U.S.A. v. Li

• Decision Date: 07 December 2000
• Docket Number: 98-1303,97-2413,Nos. 97-2034,98-1448,98-1230,98-1447,98-1229,s. 97-2034
• Citation: U.S.A. v. Li, 206 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000)
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2000) UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. NAI FOOK LI, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. YIU MING KWAN, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. JU LIN, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. BEN LIN, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. HUI LIN, Defendant, Appellant UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. MAO BING MU, Defendant, Appellant. UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. SANG LI, Defendant, Appellant. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 78

206 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2000)

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v.NAI FOOK LI, Defendant, Appellant.

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v.YIU MING KWAN, Defendant, Appellant.

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v.JU LIN, Defendant, Appellant.

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v.BEN LIN, Defendant, Appellant.

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v.HUI LIN, Defendant, AppellantUNITED STATES, Appellee, v.MAO BING MU, Defendant, Appellant.

UNITED STATES, Appellee, v.SANG LI, Defendant, Appellant.

Nos. 97-2034, 97-2413, 98-1229, 98-1230, 98-1303, 98-1447, 98-1448

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

Heard December 7, 2000

Decided February 29, 2000

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Charles W. Rankin, with whom Catherine J. Hinton, Rankin & Sultan, Sara A. Rapport and Perkins, Smith & Cohen were on brief, for appellantsNai Fook Li and Yiu Ming Kwan.

Chris H. Mangos, by appointment of the Court, for appellantJu Lin.

Paul J. Garrity, George F. Gormley and Edward P. Ryan, Jr., by appointment of the Court, were on joint brief, for appellantsBen Lin, Mao Bing Mu and Sang Li.

Heidi B. Shore, by appointment of the Court, for appellantHui Lin.

Deborah Watson, Attorney, Department of Justice, with whom Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, Alex Whiting, Assistant United States Attorney and Susan Hanson-Philbrick, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.

Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

STAHL, Circuit Judge.

Before the Court are appeals following the conviction and sentencing of defendants-appellantsHui Lin, Nai Fook Li, Yiu Ming Kwan, Ju Lin, Mao Bing Mu, Sang Li, and Ben Lin(the "appellants").In an en banc opinion issued today, we rejected several arguments three of the appellants raised concerning their purported rights under two international treaties.In this panel opinion, we address the balance of all of the appellants' claims.We reject their challenges, and affirm the convictions and sentences.

We adopt in full, and reference herein, the facts and procedural history as recited in the companion en banc opinion mentioned above.Put very briefly, the appellants engaged in a conspiracy to smuggle nationals of the People's Republic of China ("China") into the United States on a ship called the XING DA.Hui Lin, Yiu Ming Kwan, and Nai Fook Li(the "land-based defendants") operating out of the United States, met with various law enforcement personnel, including Immigration and Naturalization Service Special Agent Michael Rendon and Coast Guard Agent Rick Cox.Rendon, Cox, and their associates posed as fishermen who owned a boat on which they were willing to transport the aliens during the final leg of their journey from China.The land-based defendants negotiated with the agents and acted as liaisons between the agents and the remaining appellants.Meanwhile, Mao Bing Mu, Sang Li, Ju Lin, and Ben Lin(the "shipboard defendants") organized the XING DA's trip from China and traveled aboard the vessel as it progressed toward the rendezvous with the agents' boat.It appears that Ju Lin was, in the words of the XING DA passengers, "the boss," that Ben Lin piloted the ship, and that Mao Bing Mu and Sang Li, among others, acted as "enforcers" to keep the aliens under control during the long trip.Before its rendezvous with the agents' boat, the XING DA was intercepted and boarded by officers of the United States Coast Guard.

Discussion

In this opinion, we address various evidentiary and sentencing issues raised by the appellants.We reject each challenge.

1.Denial of AppellantBen Lin's Motion to Suppress Evidence of His Conduct Tending to Demonstrate That He Was the Captain of the Ship

Ben Lin argues that the district court erred in refusing to suppress evidence that he went to the bridge of the ship and reduced the speed of the XING DA in response to a request by the Coast Guard boarding team.He claims that this action constituted a non-Mirandized communicative act in response to custodial interrogation and therefore should have been suppressed under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436(1966).

