U.S. v. Leight

Decision Date09 July 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-1274,86-1274
Citation818 F.2d 1297
Parties23 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 555 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Karen Irene Shores LEIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Rex L. Reu, Thomson, Weintraub & Thompson, Bloomington, Ill., for defendant-appellant.

Paul L. Kanter, Asst. U.S. Atty., Frances Hulin, U.S. Atty., U.S. Attorney's Office, Danville, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before CUDAHY and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge. *

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted defendant-appellant Karen Leight of murder in the second degree for causing the death of her infant son Daniel on a military reservation. Karen appeals the conviction on grounds that the district court improperly admitted "similar act" evidence, that the government destroyed significant evidence and that federal jurisdiction was not adequately proven. We affirm.

The jury in this case had to decide whether an infant, Daniel Leight, died as a result of abuse or of accidental causes. The medical evidence introduced at trial was complex and voluminous; some fifteen physicians testified. The government argued that Karen physically abused Daniel so severely as to cause his death. Karen argued that Daniel's injuries and death derived from trauma caused by a difficult birth. The jury concluded that, beyond a reasonable doubt, Karen murdered Daniel. On appeal, Karen urges three grounds on which the verdict should be overturned.

First, Karen suggests that the verdict is a result of improper and prejudicial "similar act" evidence. As frequently occurs in child abuse cases, where there is no direct evidence of the cause of injury or death, the government presented extensive evidence suggesting that Daniel's injuries were not accidental. This included evidence of injuries suffered by Karen's two other children, Kevin and Christopher. Karen contends that this evidence improperly turned the trial into an attack on her character and resulted in a guilty verdict based on a showing of propensity. The government argues that the evidence concerning Kevin and Christopher was relevant and was essential in showing the absence of an accidental cause for Daniel's death.

Second, Karen contends that the prosecutor destroyed a critical piece of evidence--the original negative of an x-ray taken of Daniel's skull on January 14, 1983. Although there is nothing to suggest that the destruction of the original occurred in bad faith, Karen urges that this x-ray was critical to determining whether Daniel suffered two separate skull fractures or one branching fracture. Hence, the destruction of the original mandated a mistrial. The government responds that diagnostic-quality copies existed, and that nothing suggested that the copies were inaccurate.

Third, Karen argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that any murder took place on federal property. Unless the evidence could permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Daniel was killed on federal land, an element of the crime is unproven and a guilty verdict cannot stand. Because no witnesses testified of their own knowledge when or where Daniel's injuries occurred, it was only speculation, according to Karen, that the injuries occurred on federal land. The government argues that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Karen abused Daniel at their home on Chanute Air Force Base.

None of these contentions warrants a reversal. We agree that an unusual amount of similar act evidence was introduced at trial. Recognizing, however, that the district court employed the proper legal standard and that child abuse cases pose unique problems of proof, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting this evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 1 We also regret that in a difficult case like this the prosecutor, whether carelessly or ignorantly, destroyed an original x-ray. But again we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding diagnostic-quality copies admissible. And finally, we agree that sufficient evidence supports the jury's implicit finding that the murder took place on federal property.

I.

Gary and Karen Leight's third child, Daniel Leight, was born on December 14, 1982, at Chanute Air Force Base Hospital near Rantoul, Illinois. After three days in the hospital Daniel and Karen were released and went home. Two-and-a-half weeks later, on January 3, 1983, Daniel was readmitted to the hospital with a skull fracture. The examining physician considered the fracture to be consistent with birth trauma rather than child abuse. Over the next three weeks Daniel suffered some swelling of his head, but the treating physician felt Daniel was progressing satisfactorily. On February 1, however, Daniel was taken to the base hospital suffering from a seizure. Daniel spent most of the next four weeks in three hospitals undergoing tests and treatment. He suffered repeated seizures, and a new fracture of the skull was identified. Doctors disagreed on whether the newly discovered fracture was a pre-existing tributary fracture or a separate and distinct injury.

