U.S. v. Lester

Decision Date14 May 1981
Docket NumberNo. 80-2129,80-2129
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Gerald LESTER, a/k/a Jerry Stretches, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Ralph A. Vinje, Bismarck, N. D., for appellant.

James R. Britton, U. S. Atty., James S. Hill, Asst. U. S. Atty., Bismarck, N. D., for appellee.

Before LAY, Chief Judge, ROSS, Circuit Judge, and ROBINSON, District Judge. *

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

Gerald Lester was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the beating death of Owen Wise Spirit. 1 On appeal he claims that the district court 2 erred in denying his motion to suppress certain articles of clothing allegedly seized by a tribal jail officer in violation of his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We affirm.

On July 6, 1980, officers of the Bureau of Indian Affairs at Fort Yates, North Dakota were informed of the possible beating death of Owen Wise Spirit. Wise Spirit was an American Indian residing in Cannonball, North Dakota, which is located within the boundaries of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation.

Two individuals, Samuel Lester and Alvin Spotted Elk, were initially named as suspects. Samuel Lester was arrested by tribal officers on an outstanding disturbing the peace warrant. He then accompanied the tribal officers as they investigated the beating incident.

The officers discovered Wise Spirit's body in a ditch, bleeding and unconscious from the beating, but alive. 3 His blood covered the surrounding ground and an adjacent parked car.

Helene Joshua and Bella Feather informed the officers that a large group, including Gerald and Samuel Lester, Jerry Joshua, Owen Wise Spirit, Alvin Spotted Elk and Gary Little Bird had been drinking together the previous evening. The tribal officers relayed this message to Fort Yates and were advised to bring in all suspects for questioning. Both Feather and Joshua claimed to have observed blood on the pants and boots of Gerald Lester earlier that morning. They indicated their belief that Gerald Lester and Jerry Joshua were still drinking at the home of Matilda Two Bears. The officers proceeded to the Matilda Two Bears home and there placed Jerry Joshua and Gerald Lester under custody. The arresting officers observed blood on Gerald Lester's pants. The officers believed, however, that Gerald Lester appeared intoxicated. He was therefore placed in custody for detoxification. 4

At the Fort Yates jail, Gerald Lester was processed, searched, and placed in a cell. Approximately one-half to three-quarters of an hour after being placed in his cell, Gerald Lester's clothing was taken, and he was issued coveralls. Officer William Haliburton, the mailer-dispatcher of the Fort Yates Bureau of Indian Affairs, testified that this was the routine procedure when a prisoner was expected to be retained in jail for more than eight hours. Gerald Lester testified that he had been jailed four or five times for detoxification, but did not recall having his clothes taken from him previously.

Officer Haliburton, at the time of the seizure, observed blood on Gerald Lester's clothing and boots. Additionally, Haliburton noticed hair on Lester's boots. He marked and stored Lester's clothes, later transferring them to the FBI for its investigation of the murder.

Gerald Lester moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the allegedly illegal search and seizure of his clothing. Following the hearing, the trial court denied Lester's motion for the suppression of the clothing and boots taken from him July 6, 1980. The trial court ruled that Lester would have been held as a suspect in the beating of Owen Wise Spirit irrespective of tribal charges, so that the taking of the clothing was proper. Gerald Lester appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress these articles of clothing.

This case does not technically arise under the fourth amendment, as the Bill of Rights is not applicable to Indians on Indian land. Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 681 (10th Cir. 1971). Since the jailer who seized the clothing was a tribal officer, the seizure falls under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2).

The language of the Indian Civil Rights Act parallels the fourth amendment guarantee to "the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S.Const. Amend. IV. It provides in relevant part that "(n)o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall * * * violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizures." 25 U.S.C. § 1302(2). The Act purports to give "Indians constitutional rights which other Americans enjoy." White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1973), quoting 114 Cong.Rec. 5836 (1968). In light of the legislative history of the Indian Civil Rights Act and its striking similarity to the language of the Constitution, see Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F.Supp. 370, 374 (D.N.M.1971), we consider the problem before us under fourth amendment standards.

All searches without a valid warrant are unreasonable under the fourth amendment unless shown to be within one of the established exceptions. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Appellant contends that the search and seizure of his clothing preceded his arrest for the murder with which he was charged and thus was not incident to the actual arrest. 5

The record establishes that, at the time of appellant's arrest, 6 the arresting officers possessed sufficient information to make an arrest for assault but stated the ground for the arrest as detoxification. The validity of the subsequent search in this case, however, does not turn upon the suitability of the stated grounds for the arrest. Rather, it turns on whether the officers had probable cause to believe that Lester's clothing contained evidence of the murder. Ricehill v. Brewer, 459 F.2d 537, 538-39 (8th Cir. 1972); Thunder Horse v. State, 456 F.2d 1262, 1263 (8th Cir. 1972). (In both of these cases the defendant had initially been arrested for vagrancy.) In other words, the validity of the arrest should be judged by whether the arresting officers actually had probable cause for the arrest, rather than by whether the officers gave the arrested person the right reason for the arrest. 7

Probable cause to arrest appellant arose when the officers observed the blood and hair on Lester's pants and boots, having recently been informed of his possible participation in the assault upon Owen Wise Spirit. In essence, appellant's bloodstained clothing was within the plain view of the arresting officers.

It is well established that evidence falling within the plain view of an officer properly in a position to perceive the view is subject to seizure and admissible as evidence. United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir. 1976). Evidence is within the plain view rule where the initial intrusion resulting in the "plain view" is lawful, discovery of the evidence is "inadvertent," and the incriminating nature of the evidence is "immediately apparent." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at 2038.

These requirements were clearly satisfied in the present case. The initial entry preceding the arrest falls within the consent exception to the search warrant requirement. 8 Discovery of the blood on appellant's clothing, which was obvious and open, was inadvertent. And the incriminating nature of the bloodstains on the clothing of one suspected of committing an assault was obvious.

These circumstances do not give rise to the inference that the arrest was effected for the purpose of creating an excuse to search. Nor can it be inferred that the officers used the detoxification charge as a pretext to further their quest for evidence relating to the murder. Klingler v. United States, 409 F.2d 299, 304-05 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 859, 90 S.Ct. 127, 24 L.Ed.2d 110 (1969) (vagrancy arrest). Rather, it appears that the seizure of the evidence in this case, already in plain view of the arresting and custodial officers, was merely a normal incident to a custodial arrest.

"(I)n the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is * * * an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment," and "a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment." United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 476, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973). In Robinson the court held admissible heroin concealed inside a cigarette package found in defendant's pocket, even though the package had been opened and examined without a warrant. The Court noted:

A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search.

Id.

Moreover, a search of arrestee's person incident to a lawful arrest does not violate the fourth amendment even if a substantial period of time has elapsed between the arrest and subsequent taking of property. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 1239, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). In Edwards the Supreme Court approved a stationhouse evidentiary search and seizure of articles of clothing worn by the defendant at the time of his arrest. The Court held that for a reasonable time (over ten hours in Edwards) and to a reasonable extent the effects in the possession of an accused at the time of arrest which were then subject to search and seizure could lawfully be searched and seized without a warrant at the stationhouse. In so holding, the Court noted:

(O)nce the accused is lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at...

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