U.S. v. Lacy
| Decision Date | 19 May 2000 |
| Docket Number | Crim. No. 98-10185-NG. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, v. Tyrone LACY, et. al. Defendants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Lois M. Lewis, Law Office of Lois M. Lewis, West Newton, MA, Roger A. Cox, Ashland MA, for Tyrone Lacy.
John Salsberg, Salsberg & Schneider, Boston, MA, for Thomas Hargrove.
Matthew H. Feinberg, Segal & Feinberg, Boston, MA, for Shawn Mells.
John C. LaChance, Framingham, MA, for Calvin Dedrick, Jr.
Earl Howard, Law Office of Earl Howard, PC, Cambridge, Peter Parker, Peter Parker, Boston, MA, David A. Ruhnke, Ruhnke & Barrett, Montclair, NJ, for Art Lee Taylor.
Harold H. Hakala, Boston, MA, for Anthony Gary Cooper.
Stephen Hrones, Hrones & Garrity, Boston, MA, for Michael Curry.
Michael C. Bourbeau, Boston, Ma, for Theron Davis.
Albert F. Cullen, Jr., Law Offices of Albert F. Cullen Jr., Boston, MA, for Charles Evans.
Joan C. Stanley, Boston, MA, for James Gunn.
James P. Duggan, Boston, MA, for Damien Lighten.
George F. Gormley, Gormley & Colucci, P.C., Boston, MA, for Patrick McGowan.
James J. Cipoletta, Cipoletta & Ogus, Revere, MA, for Christopher Merritt.
Thomas J. Ford, Boston, MA, for Darrell Merritt.
Paul J. Haley, Law Office of Paul J. Haley, Hillsborough, NH, for Raul Montilla.
Tracy A. Miner, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., Boston, MA, for Howard Damien Oliver.
Geraldine Hines, Burnham, Hines & Dilday, John H. Cunha, Jr., Cunha & Holcomb, PC, Boston, MA, for Calvin Parker.
Melvin Norris, Newton, MA, for Kamal Parker.
Michael C. Andrews, Boston, MA, for Angelo Perkins.
Benjamin D. Entine, Boston, MA, for Marvin Perkins.
Walter B. Prince, Boston, MA, for Damien Perry.
Roger Witkin, Boston, MA, for Shon Perry.
Peter B. Krupp, Lurie & Krupp, LLP, Boston, MA, for Derrick Rogers.
William H. Keefe, Jamaica Plain, MA, for Douglas Rodriguez.
Dennis J. Kelly, Burns & Levinson, Boston, Ma, for Dwayne Turnbow.
Charles P. McGinty, Federal Defender Office, Boston, MA, for Alexis Valdez.
Henry F. Owens, III, Lane, Altman & Owens, Boston, MA, for Michael Veney.
James S. Dilday, Grayer, Brown & Dilday, Pamela E. Berman, Choate, Hall & Stewart, Christopher M. Waterman, Choate, Hall & Stewart, Boston, MA, for Tyre Veney.
John F. Palmer, Law Office of John F. Palmer, P.C., Boston, MA, for Charles Wilkerson.
Joseph S. Oteri, Oteri, Weinberg & Lawson, Kevin S. Nixon, Boston, MA, for Michael Wilkerson.
Philip A. Tracy, Jr., Boston, MA, Thomas J. Saunders, Baltimore, MD, for Reginald D. Neal.
Roger Witkin, Boston, William C. Brennan, Jr., Upper Marlboro, MD, for Basil Williams.
Michael J. Liston, Carr & Liston, Boston, MA, for Alphonzo Fowlkes.
John W. Laymon, Kaplan, Laymon & Gunning, Robert L. Sheketoff, Sheketoff & Homan, Robert L. Sheketoff, Sheketoff & Homan, Boston, MA, for Charles Miles.
Charles W. Rankin, Rankin & Sultan, Boston, MA, for Criminal Justice Act.
Patrick Hamilton, Office of the United States Attorneys, Theodore B. Heinrich, U.S. Attorney's, Boston, MA. for U.S. Attorneys.
