U.S. v. Leiskunas
Decision Date | 06 September 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 10–2160.,10–2160. |
Citation | 656 F.3d 732 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Tomas LEISKUNAS, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David E. Bindi (argued), Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.Carol A. Brook, Helen Kim Skinner (argued), Attorneys, Office of the Federal Defender Program, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellant.Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and MANION and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
Tomas Leiskunas, a participant in a major mortgage fraud scheme, was charged with committing wire fraud as part of that scam. His role was to act as a “straw”, or fake, buyer of seven properties, and to cause $4,473,161.55 to be transferred from unwitting mortgage companies to their banking partners. Ultimately, as part of the scheme, he received $90,000 from his co-schemers. He pled guilty, and was sentenced to 37 months' imprisonment, which was the lowest end of the guideline range. He was also sentenced to two years of supervised release, and ordered to pay $1,792,000 in restitution.
Leiskunas appeals, arguing that his sentence should have been lowered because of his substantial assistance to the government, but we reject this argument because the district court acted within its discretion in considering, and rejecting, Leiskunas's assertion of substantial assistance. Leiskunas also argues that the court erred when it applied a loss amount of $1,792,000 to him without explanation. We agree that the court should have explained its rationale in attributing a loss amount to Leiskunas. Finally, Leiskunas argues that his sentence should have been modified to reflect the guidelines' minor role adjustment. We conclude that the court erred in interpreting the minor role adjustment guideline when it stated that an act otherwise deemed minor could, if repeated, necessarily preclude the adjustment, and that a person playing a necessary role cannot play a minor role. We remand to give the court an opportunity to explain the reasonably foreseeable financial loss amount that should be attributed to Leiskunas as a result of his crime, and to consider Leiskunas's minor role argument as discussed in this opinion.
In 2006, at 26 years old, Tomas Leiskunas had a minor criminal history and at least two aliases. He was charged in a one-count indictment with being a willing participant in a mortgage fraud scheme. The indictment alleged that beginning no later than September 2006 and continuing until approximately November 2006, Leiskunas and others knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud and to obtain money and property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, and material omissions. The indictment also charged that on or around November 2, 2006, for the purpose of executing the scheme, Leiskunas knowingly caused to be transmitted by means of wire communication in interstate commerce a funds transfer in the amount of $468,971.86 from Wachovia Bank in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to First American Trust Company in Santa Ana, California, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
Leiskunas pled not guilty to the charge in the indictment. Later, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. Rather than enter into a plea agreement with the government, Leiskunas filed a written plea declaration in which he admitted that he agreed to act as a straw buyer of seven properties. He also stated that another individual in the scheme told him that he would receive some form of payment for his willingness to be a straw buyer when the properties were eventually resold. He admitted that he was present at mortgage transaction closings in his role as the straw buyer, and that he “understood that he did not have to live in any of the properties for which he was signing mortgage applications.” During these closings, Leiskunas provided his identification, reviewed the final loan paperwork, and approved documents that contained false financial and employment information. He also acted as though he was a legitimate buyer, when he knew he was not. Leiskunas never intended to assume any mortgage liability for the properties, even though the properties were being purchased based on mortgages acquired in his name.
A Pre–Sentence Report (PSR) was prepared in advance of Leiskunas's sentencing hearing. The PSR noted that a total of $4,473,161.55 was transferred from the mortgage loan companies to the banks due to Leiskunas's fraudulent purchase of seven properties. The PSR also explained that as a result of Leiskunas's participation in the scheme, a co-schemer deposited $90,000 into Leiskunas's bank account, $30,000 of which Leiskunas transferred to two other accounts. The PSR also concluded that his base offense level was seven, and contained a recommendation that he receive a 16–point enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I), for causing a loss greater than $1,000,000 but less than $2,500,000, because of a reasonably foreseeable loss of at least $1,792,000. The loss amount was calculated by the probation officer based on the government's estimate of loss and the probation officer's interview of the case agent. The $1,792,000 figure was determined by calculating the difference between the $4,473,161.55 loan amount and the amount recouped when each property was eventually resold, after Leiskunas defaulted on the loans.1 Leiskunas was credited with a three-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of responsibility. With a Category II criminal history, and a total offense level of 20, Leiskunas's advisory guidelines range was 37–46 months' imprisonment.
During Leiskunas's sentencing hearing, the government's proposed loss calculation method mirrored that of the PSR. The government argued that the applicable loss amount for Leiskunas's crime
Also, the government stated that a sentence adjustment for acceptance of responsibility was appropriate because However, the government did not make a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, which allows the court to depart from the guidelines based on the government's representation that the defendant gave substantial assistance to governmental authorities.
Regarding Leiskunas's role in the scheme, the government argued that a minor role adjustment was not appropriate in Leiskunas's case because he In response, Leiskunas argued that he deserved a minor role adjustment as well as a further reduced sentence due to his substantial assistance to the government. As to the minor role adjustment, Leiskunas's attorney argued that he acted only at the direction of others, had no idea how large the scheme was or the number or identities of the co-schemers, exercised no power over the scheme, and that he was a replaceable cog within the scheme. With respect to the substantial assistance adjustment, his attorney noted that Leiskunas also contended that the loss amount attributed to him by the government was wrong. His attorney argued that Leiskunas believed that the houses that he fraudulently purchased would be resold at a profit, and that “he had no reasonable foreseeability when it came to knowing that [foreclosure] was going to happen to the banks.”
But the court declined to apply the minor role enhancement in sentencing Leiskunas and stated:
I can't say that you had a minor role here, because you were in a sense necessary for this to happen. You need the straw buyer or [the scheme] isn't going to happen at all. If this were just one transaction or maybe two, I could say it's a much closer case. Seven, I can't say it's a closer case.... You were an integral part of this. What makes you a minor participant is if you just had a transitory brush with the activity, or it was an opportunistic moment that somebody took advantage of in just making one or two bad decisions.... I just cannot conclude in good faith that you are a minor participant.
The court also declined to apply the substantial assistance adjustment, stating:
In a way, I can't get involved in [the cooperation issue], because my experience with the government is that if they had a ... reason to ask for a departure, they would do that.... I'm not going to insinuate myself ... into that.... I understand that that's a 3553 factor, I'm just not in a position to quantify that at this point from what I've heard.... I think the sentence is reasonable.... [Those are] prosecutorial decision[s] that I'm not going to make for them.
But the judge also acknowledged that he had the discretion to consider Leiskunas's cooperation in determining his sentence, and that, if he so chose, ...
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