Between February 25 and March 22 Daniel remained on anti-convulsant medication and saw his doctor twice a week. Seizures reportedly continued but the treating physicians felt Daniel was making progress. On March 22, however, Daniel suffered a full cardio-respiratory arrest. He was revived at the Chanute emergency room but died on March 25, 1983, at the Carle Clinic in Urbana, Illinois.

Kevin Leight, Karen and Gary's second child, was born before Daniel on November 9, 1980, also at the Chanute Air Force Base. On December 15, 1980 Kevin was hospitalized for possible seizures; a CAT scan revealed bleeding within Kevin's brain. Karen reported that a few days earlier Kevin must have struck his head on a tile floor after a family pet knocked over his bassinet. Kevin was released from the hospital on December 26. By January 10, 1981, however, Kevin was readmitted to the hospital because of seizures. Surgery was performed to drain excess fluid from Kevin's brain, and x-rays and CAT scans revealed a skull fracture and new areas of bleeding within the brain. After four weeks of hospitalization Kevin was stabilized and then discharged on February 8.

On February 18, Kevin received emergency treatment for vomiting but was not admitted to the hospital. Late that evening, while Karen was sitting up with Kevin, he suffered a full cardiac arrest. Kevin was pronounced dead on February 19, 1981.

Christopher Leight, Gary and Karen's first child, was born on June 28, 1979, in Washington, D.C. Christopher was hospitalized between November 18 and December 23, 1979, suffering from redness and blisters on his face together with some bruises on his body. Karen reported that Christopher developed the redness and blisters shortly after she fed him some barley cereal and wiped his face clean with a washrag. A treating physician, however, diagnosed Christopher as suffering from a thermal burn, not any allergic reaction. Apparently no follow-up tests were done to confirm the cause of Christopher's injuries.

On July 10, 1985, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Karen Leight with two counts of first degree murder for killing her children Kevin and Daniel on federal lands. 2 Pursuant to Karen's pre-trial motion, the district court severed the two counts because of the inherent prejudice that would result from trying the counts together. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. The government chose to proceed on the count charging that Karen murdered Daniel. On December 1, 1985, a jury was selected, and testimony began on December 3.

During the trial the district court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104, to determine whether evidence of Karen's alleged abuse of her other children, Kevin and Christopher, was admissible in the government's case-in-chief. The court ruled that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b).

The government introduced evidence from three expert witnesses that Daniel suffered physical abuse that caused his death. In addition, other doctors testified that Daniel suffered at least two separate traumatic injuries to his head after he was born. The government introduced evidence from two experts who testified that Kevin died as a result of repeated child abuse. The government also introduced expert testimony that Christopher suffered child abuse. Finally, testimony from some neighbors and acquaintances of Karen suggested that Karen's infant children displayed bruises and scratches and that Karen handled them roughly at times.

On December 17, 1985, the jury returned a verdict finding Karen guilty of murder in the second degree, and on February 14, 1986, Karen was sentenced to life imprisonment.

II.
A. Rule 404(b) Challenges

If evidentiary rules were ranked in accordance with the controversy they engender, Rule 404(b) would stand near the top. Courts and litigants struggle continually to set boundaries for the Rule which give scope for its legitimate purposes while avoiding irrelevant disclosures of defendants' closet skeletons and past pecadillos.

Undoubtedly, Rule 404(b) plays a crucial role in determining when and what "similar act" evidence is admissible for limited purposes, but courts must guard against overinclusive interpretations, see, e.g., United States v. Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 813 (7th Cir.1985) (Cudahy, J., concurring) (court must ensure that similar act evidence introduced to show "intent" is in fact introduced for that purpose, not to flood courtroom with other-crimes evidence); United States v. Draiman, 784 F.2d 248, 254 (7th Cir.1986). In this difficult case it is particularly important to guard against...

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