. Most recently, prospective jurors were asked to complete a lengthy and comprehensive questionnaire exploring a number of subjects, including the possible effect of September 11 upon their lives and their ability to serve fairly and impartially. Prospective jurors then were subjected to individual voir dire, where these matters were probed more deeply. Through these and other tools available (and, in many instances, mandated) under this nation's system of justice, the Court is confident that a fair trial can be achieved even in the face of the challenges posed by September 11. These same measures, in the Court's view, are sufficient to ensure that the war in Iraq does not undermine Defendants' right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
Practical considerations lead to the same conclusion. As noted, we live in uncertain times, with no assurance that a period of greater clarity and equanimity is near at hand. While the nation's attention today is focused upon the fighting in Iraq, we do not know whether tomorrow will bring another event of greater and more direct bearing upon the charges brought against Defendants in this case. The Court can take account of matters which already have transpired—and, in fact, because the Iraq conflict has been on the horizon for some time now, the Court and counsel have questioned prospective jurors on this issue from the outset, even before hostilities commenced. What the Court cannot do, however, is anticipate the gravity and significance of events yet to occur. Nor is the Court willing to speculate that this uncertain future invariably will be more hospitable to Defendants' fair trial rights. Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein and at the March 24, 2003 hearing on Defendants' motion, the Court declines to adjourn the trial in this case.
The allegations of this case have been set forth in the Court's prior Opinions, and need not be repeated here. As noted, the Third Superseding Indictment in this case charges Defendants Karim Koubriti, Ahmed Hannan, Abdel Ilah Ed Mardoudi, and Farouk Ali-Haimoud with conspiracy to provide material support or resources to terrorists, conspiracy to engage in document fraud, and document fraud. A pool of over two hundred prospective jurors was asked to complete a 26-page questionnaire in late February of 2003, and individual voir dire commenced on March 18, 2003.
On the evening of March 19, 2003, the United States went to war with Iraq. Yet, even before the commencement of hostilities, the Court and the parties fully anticipated the prospect of war, and the Court instructed that counsel should voir dire on this subject. Thus, from the beginning of voir dire, and before the start of the fighting in Iraq, the Court and counsel have painstakingly questioned each potential juror regarding the impact of war on his or her ability to remain fair and impartial, and this practice has continued now that the military conflict has begun. The prospective jurors were reminded that none of the Defendants is from Iraq—rather, as stated in the initial questionnaire, they hail from Morocco and Algeria—but that they and the people of Iraq share an Arabic national origin. To date, all of the jurors qualified by the Court, and the vast majority of those who were excused for cause, have indicated that the conflict in Iraq would not affect their ability to fairly assess the evidence at trial and impartially render their verdict.1
On the morning of March 20, 2003, Defendants filed their present motion requesting that the Court adjourn the trial until the end of the war in Iraq.2 In support of this motion, Defendants assert that the outbreak of war and the surrounding media coverage will result in a surge of pro-government patriotism and hostility to Middle Easterners such as Defendants, rendering a fair trial by an impartial jury impossible. Defendants further contend that a public perception of possible links between Saddam Hussein and terrorist activities only exacerbates the problem. Finally, Defendants maintain that one specific item of the government's evidence in this case—a day planner containing an alleged sketch of the United States air base at Incerlik, Turkey—is inextricably intertwined with the war because this same base may be used in military operations against Iraq.
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution guarantee Defendants "a fair trial by a panel of impartial, `indifferent' jurors." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). Although external influences, such as pretrial publicity or world affairs, might challenge the neutrality of jurors, and thereby threaten prejudice to a defendant's ability to receive a fair trial, the mere existence of such influences does not necessarily undermine constitutional rights. We do not insist, for example, that "jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved" in a case. Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722, 81 S.Ct. at 1642. Rather, the Supreme Court has emphasized:
To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.
366 U.S. at 723, 81 S.Ct. at 1642-43.
A juror's assurances on this point are not the end of the matter, however. "[I]t remains open to the defendant to demonstrate the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality." Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Plainly, then, whether one is asking if a juror can lay aside his preconceived notions and fairly render a verdict, or instead exploring whether a juror's assertions of neutrality are reliable, the focus in either case is upon the jury voir dire.
The Supreme Court has "stressed the wide discretion granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire in the area of pretrial publicity and in other areas of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias." Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1906, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991); see also United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 411 (6th Cir.2000) (). Likewise, this Court has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a continuance on such grounds as allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity. See United States v. Medlin, 353 F.2d 789, 792 (6th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 973, 86 S.Ct. 1860, 16 L.Ed.2d 683 (1966); United States v. El-Jassem, 819 F.Supp. 166, 177 (E.D.N.Y.1993), affd, 48 F.3d 1213 (2d Cir.1994). As noted in El-Jassem:
A continuance is appropriate only where it would significantly reduce the effect of publicity and warrant compromising the public interest in prompt disposition of...
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U.S. v. Elmardoudi, 06-CR-112-LRR.
...and Illinois. Defendant was eventually tried on the Michigan Indictment in the Michigan Proceedings. See United States v. Koubriti, 252 F.Supp.2d 437, 439 (E.D.Mich.2003); see also United States v. Koubriti, 305 F.Supp.2d 723, 727 n. 3 (E.D.Mich.2003). On June 3, 2003, a jury found Defendan......
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U.S. v. Adedoyin
...say that the court abused its discretion in denying Adedoyin's motion for a 90-day postponement. See, generally, United States v. Koubriti, 252 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D.Mich.2003) (finding that postponement until the end of the war against Iraq was not warranted in case where defendants of Middle......