U.S. v. Krouse
Decision Date | 04 June 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 02-50458.,02-50458. |
Citation | 370 F.3d 965 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Conrad Albert KROUSE, III, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
William J. Kopeny, Irvine, CA, for the defendant-appellant.
Todd T. Tristan, Assistant United States Attorney, Santa Ana, CA, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Alicemarie H. Stotler, District Judge, Presiding.
Before: GOODWIN, PREGERSON, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
For the first time in this circuit, we must decide what it means to possess a firearm "in furtherance of" a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In so doing, we affirm the conviction and 161-month sentence of Conrad Albert Krouse.1 We conclude that sufficient evidence supports Krouse's conviction for possession of a firearm "in furtherance" of a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c) because the facts in evidence demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the weapons discovered in Krouse's home and his drug trafficking operation.
This case began with an investigation into the disappearance of various arcade and vending machines from a tavern in Buena Park, California. Suspecting that Krouse had stolen the machines, local police officers executed a search warrant on his home. They discovered the missing machines plus five firearms, ammunition, 86.5 grams of cocaine, and almost 150 pounds of marijuana.
Krouse was ultimately indicted on five federal weapons and drug charges, including one count of possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At trial, Krouse claimed that the drugs and weapons discovered in his home belonged to two associates known as "Rhythm" and "Poetry." Krouse testified that the pair had commandeered his home office where most of the contraband was discovered. His story proved unconvincing. Krouse was convicted after trial by jury on four of five counts and sentenced to 161 months in prison.2 His appeal was timely.
We are asked to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which criminalizes possession of a firearm "in furtherance of" a drug trafficking or violent crime. Krouse contends that insufficient evidence supports his conviction under this statute. We disagree.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) provides in relevant part:
[A]ny person who ... in furtherance of any ... crime [of violence or drug trafficking offense] possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.
We focus on the narrow question of whether the firearms discovered in Krouse's home "further[ed]" his drug trafficking operation.3
To "further" means "to help forward ... promote [or] advance." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002). As used in § 924(c), the House Judiciary Committee intended that "[t]he government must clearly show that a firearm was possessed to advance or promote the commission of the underlying offense." H.R.Rep. No. 105-344 (1997), 1997 WL 668339, at *12 ("House Report").
Evidence that a defendant merely possessed a firearm at a drug trafficking crime scene, without proof that the weapon furthered an independent drug trafficking offense, is insufficient to support a conviction under § 924(c). See United States v. Lawrence, 308 F.3d 623, 629-31 (6th Cir.2002) ( ); United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C.Cir.2002) (); United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir.2000) (same); House Report at * 12 (). Congress indicated that supplementing evidence of mere possession with expert testimony that drug traffickers often carry firearms in the course of doing business presents a borderline case under § 924(c). See House Report at * 12; see also United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1274 (10th Cir.2001) ().
A conviction for possession of a firearm "in furtherance of" a drug trafficking offense or crime of violence under § 924(c) requires proof that the defendant possessed the weapon to promote or facilitate the underlying crime. See United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir.2002) (); United States v. Mackey, 265 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir.2001) (); House Report at *12 (). In other words, this element of § 924(c) turns on the intent of the defendant. See United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1208 (10th Cir.2001).
When an appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his conviction, "the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In Ceballos-Torres, the Fifth Circuit suggested that consideration of the following factors "might" help answer this question: the type of drug activity involved, the accessibility of the firearm, the type of weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, whether the defendant legally possessed the weapon, whether it is loaded, the proximity of the weapon to the drugs, and the time and circumstances under which the gun is found. 218 F.3d at 415. These factors inevitably evolved into an eight-part "test." See, e.g., United States v. Suarez, 313 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir.2002). Such tests may not aid the analysis in all cases.
Although the Ceballos-Torres factors may help distinguish a lawfully-owned wall-mounted antique from a firearm possessed to further drug trafficking or a crime of violence, see 218 F.3d at 415, the Fifth Circuit's guidance is less helpful in closer, and more common, cases. When a handgun is discovered in the trunk of a drug dealer's car, or under his pillow, or in a gun safe, the Ceballos-Torres factors do not help distinguish possession for the promotion of drug trafficking from possession for other, perhaps legitimate, purposes. Nor do we believe that loaded or unregistered firearms are particularly indicative of drug trafficking or crimes of violence. When deciding whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction under § 924(c), we will not resort to a checklist that has little relation to the crime charged.
We hold that sufficient evidence supports a conviction under § 924(c) when facts in evidence reveal a nexus between the guns discovered and the underlying offense. See United States v. Luciano, 329 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2003) ( ); Mackey, 265 F.3d at 462 (); United States v. Finley, 245 F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir.2001) (); House Report at *12 ().
We affirm Krouse's conviction under § 924(c) here because ample evidence establishes the nexus between the firearms discovered in his home office and the drug trafficking operation discovered in the same room. No less than five high caliber firearms, plus ammunition, were strategically located within easy reach in a room containing a substantial quantity of drugs and drug trafficking paraphernalia.4 See Luciano, 329 F.3d at 6 (...
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