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM RE: MALCOLM DEDRICK, MICHAEL CURRY, AND DAMIEN PERRY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. BACKGROUND.........................................................113
II. DAMIEN PERRY: IS A BULLET LODGED IN THE DEFENDANT'S
HEAD AN EXTRAORDINARY PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTIC WARRANTING
A DEPARTURE? — AND OTHER ISSUES ..................................114
A. Background ......................................................114
B. The Guideline Calculations ......................................115
C. Quantity of Drugs ...............................................116
D. Bullet in His Brain .............................................117
III. MALCOLM DEDRICK—DEPARTURE FROM CAREER OFFENDER
GUIDELINES ......................................................119
A. Background ......................................................119
B. The Guidelines Calculation ......................................120
C. Adequacy of Criminal History Category ...........................121
D. Credit for Discharged Term of Imprisonment ......................123
IV. MICHAEL CURRY .....................................................124
A. Background ......................................................124
B. Guideline Calculation ...........................................124
This case involves over thirty defendants, most of whom are alleged to be members of the Castlegate "gang."1 They are charged with drug distribution (crack cocaine) and, in the case of some, acts of violence. Sentencing has posed a considerable challenge, namely, how to enforce the dual concerns of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, to eliminate unwarranted disparity among those convicted of the same crime, and at the same time, effect individualized justice.2
The prosecution resulted from the cooperation of a number of federal and state agencies including the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), the Boston Police Department ("BPD"), and the Boston Housing Police. Press reports have uniformly touted these efforts, and credited them with a dramatic reduction in youth violence in the area.
But however significant the overall prosecution effort has been, and however valuable, I have a unique obligation. I am obliged to sentence individuals, not groups. Not all of the indicted individuals stand in the same position with respect to the gang's activities.
The individuals who have pled guilty thus far are those who were charged with the sale of crack cocaine (cocaine base).3 With few exceptions the charges did not involve violence. Nor did most defendants have significant records of violence. But even though they may be similarly situated, they have faced a wide range of lengthy sentences, a range that in my judgment did not reflect differences in their culpability.4 Individuals who were identified as suppliers to several of the defendants faced lower sentences than individuals who were "only" street dealers. Some street dealers faced higher sentences than their perhaps more culpable peers if their criminal records triggered "career offender" status.5 (Compare below, the sentence for Malcolm Dedrick, who was a "career offender" and Michael Curry, who was not.)
It did not take much to qualify for such status. In some cases, the difference between a roughly five year and a roughly ten year sentence was determined by a single prior conviction for drugs. In other cases it was the quantity of drugs with which the individual was associated. Since every gram of crack cocaine yields large differences in the Base Offense Level, fact-finding differences create major disparities even as to individuals at the same level, i.e. street dealers.6
And while the Guidelines' emphasis on quantity and criminal history drives these high sentences, sadly, other factors, which I believe bear directly on culpability, hardly count at all: Profound drug addiction, sometimes dating from extremely young ages,7 the fact that the offender was subject to serious child abuse, or abandoned by one parent or the other, little or no education.8 Nor may I consider the fact that the disarray so clear in the lives of many of these defendants appears to be repeating itself in the next generation: Many have had children at a young age, and repeat the volatile relationships with their girlfriends that their parents may have had. And I surely cannot evaluate the extent to which lengthy incarceration will exacerbate the problem, separating the defendant from whatever family relationships he may have, or the impact on communities when these young men return.9
Finally, I may not compare these sentences to those meted out to individuals convicted of what would appear to be far more serious offenses. If I had credited the government's account that over fifty grams of cocaine base had been distributed in most of these cases, then I would have been obliged to assign an offense level of 32. This level yields a higher sentence for these defendants than it yields for those accused of, for example, transmitting top secret National Defense Information, level 29 (U.S.S.G. § 2M3.3); solicitation to commit murder, level 28 (U.S.S.G. § 2A1.5); assault with intent to commit murder, level 28 (U.S.S.G. § 2A2.1); criminal sexual abuse, level 27 (U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1); kidnapping, abduction and unlawful restraint, level 24 (U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1).
This memorandum specifically concerns three defendants, Damien Perry, Malcolm Dedrick, and Michael Curry, out of the ten10 I have already sentenced. I write for the following reasons: To the extent that these cases reflect legal and factual issues which I have resolved in earlier cases and which, in my judgment, after seeing a number of defendants, are likely to recur, the better practice is to prepare a written opinion. To the extent that these cases present unique, and particularly complex issues, which are not likely to recur, a written opinion provides a better vehicle for articulating my reasons. In answer to the question, "What role should individual sentencing judges play in the guideline development process?" Ronald Welch, Minority Counsel, Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, Former Special Counsel, U.S. Sentencing Commission, wrote: "Sentencing judges must play a central role in the guideline development process and their mechanism for doing so is the issuance of sentencing opinions." 1 Fed.Sent.R. 372 (February/March 1989).
A word on procedure: The judgments have not issued in the case of defendants Dedrick, Curry and Perry. Accordingly, the appeal period has not begun to run. See e.g. United States v. Derman, 211 F.3d 175, 182 (1st Cir.2000) (). I typically coordinate the release of my decisions to coincide with the issuance of the judgment, so that the parties are not prejudiced insofar as their...
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