It is well established that Miranda warnings must be communicated to a suspect before he is subjected to "custodial interrogation."SeeUnited States v. Ventura, 85 F.3d 708, 710(1st Cir.1996).A "custodial situation necessitating Miranda warnings arises . . . where 'there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'"United States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 809(1st Cir.1987)(quotingCalifornia v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125(1983)).The term "interrogation" encompasses not only express questioning but also "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301(1980)(internal footnotes omitted).

We do not agree that the Coast Guard's request that the XING DA's crew slow the ship for further boarding can be construed as a custodial interrogation under Miranda.First, notwithstanding any suspicion that the XING DA was smuggling aliens into the United States, the Coast Guard's routine stop, boarding, and inspection of a vessel on the high seas is not considered "custodial."SeeUnited States v. Magdaniel-Mora, 746 F.2d 715, 723(11th Cir.1984);United States v. Gray, 659 F.2d 1296, 1301(5th Cir.1981).The "custody" determination employs an objective test; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation.SeeVentura, 85 F.3d at 711.By all accounts, the XING DA crew consented to the Coast Guard's boarding.The request that the crew slow the ship -- to which Ben Lin responded -- was made during the opening moments of this boarding.No arrests had been made at that point, and no accusations of smuggling had been leveled.The officers had merely commenced a routine safety inspection and obtained a copy of the ship's registration papers.Moreover, although the crew members were gathered in one section of the ship during the inspection, it appears that the Coast Guard had neither applied nor threatened any force.Thus, at the time Ben Lin engaged in the putatively communicative behavior at issue, the boarding and inspection had not yet risen to the level of a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest."Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322(1994);see alsoUnited States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 303(11th Cir.1988)(holding that the appellant was not in "custody" during an initial boarding, despite the existence of probable cause to arrest, because the appellant was not told he was under arrest and because the Coast Guard merely engaged in a routine boarding and inspection procedure in gathering the crew to one area of the ship).

Further, even if appellant had been in "custody" for Miranda purposes, we cannot describe Officer Hilbert's request to slow the ship as "interrogation."The simple request to slow the ship was not a remark that Officer Hilbert should have known was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.Rather, the request appears to be of the type that would normally attend a nautical arrest.Communications that are "normally attendant to arrest and custody" are not "interrogation" as the word is understood by Miranda.Innis, 446 U.S. at 301.

For all of these reasons, we reject Ben Lin's challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to suppress.

II.Admission of Evidence of the Conditions On Board the Ship and the Treatment of the Passengers on the Vessel

AppellantsMao Bing Mu, Sang Li, and Ben Lin next argue that the district court erred in allowing the government to present evidence concerning the conditions aboard the XING DA, the deprivations suffered by the alien passengers, and the harsh treatment of those passengers.They contend that this evidence should have been excluded under Fed. R. Evid. Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.The district court found that the testimony's probative value exceeded any prejudicial impact.Admissibility determinations under Rule 403 are committed to the trial court's sound discretion, seeUnited States v. Rodrguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153, 155(1st Cir.1989), and we review only for an abuse of that discretion, seeUnited States v. Aguilar-Aranceta, 58 F.3d 796, 801(1st Cir.1995).We find no such abuse here.

Appellants refer to the graphic testimony of the filthy conditions prevailing in the hold of the ship, the lack of adequate safety devices on board, and the beatings suffered by the passengers, arguing that this evidence was not relevant to any issues to be determined by the jury and that, even if relevant, it was so unfairly prejudicial that it should have been excluded.We agree with appellants that this evidence was prejudicial in that it had the potential to inflame the jury against those who created and controlled this inhumane environment.

The government responds first that in order to present proof that the criminal enterprise was conducted "for profit," it needed to establish not only the price paid by the aliens for the 54-day voyage, but also the trip's minimal costs to the coconspirators.Those costs, the government argues, were best evidenced by the XING DA's shoddy conditions, meager provisions, and inadequate safety measures.Second, the government argues that Mao Bing Mu and Sang Li served as "enforcers" over the aliens and that, without evidence of the beatings, the government would not have been able to prove their participation in the conspiracy.

We agree that this evidence was probative to material issues to be determined by the jury, notwithstanding its prejudicial nature.In their brief, appellants admit that...