U.S. v. Labat, 950

Decision Date25 May 1990
Docket NumberNo. 950,D,950
Citation905 F.2d 18
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Alfred LABAT, Defendant-Appellant. ocket 89-1368.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

John G. Duncan, Asst. U.S. Atty., Syracuse, N.Y. (Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., U.S. Atty. for the N.D. of N.Y., Syracuse, N.Y., on the brief), for appellee.

Cesar De La Puente, Miami, Fla. (Cesar M. de la Puente, P.A., Miami, Fla., on the brief), for defendant-appellant.

Before OAKES, Chief Judge, KEARSE and WALKER, Circuit Judges.

KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Alfred Labat appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, following a jury trial before Howard G. Munson, Judge, convicting him on one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2 (1988), one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, and one count of use of a communication facility to commit a narcotics felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b) (1988). Labat was sentenced principally to concurrent prison terms of 60 months on the possession count, 51 months on the conspiracy count, and 48 months on the communication facility count; the prison terms were to be followed by four years' supervised release. On appeal, Labat contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of any of these offenses. We agree as to the possession count; in all other respects, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Labat and several others were named in a seven-count indictment charging them with various narcotics offenses. All of the other defendants entered pleas of guilty. Labat, charged in three counts, was tried alone.

The government's case against Labat was presented principally through the testimony of codefendant Ralph Moon, unindicted coconspirator Joseph Ray, who, like Moon, had pleaded guilty to narcotics violations, and Investigator James Mathews, a New York State police officer working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The government also introduced tape recordings of ten telephone conversations between Moon and Labat between December 20, 1987, and January 21, 1988. The trial evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, showed the following.

Labat was a resident of Florida whom Moon had known for some 12 years; prior to 1985, the two had engaged in cocaine trafficking in Florida. In 1985, Moon moved to New York; from 1985 until early 1988, Moon engaged in sales of cocaine and marijuana with Ray in the vicinity of Fulton, New York. As discussed in greater detail in Part II.A. below, in December 1987, Moon, in New York, had several telephone conversations with Labat, in Florida, with respect to Labat's efforts to obtain one-to-two kilograms of cocaine to sell to Moon at $17,000 to $18,000 per kilo.

Beginning in the spring of 1987, Mathews, working in an undercover capacity, had purchased smaller quantities of cocaine and marijuana from Moon on a number of occasions. On January 15, 1988, Mathews told Moon he was interested in purchasing a kilogram of cocaine. Moon suggested that he and Mathews could travel together to Florida and purchase the desired kilogram for $18,000 from Labat. After conferring with Ray, Moon suggested, as an alternative, that Mathews could obtain a kilogram of cocaine from Ray for $30,000. Moon and Mathews parted company, leaving both options open.

On January 18, 1988, Labat telephoned Moon and said he would try to obtain one In the meantime, however, Ray decided to obtain the cocaine for sale to Mathews from another source at a lower price. Thus, on January 22, Ray left New York to drive to Florida, where he purchased one kilo of cocaine for $16,000 from one Randy Dentel. Ray returned to New York on January 26; on January 29, Moon and Ray sold that kilogram of cocaine to Mathews for $30,000. This prosecution soon followed.

                kilogram of cocaine at a price of $22,000 and personally deliver it to Moon in New York.  Over the next two days, Moon informed Mathews that he could obtain one kilo from Labat for $22,000;  Ray renewed his offer to provide a kilo for $30,000.  On Thursday, January 21, Labat called Moon and told him, "there's no problem on the numbers."    He said he had not seen the cocaine in question, which was at a location between Florida and New York, but was working on the details of inspecting it and transporting it to Moon.  Labat promised to have details for Moon the following Monday
                

Labat was charged with one count of conspiring with Moon and others to distribute and to possess cocaine with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841(a)(1) and 846 and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, one count of aiding and abetting the possession of the cocaine sold to Mathews, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, and one count of using a communication facility, i.e., the telephone, to commit, or to cause or facilitate the commission of, a narcotics felony, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 843(b). Testifying at trial, Labat did not deny that he had discussed supplying cocaine to Moon, but he said (a) he did not in fact attempt to find any cocaine to provide to Moon and never intended to do so, and (b) he did not know Ray and the other coconspirators and did not know that Moon ever considered obtaining cocaine from another source. The jury found Labat guilty on all three counts, and he was sentenced as indicated above.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, Labat contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of any of the charged offenses. For the reasons below, we reject his challenge with respect to the conspiracy and telephone counts; but we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction on the possession count.

A. The Conspiracy and Telephone Counts

In challenging his conviction for conspiracy, Labat contends that the evidence showed that he did not know, never heard of, and never talked with Ray or any of Moon's other coconspirators. Though conceding that the evidence showed a conspiracy among Moon, Ray, and others, Labat contends that there was insufficient proof that Labat joined that conspiracy. His arguments lack merit.

In order to prove a conspiracy charge against a given defendant, the government must present " 'some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it.' " United States v. Sanchez Solis, 882 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 183 (2d Cir.1984)). Both the existence of the conspiracy and the defendant's participation in it with the requisite criminal intent may be established through circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1129 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1139, 107 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 762 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084, 105 S.Ct. 1842, 85 L.Ed.2d 142 (1985). The defendant need not know the identities of all of the other conspirators, nor all of the details of the conspiracy. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557, 68 S.Ct. 248, 256, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947). Since the essence of conspiracy is the agreement and not the commission of the substantive offense that is its objective, the offense of conspiracy may be established even if the collaborators do not reach their goal. See United States v. Abel, 258 In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, a defendant bears a heavy burden. United States v. Adegbite, 877 F.2d 174, 179-80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 370, 107 L.Ed.2d 356 (1989); United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 530 (1988). In reviewing such a challenge, we must credit every inference that could have been drawn in the government's favor, United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 840, 104 S.Ct. 134, 78 L.Ed.2d 128 (1983); United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 361 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108, 103 S.Ct. 2456, 77 L.Ed.2d 1335 (1983), and we must affirm the conviction so long as, from the inferences reasonably drawn, the jury might fairly have concluded guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, United States v. Buck, 804 F.2d 239, 242 (2d Cir.1986); United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 244-45 (2d Cir.1972). Labat has not carried his burden with respect to the conspiracy count.

F.2d 485, 489 (2d Cir.1958), aff'd on other grounds, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S.Ct. 683, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960).

Both the furtiveness and the contents of the telephone conversations permitted the jury to find that Labat knew Moon was associated with others in a scheme to possess and distribute at least one-to-two kilograms of cocaine and that Labat in fact agreed to join that conspiracy. Frequently a call to or from Labat's home was made simply to arrange a subsequent conversation in which Labat would use a pay telephone. The ensuing conversations then were carried on in a code that used the word "shoe" to denote a kilogram of cocaine. For example, when Moon told Labat in a December 21, 1987 conversation that he wanted one kilogram of uncut cocaine for $14,000, Labat responded that he could not sell uncut cocaine for that price ("I don't think I can do it unless--unless you want to take something that's less quality"), and that he could not sell a kilogram of that purity for less than $17-18,000 ("I don't think I'd be able to--to sell a shoe for less than 17, 18"; "[t]hose shoes don't go any cheaper"). Moon said he actually had $16,000, needed a whole kilogram, and did not want to settle for lower purity, so h...

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