U.S. v. LaBonte

• Decision Date: 27 May 1997
• Docket Number: 951726
• Citation: 117 S.Ct. 1673,520 U.S. 751,137 L.Ed.2d 1001
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. George LaBONTE, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

520 U.S. 751

117 S.Ct. 1673

137 L.Ed.2d 1001

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v George LaBONTE, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer.

No. 95-1726.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 7, 1997.

Decided May 27, 1997.

Syllabus ^*

Title 28 U.S.C. §994(h) directs the United States Sentencing Commission to "assure'' that its Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of'' adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. The Commission sought to implement this directive in its "Career Offender Guideline,'' Guidelines Manual §4B1.1. That Guideline initially failed to designate which "maximum term'' a sentencing court should use when federal law establishes a basic statutory maximum for persons convicted of a particular offense, but also provides an enhanced penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense. The District Court used such an enhancement in sentencing respondents, each of whom was convicted of federal drug felonies and qualified as a career offender under §4B1.1. After the First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, the Commission adopted Amendment 506, which, inter alia, altered §4B1.1's commentary to preclude consideration of statutory sentence enhancements. One District Court Judge found that Amendment 506 was contrary to §994(h) and refused to reduce the sentences of respondents Dyer and Hunnewell, but another such judge upheld the amendment and reduced respondent LaBonte's prison term. The First Circuit consolidated the ensuing appeals and held that §4B1.1, as construed under Amendment 506, was a reasonable implementation of §994(h)'s directive.

Held: Amendment 506 is inconsistent with §994(h)'s plain and unambiguous language and therefore must give way. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 1915, 123 L.Ed.2d 598. Assuming that Congress said what it meant in drafting §994(h), and giving the words used their "ordinary meaning,'' Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108, 111 S.Ct. 461, 465, 112 L.Ed.2d 449, the phrase "maximum term authorized'' must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements. Respondents' contrary argument that the phrase refers only to the highest penalty authorized by the offense of conviction, excluding any enhancements, has little merit. Their assertion that §994(h) is ambiguous is based, at least in part, on a strained and flawed construction of the phrase "categories of defendants.'' Their claim that Amendment 506 satisfies Congress' mandate to sentence repeat offenders "at or near'' the maximum sentence authorized is also rejected. Although the phrase "at or near'' unquestionably permits a certain degree of flexibility for upward and downward departures and adjustments, it does not license the Commission to select as the relevant "maximum term'' a sentence that is different from the congressionally authorized maximum term. Finally, this Court is unmoved by respondents' heavy reliance on the Commission's inapposite assertions that Amendment 506 avoids unwarranted double counting of prior offenses and eliminates unwarranted disparity associated with variations in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in seeking enhanced penalties. Pp. ____-____.

70 F.3d 1396, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.

Michael Dreeben, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

David N. Yellen, for respondents.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 28 U.S.C. §994(h), Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) to "assure'' that the Sentencing Guidelines specify a prison sentence "at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of'' adult offenders who commit their third felony drug offense or violent crime. We are asked to decide whether, by "maximum term authorized,'' Congress meant (1) the maximum term available for the offense of conviction including any applicable statutory sentencing enhancements, as the United States argues, or (2) the maximum term available without such enhancements, as the Commission has determined. We conclude that the Commission's interpretation is inconsistent with §994(h)'s plain language, and therefore hold that "maximum term authorized'' must be read to include all applicable statutory sentencing enhancements.

I

A

In 1984, Congress created the Sentencing Commission and charged it with "establish[ing] sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system.'' 28 U.S.C. §991; see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-370, 109 S.Ct. 647, 652-654, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). The Commission, however, was not granted unbounded discretion. Instead, Congress articulated general goals for federal sentencing and imposed upon the Commission a variety of specific requirements. See §994(b)-(n). Among those requirements, Congress directed that the Commission:

"shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defendants in which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and-

" (1) has been convicted of a felony that is-

" (A) a crime of violence; or

" (B) an offense described in section 401 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841) . . . ; and

" (2) has previously been convicted of two or more prior [such] felonies . . . . '' 28 U.S.C. §994(h).

The Commission sought to implement this directive by promulgating the "Career Offender Guideline,'' which created a table of enhanced total offense levels to be used in calculating sentences for "career offenders.'' United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §4B1.1 (Nov.1987) (USSG). Pursuant to that Guideline, each defendant who qualifies for career offender status is automatically placed in criminal history "Category VI,'' the highest available under the Guidelines. The table then assigns the appropriate offense level based on the so-called "offense statutory maximum.''

When the Commission coined the phrase "offense statutory maximum,'' it defined it, unhelpfully, as "the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction.'' USSG App. C, amend. 267 (Nov.1989) (adding §4B1.1, comment., n. 2). Neither the Career Offender Guideline itself, however, nor the accompanying commentary, designated which "maximum term'' was to be used when federal law established a basic statutory maximum for persons convicted of a particular offense, but also provided an enhanced maximum penalty for career offenders convicted of that same offense. ¹ The Courts of Appeals, required to choose between sentencing "at or near the maximum'' of the base sentence, or of the base sentence plus the relevant statutory enhancements, uniformly concluded that the "offense statutory maximum'' for a defendant with prior convictions was the enhanced maximum term. ²

The Commission subsequently amended the Career Offender Guideline's commentary to preclude consideration of statutory enhancements in calculating the "offense statutory maximum.'' Rejecting the approach prevailing in the Courts of Appeals, the Commission defined the phrase "offense statutory maximum'' as:

"the maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction that is a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, not including any increase in that maximum term under a sentencing enhancement provision that applies because of the defendant's prior criminal record . . . . '' USSG App. C, amend. 506 (Nov.1994) (amending USSG §4B1.1, comment., n. 2).

Pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. §994(u), the Commission opted to give Amendment 506 retroactive effect, providing sentencing courts with discretion to reduce sentences imposed before the amendment's November 1, 1994, effective date. See USSG §1B1.10(c) (Nov. 1996).

B

Prior to the adoption of Amendment 506, respondents George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell, and Stephen Dyer were convicted of various federal controlled substance offenses in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. Each respondent qualified as a career offender under USSG §4B1.1 (Nov.1987), had received the required notice that an enhanced penalty would be sought, and was sentenced under the Career Offender Guideline using the enhancement. The First Circuit affirmed each respondent's conviction and sentence. Following the adoption of Amendment 506, however, each respondent sought a reduction in his sentence. In the cases of respondents Dyer and Hunnewell, the District Court found that the amendment was contrary to 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. §994(h), and refused to reduce the sentences. In respondent LaBonte's case, however, a different judge of the same District Court upheld the amendment and reduced LaBonte's sentence. The First Circuit consolidated the ensuing appeals and a divided panel, applying the approach set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), upheld Amendment 506 as an appropriate exercise of the Commission's discretion. U.S. v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1403-1409 (1st Cir.1995). The First Circuit looked to the statutory language and "f[ou]nd no clear congressional directive regarding the meaning of the term "maximum' as that term is used in section 994(h).'' Id., at 1406. In the court's view, the meaning of the word "maximum'' was influenced by its presence in the phrase "maximum term authorized for [certain] categories of defendants.'' Id., at 1404 (bracketed term in original). While acknowledging that the phrase could apply exclusively to that category of repeat offenders for whom the government filed a notice to seek sentence enhancement, the court also observed that the word "categories'...